WARFIGHTING SKILLS PROGRAM

MARINE CORPS LEADERSHIP

MARINE BARRACKS
WASHINGTON, D.C.

MCI 7404

MARINE CORPS LEADERSHIP
7404

Marine Corps Institute, Washington, D.C.

1990

Warfighting Skills Program

STUDENT INFORMATION

This information is provided to assist you in completing your course/program of study. For additional information, refer to the MCI Procedures Manual.

1. **Course Procedure:**

a. **Read the course requirement on pages 129-133 of the text first.** Tentatively choose a writing requirement and use it as a reference as you read through the text.

b. Read the text. Take notes as you go to help you keep track of ideas and outline your essay.

c. When you finish the text, complete the course requirement and submit it to your testing officer. He will grade it and notify you of your score. If you receive a passing grade, your testing officer will submit both your essay and score to MCI.

d. If your essay fails to achieve a passing score, your testing officer will return it and allow you to either revise it or submit a new one. If your second submission fails, you testing officer will notify both you and MCI of your score. To pass the course, you must score at least 75% on either of your two submissions.

e. Keep a copy of your essay. MCI will not return any essays.

2. **Receipt of Essay at MCI.** If you pass the course, MCI enters the completion in the Marine Corps Manpower Management System (MMS). If you fail, an administration notice card (MCI-R6) is forwarded to your unit. The training officer makes an entry on the MCI-R5 card and has the SRB clerk note your Service Record Book/Officer Qualification Record (SRB/OQR). You are then administratively deleted from the remaining courses of the program. If you still desire to complete the program, you must enroll as a new student and submit copies of course completion certificates to receive prior credit.

3. **Disenrollment.** Disenrollment occurs upon reaching the Course Completion Deadline (CCD) date or the Adjusted Course Completion Deadline (ACCD) date (6-month extension) for the program. Reenrollment will be granted upon request within 3 months after disenrollment if a reenrollment was not previously granted for the program.

a. You will be disenrolled if you do not complete your course by the course completion deadline (CCD). To avoid this, ask your training officer/NCO to request a six month extension allowing you more time to complete your course/program.

b. If you already have a six month extension and still do not complete all courses by your adjusted course completion deadline, you will automatically be disenrolled from the program. If you wish to continue the program, ask your training officer/NCO to reenroll you. **You are allowed only one extension and one reenrollment!**

4. **Program Completion.** A certificate of completion and a letter of transmittal with the course grade are forwarded to the commanding officer of each Marine who successfully completes a WAFSKIP course. The commanding officer has the completion recorded in the student's SRB or OQR and presents the certificate to the student. Upon successful completion of **all courses**, a program diploma is forwarded to your commanding officer who presents it to you at an appropriate ceremony.

5. **Reserve Retirement Credits.** Reserve retirement credits are awarded **only** to inactive duty personnel upon successful completion of each course. Reserve retirement credits are earned at the rate of one credit for every 3 hours of estimated student effort. The total number of reserve retirement credits is indicated on the course title page and is awarded upon the successful completion of the course. Credits are not awarded for MCI study performed during drill periods if they are also awarded for drill attendance.

6. **Mail-Time Delay.** If you do not receive a requested service within 30 days, call or write to MCI.

7. **Information/assistance From MCI.** Further information is found in the current MCI Procedures Manual. If you have a question about the **content** of a course/program, call commercial (202) 433-4109/4110 or autovon 288-4109/4110. For **administrative assistance**, use the enclosed MCI-R11/14 or the Unit Activity Report (UAR) or call commercial (202) 433-2299 or autovon 288-4175.

8. **Student Data.** If you need to request a change to your student data in the MCI database, e.g., rank, change of address, use the MCI-R11k (Old MCI-R14 Student Request/Inquiry) located at the end of each text.

9. **Course Evaluation Questionnaire.** Please take a few minutes to complete and return the course questionnaire located at the end of this course.

PROGRAM:	WARFIGHTING SKILLS PROGRAM
COURSE:	*Marine Corps Leadership* MCI-7404 (1990)
ESTIMATED STUDENT EFFORT:	18 hours
RESERVE RETIREMENT CREDITS:	6
PURPOSE:	To learn the fundamental challenges, qualities, goals, and techniques of Marine Corps leadership.
SCOPE:	This course presents the challenges to leadership in both peace and war, the qualities needed for successful leadership, and techniques that the leader can use.

WARFIGHTING SKILLS PROGRAM (WAFSKIP)

PROGRAM OUTLINE

COURSE NUMBER	COURSE	ESTIMATED HOURS	RESERVE RETIREMENT CREDITS
7401	Tactical Fundamentals	12	4
7402	Small Unit Tactical Problems Problems	9	3
7403	Combat Techniques	9	3
7404	**MARINE CORPS LEADERSHIP**	**18**	**6**
7405	Fire Support/Combined Arms	12	4

Note: These are the courses currently (as of 1 April 1990) in the Warfighting Skills Program. Disregard program outlines in any course texts you may have received previously. Some of the courses listed above may be out of stock or still under development; they will be automatically mailed to you once they are completed and in stock. New courses will be added to the program as they are developed. However, you are responsible to complete **only** those courses listed above and any others that are open on the date you enroll in the program in order to get a WAFSKIP diploma. If you have completed the program and wish to take courses that were added to the program after your enrollment date, you must enroll in the new courses **individually**. If you are unsure about which courses you must complete to receive a program diploma, check with your training NCO.

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INTRODUCTION

Leadership in war is an art, a free, creative activity based on a foundation of knowledge. The greatest demands are made on the personality.

German Field Service Regulations of 1933

Leadership is the art of getting things done through people.

General A.M. Gray
29th Commandant of the Marine Corps

Leadership is the defining quality of a Marine NCO or officer. It is the ability to inspire and motivate a group of Marines to accomplish a mission. By its nature, leadership is defined by the following characteristics:

1. **Emphasis on the will.** Leaders **inspire** men to do things. This means leaders must understand and positively affect the factors that determine a man's will to fight, factors such as fear, courage, stress, and a shared sense of mission. These qualities are intangible, but often determine the outcome of combat.

2. **Motivating Marines to do things they wouldn't ordinarily do.** Anyone can be put in charge of a group of Marines and **lead** them to an ice cream parlor. This task is simple because Marines go to ice cream parlors willingly. But to motivate a Marine unit to fight on in difficult circumstances against a determined enemy requires **leadership.**

3. **Leadership as an art.** Like tactical decision-making, leadership is an **art** based on character and competence. In fact, leadership requires the ability to make sound tactical decisions; the two cannot be separated. When faced with a tactical situation, the leader does not consult a textbook to find out what to do. Instead, he meets his challenge by developing unique solutions based on sound reasoning and good judgment, solutions appropriate to the situation. Similarly, he must lead a group of unique individuals to get the job done. Since both tactical and leadership challenges are unique, the leader must appreciate each situation individually.

This course will educate you in leadership by looking at it from three perspectives. First, you will learn the challenges you face as a leader in both war and peace. Second, you will learn the qualities that you as a leader must have to succeed. Finally, you will learn some useful leadership techniques that you can apply when you take charge of a group of Marines.

Chapter One

THE CHALLENGE OF LEADERSHIP IN COMBAT

. . . In that moment, so close to death, I was seized by a rush of terror so powerful that I felt my mind was cracking. Trapped by the weight of earth, I began to howl like a madman. The memory of that moment terrifies me still. The sense that one has been buried alive is horrible beyond the powers of ordinary language. Dirt had run down my neck and into my mouth and eyes, and my whole body was gripped by a heavy and astonishingly inert substance which only held me more tightly the harder I struggled. Under my thigh I felt a leg kicking with the desperation of a horse between the shafts of a heavy cart. Something else was rubbing against my shoulder. With a sudden jerk, I pulled my head free of the dirt and of my helmet, whose strap was cutting into my windpipe, nearly strangling me. Some two feet from my face a horrible mask pouring blood was howling like a demon. My body was still entirely trapped. I knew I was either going to die or lose my reason.

Guy Sajer
The Forgotten Soldier

For us, combat was a series of changing events characterized by confusion, awesome violence, gripping fear, physical stress and fatigue, fierce hatred of the enemy, and overwhelming grief over the loss of friends. We endured vile personal filth in a repulsive environment, saturated with the stench of death and decay . . .

. . . In combat I saw little, knew little, and understood still less about anything that occurred outside K 3/5. We had our hands full fighting and trying to survive moment to moment.

E. B. Sledge
With the Old Breed

As the nation's expeditionary force in readiness, the Marine Corps stands ready to carry out a variety of missions. Deployed around the world, Fleet Marine Force (FMF) units must be ready on a moment's notice to meet any threat to national security. Marines may be called on to protect American lives, support friendly governments, retaliate against enemies, or undertake other special operations. As the nation's premier amphibious force, FMF units also stand ready to conduct amphibious operations in support of land or naval campaigns.

To the small unit leader, these missions usually translate into winning in battle. The Marine Corps has a long legacy of success in battle. Since the birth of this nation, Marines have fought successfully around the globe in every major conflict in which the United States has participated. Today's Marines are rightfully proud of the accomplishments of those who wore the eagle, globe, and anchor before them.

The cornerstone of this success has been leadership--leadership by Marines who, in combat, refused to bend to the will of the enemy. This legacy of leadership, of *getting things done through people*, is now **your** mission.

As a combat leader, you will face tremendous challenges. Some of your Marines will freeze, cower, or panic under fire. They will be stunned by the horrible deaths or wounds of their friends, their fellow Marines. They--and you--may suffer unimaginable hardships from heat or cold, thirst or hunger, and fatigue. All the props of civilized life may be stripped away, reducing you and your Marines to little more than animals fiercely bent on surviving. In the face of all this, you must think rationally, make decisions, inspire your men to renewed efforts, and keep your vision and that of those you lead focused on your mission. And you must do this in the face of a clever, thinking, active enemy who is trying ceaselessly to kill you and those you lead.

Succeeding in the face of these obstacles begins with studying and understanding them. Let's study two challenges--the will to fight and the friction of war--and see what problems they may cause the leader.

THE WILL TO FIGHT

> *Prior to the (First) World War, all armies fought in comparatively close order. The psychological reaction of the individual soldier was not so decisive since the fighting was done, not by the individual, but by the mass, and the mass was held together by drill and discipline. Moreover, the psychological impressions of battle were simpler. . . . In modern war, the impressions are much more powerful. Usually we fight against an enemy we cannot see. . . . We no longer fight in great masses, but in small groups, often as individuals. Therefore, the psychological reaction of the individual has become increasingly important. As commanders we must know the probable reaction of the individual and the means by which we can influence this reaction.*
>
> Capt Adolf von Schell
> *Battle Leadership*

> *Because war is a clash between opposing human wills, the human dimension is central in war. It is the human dimension which infuses war with its intangible moral factors. War is shaped by human nature and is subject to the complexities, inconsistencies, and peculiarities which characterize human behavior. Since war is an act of violence based on irreconcilable disagreement, it will invariably inflame and be shaped by human emotions.*
>
> *Warfighting,* FMFM 1

From MCI-7401, *Tactical Fundamentals*, you know that the moral quality, the human will to fight, is a decisive element in battle. Combat is the supreme test of wills: the clash with an enemy who is determined to kill you. The enemy's will is what keeps him fighting; defeat it, and you bend him to your will. In combat, this becomes your central aim.

Overcoming the enemy's will implies that you must inspire and maintain the will to fight in your own troops. Combat causes a great variety of human responses, ranging from freezing under fire to extraordinary valor and courage. How will your Marines react to enemy contact? You can never be certain, because many factors that affect the human will--fear, anguish, esprit, and unit cohesion--are intangible. In addition, men will react differently to enemy contact. Some men will fight bravely in one engagement but less so in the next. But this is certain: **You**, the leader, have a tremendous influence on the fighting spirit of your Marines.

In combat, the things that can inhibit your Marines' fighting spirit--danger, fear, shock, and anguish, among others--may all be categorized as **combat stress**. By definition, stress affects performance. Those things that cause an **immediate** loss of performance, like the fear you experience when you suddenly come face to face with an enemy tank at close range, are called **acute stress reactions**. Conversely, factors that build stress over time, like fatigue, anguish, and repeated exposure to danger, cause long-term reactions called **cumulative stress**. How much combat stress affects your unit greatly depends on how well you understand it, prepare for it, and handle it. Let's study each form of stress and how it affects the combat performance of your Marines.

Saipan, 1944

Acute Stress

Acute stress is sudden, unexpected, and of relatively short duration, but also very intense. You experience acute stress when you narrowly avoid an automobile accident, argue violently with someone, or compete athletically.

In combat, **fear** is the most common source of acute stress. Fear is man's reaction to danger. Since combat is inherently dangerous, fear is universal among men in battle. This fear is not a sign of cowardice. It is part of human nature. Men instinctively want to survive, and combat threatens them with death. Fear of injury, of the pain it brings and the possibility of being permanently disabled, is also inborn. Fear is intense in combat, because men see other men being killed and injured. They know the same can happen to them at any moment.

Many things cause fear. **The unknown** is a great source of fear in combat. Think about your own experience with the unknown, for example, on a training exercise in a nighttime defensive position. At night, you become particularly sensitive to sounds. Your mind creates images and you "see" things that aren't really there. In combat, such experiences may cause great anxiety and fear, particularly if you know or suspect that the enemy is probing your unit's positions.

Obviously, certain **weapons** cause a lot of fear. The amount of fear usually depends on what the Marine perceives he can do about it. For example, being mortared or bombed may raise great fear in an infantryman because he usually cannot respond directly to the source of the fire. Mines and booby traps have the same effect. On the other hand, the infantryman may deal better with fear caused by receiving enemy small arms fire because he can usually fire back.

Fear is sometimes irrational. Some weapons may cause great fear despite being less dangerous than others. For example, in World War II, the German Stuka dive bomber occasionally instigated panic in ground troops, not because it was particularly dangerous, but because it was fitted with a siren that made it especially unnerving.

Fear causes both physiological and emotional reactions. Physiological reactions may include trembling hands, nausea, perspiration, and increased breathing and heart rate. These reactions are not necessarily bad. If effectively controlled, they help the body prepare to meet danger. **Controlled fear** increases your ability to react to physical threats and survive.

Peleliu, 1944.

However, **uncontrolled fear** is dangerous. It usually causes one of two reactions: panic or shock. Panic is a sudden burst of emotion that results in flight. It is particularly dangerous to a unit because it spreads rapidly. In studying incidents of panic during World War II, S.L.A. Marshall noted that there were two distinct steps in a unit panicking. First, some friendly action, like the unexpected withdrawal of an adjacent unit, was misunderstood. Soldiers watching the adjacent unit withdraw panicked because they feared they would be isolated and surrounded. Then, panic spread quickly and the entire unit fled in herd-like fashion.

Panic may also result if your weapons prove ineffective against the enemy. For example, elements of the first U.S. unit to fight in Korea in 1950, Task Force Smith, panicked in their first battle when their World War II Bazookas failed to stop North Korean T-34 tanks. History suggests it is virtually certain some of our current weapons will also prove ineffective against some enemies.

Panic usually begins in the rear and moves forward. That is why maneuver warfare tactics stress getting into the enemy's rear. But remember: a capable enemy will be trying to do the same to you, and sometimes he will succeed. Your Marines may tend to panic when they feel cut off, isolated, or encircled.

Shock, or freezing under fire, is the more common reaction to uncontrolled fear. You may observe Marines who completely lose the ability to act when they suddenly find themselves in danger and are overcome by fear. Some will cower in their fighting holes or sleeping bags, unable to fight no matter what the circumstances. Others will have the will to fight but find themselves physically exhausted and unable to move or fire a weapon. As one soldier observed on Omaha Beach, June 6th, 1944:

> *They sat there dumbly in the line of fire, their minds blanked out, their fingers too nervous to hold a weapon.*
>
> S. L. A. Marshall
> *Men Against Fire*

Any of these reactions may be temporary, lasting only as long as the danger is present, or they may incapacitate a man indefinitely.

However, fear can also be a source of courage. The fear of **letting his comrades down** is common in men who are about to enter battle for the first time, particularly in cohesive, tightly-knit units. As Marshall noted in *Men Against Fire*:

> *When fire sweeps the field, nothing keeps a man from running except a sense of honor, the bound obligation to the people right around him, of fear of failure in their sight, which might eternally disgrace him.*

Fear is a powerful force in battle. It is common to all men, but rarely discussed and understood. You will feel it yourself. Instead of denying fear, you need to think about, plan for it, and learn how to lead yourself and your Marines to act in spite of it.

Cumulative Stress

Marines are well acquainted with cumulative stress. Work deadlines, frequent inspections, tough, physically demanding training, and long working hours are inherent in the day-to-day life of most Marines. Frequent deployments and the unpredictability of real world contingencies produce stress on Marine families.

But the cumulative effects of combat stress are even greater. In World War II, nearly 25% of all casualties were stress related. In some units, stress casualties were equal to or greater than those from death and injury. With the lethality of modern weapons and the complex, high technology warfare of the future, some predict that psychological casualties will be even greater.

Guadalcanal, 1942

Early combat experience usually builds confidence and "steels" a man for future combat. However, this is true only up to a point. At some point, stress begins to mount with each new enemy contact, and performance suffers. Then you begin to see one or more adverse reactions. Some men may develop fatalistic attitudes, joking about death and believing it's only a matter of time before their number comes up. They may throw caution to the wind and behave irrationally in the face of fire. Others will experience tremendous internal conflict as stress builds and they try to overcome their loss of courage. Such men may seek death deliberately as the only honorable escape from their predicament. Others may take their own life. In the aerial attack preceding Operation Goodwood, an attempted Allied breakout from the Normandy beachhead in 1944, the six-hour bombardment caused at least 25 German soldiers to commit suicide.

It is generally accepted today that all men have a breaking point. As Major General T. S. Hart noted in *Determination in Battle*:

> *There is no doubt that troops, however well-led, can only take the stress of battle for so long--then they break. Any commander, at any level, who tries to overdraw the account is courting disaster. . . . the mental and the physical constantly interact. Therefore, physical fatigue, hunger, disease, thirst, and above all, the stress of adverse climatic conditions, can reduce the physical state of the soldier to such an extent that his will to fight is broken.*

Identifying each man's breaking point is difficult, if not impossible. Some men will draw from a deep well of courage, while others will break early from the anxiety of entering combat for the first time. Rest and encouragement can replenish the will, but only so much.

While most of your Marines will never reach their breaking point, some will. Depending on how severe the illness is, the breakdown may be short or long term. Many psychiatric casualties are reversible if they receive prompt treatment as close to the front as practical. But some will be so severe that they require long term treatment (months) in rear area medical facilities. A few may never recover.

Over time, the cumulative effect from anxiety, anger, anguish, fatigue, boredom, and repeated exposure to danger reduces combat effectiveness in almost all men. Leading Marines in prolonged combat, you must watch carefully for signs of stress-related breakdown and act quickly to combat them. Stress casualties can be just as debilitating as those caused by death or physical injury.

Summary

Many factors determine a man's will to fight. In combat, factors such as fear, stress, and fatigue affect all Marines differently. Since these things are intangible, you can't measure them. Instead, you must study and learn human behavior in combat and positively affect your Marines' will to fight through your own action and example. **You** are the most important factor in keeping your Marines fighting. As Captain Adolf von Schell concluded in *Battle Leadership*:

. . . It is my belief that no one can give a prescription for a correct application of the principle of psychology in war. The only thing of which we are certain is this: the psychology of the soldier is always important. No commander lacking in this inner knowledge of his men can accomplish great things.

FRICTION

Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war.

Friction is the only concept . . . that distinguish(es) real war from war on paper.

Carl von Clausewitz
On War

In MCI-7401, *Tactical Fundamentals*, you learned that friction is *the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult.* Friction inhibits combat performance. When a plan fails because the trucks fail to show or the linkup unit gets lost, that is friction. Friction is not a difficult concept to understand because you see it daily in peace or war. For example, consider how friction applies to football. From an offensive team's perspective, every play should score a touchdown. Obviously, that doesn't happen. Why not? Linemen miss blocks, receivers drop passes, and the defense blitzes when and where you least expect it. Without friction, football would be a dull game.

But you cannot fully appreciate friction in combat until you have experienced it. The uniquely dangerous nature of combat--the fact that someone is trying to kill you--generates enormous friction. Friction may be external, imposed by enemy action, the terrain, weather, or mere chance. Or friction may be self-induced, caused by such factors as lack of a clearly defined goal, lack of coordination, or unclear or complicated plans. Countless minor incidents--the kind you can never really foresee--combine to create friction so that you always fall short of your goal.

The very essence of war as a clash between opposed wills creates friction. It is critical to keep in mind that the enemy is not an inanimate object but an independent and active force. The enemy seeks to resist your will and impose his own will on you. It is the dynamic interplay between his will and yours that makes war difficult and complex. In this environment, friction abounds.

To the combat leader, friction has two important implications. First, the Marine Corps' warfighting doctrine teaches that while you should attempt to minimize self-induced friction, the greater requirement is *to fight effectively within the medium of friction.* The means to overcome friction is the will: you prevail through persistent strength of mind and spirit. Friction affects both you and your enemy. While striving to overcome the effects of friction yourself, you must attempt at the same time to raise your enemy's friction to a level that destroys his ability to fight. If you can operate despite friction at a higher tempo than the enemy, you will win. To generate high tempo within friction, you must control subordinates **implicitly** by using mission orders. Sometimes, you will see leaders who strive to **eliminate friction** (focus inward) through detailed orders that closely control subordinates. Historically, that has seldom worked.

Second, in the face of friction, your most important challenge is to maintain your focus on your mission. Friction generates constant and urgent pressure to lay your mission aside. Casualties demand your immediate attention; communications break down; the neighboring unit you were told would attack has not done so; your key subordinate leader has just been killed--all these distractions and more will press upon you, seemingly forcing you to lay the mission aside. This challenges your strength of will. You must be strong enough to keep focused on the mission and keep your unit focused on it, despite pressure to do otherwise. Accepting the fact that friction creates great difficulties, you must think and work your way around them, always following the star that is your mission and leading your Marines to do the same. To Marines, failure is not an option; *the leader makes it happen.*

Grenada, 1983.

Consider how this relates to the first challenge discussed in this chapter, the will to fight. In the effort to keep your unit fighting and focused on its mission, your own will, the will of the leader, is the single most important factor. Being a leader requires great strength

of will on your part. Your Marines can sense your strength of will. If it is weak, they will yield easily to their fears and to stress. If it is strong, it will instill and strengthen their own courage and determination.

A powerful picture of strength of will in combat is given by Captain Robert H. Barrow, commanding officer, Company A, 1st Marines. In *Battle at Best*, S. L. A. Marshall describes Barrow's exceptional leadership during the 1st Marine Division's legendary march to the sea from the Chosin Reservoir in December, 1950:

At dark on 8 December, the snowfall ceased and the cold intensified. Down along the canyon road near the water gate, a brisk wind was piling the drifts as high as a man's head.

At the Battalion CP, which was partly sheltered by the canyon wall, the thermometer read thirty degrees below zero. Up on the windswept crags where Able Company was clearing Chinese dead from the bunkers to make room for its own ranks, and at the same time preparing to evacuate its own casualties down the iced slopes of the mountain, it must have been a touch colder than that, though there was no reading of the temperature.

All batteries had frozen. Weapons were stiffening. The camp long since had run out of water because of the freezing of canteens. To ease their thirst, the men ate snow and seemed to thrive on it.

But of the many problems raised by the weather, the most severe one was getting an average good man to observe what the field manuals so easily describe as a "common sense precaution."

For example, prior to marching from Chinhung-ni, Captain Barrow of Able had made certain that each of his men carried two spare pairs of socks. But that safeguard did not of itself insure his force, though the men, with feet sweated from the rigors of the day, were all at the point of becoming frostbite casualties by the hour of bivouac.

The Chosin Reservoir, 1950

Let Barrow tell it. "I learned that night that only leadership will save men under winter conditions. It's easy to say that men should change socks; getting it done is another matter. Boot laces become iced over during prolonged engagements in snowdrifts. It's a fight to get a boot off the foot. When a man removes his gloves to struggle with the laces, it seems to him that his hands are freezing. His impulse is all against it. So I found it necessary to do this by order, staying with the individuals until they had changed, then making them get up and move about to restore the circulation."

That process, simple in the telling, consumed hours. By the time Barrow was satisfied that his command was relatively snug, it was wearing on toward midnight. Right then, his perimeter was hit by a counterattack, an enemy force in platoon-strength-plus striking along the ridgeline from (Hill) 1081 in approximately the same formation which Barrow had used during the afternoon.

All that needs be told about this small action is summed up in Barrow's brief radio report to (Lieutenant Colonel) Schmuck. "They hit us. We killed them all--all that we could see. We have counted eighteen fresh bodies just outside our lines."

Captain Barrow later became our 27th Commandant. Remember: *The leader makes it happen.*

ANNEX A

Selected Articles

All articles reproduced courtesy of *Marine Corps Gazette*.

Understanding Fear

by Col Robert J. Mastrion

Discussion of fear is conspicuous by its absence from our formal schools. It is rarely heard in professional conversations in which combat veterans pass on their experiences to young Marines. This is not a conscious omission but one based on a lack of understanding of the subject. Perhaps we are in a "Catch 22" situation where we do not discuss the subject because we do not understand it; yet we will never understand it unless it is discussed. The following observations on combat fear are from one who has observed war through the eyes of an infantryman; thus they are most pertinent to infantrymen and those engineers, communicators, artillery forward observers, forward air controllers, naval gunfire spotters, and U.S. Navy corpsmen who normally accompany the infantryman in combat.

What precisely is fear? It is easy to confuse anxiety and fear. Anxiety is a nervousness or feeling of apprehension brought on by doubt concerning the nature of the situation you are facing. Essentially, we feel anxiety when we face the unknown. Facing the unknown causes doubt about our ability to cope with the impending situation. Anxiety is something we face daily. When we are young, life is filled with anxiety since each day we face new experiences. How will I do in tomorrow's examination or athletic competition? What career shall I pursue? How should I act when I face my platoon for the first time? As we get older and gain more experience, the situations we face each day become a repeat of situations we have faced before, and anxiety diminishes. However, we are never quite free of anxiety no matter how experienced we become. Don't we all feel anxious when confronted with a new job? No matter how many months of combat you have survived, when the shooting starts again, don't you feel a bit anxious? When we experience anxiety we become nervous, but we can still function. As the situation develops we become familiar with its characteristics and even recognize patterns we have experienced before. Our anxiety soon decreases.

True fear, unlike anxiety, is an emotion that we do not experience daily. Yet each individual has probably experienced true fear at least once. Remember that close scrape with serious injury or death you had? You stepped into the street and a speeding car just missed you, or you lost control of a car and just missed that oncoming cement truck. After the near miss took place and you realized what almost happened to you, do you recall that gut wrenching, muscle paralyzing, mind twisting, strength draining emotion you experienced? That, my friends, was fear.

In combat, there are three types of fear we will face:

► The first type of fear is one brought on by a feeling of being helpless. This type of fear comes in two forms. A feeling of helplessness will overtake men when they are convinced they cannot handle the situation. We have witnessed this phenomenon many times in sports. Two teams are evenly matched yet one team played very poorly because the other team had "psyched" them out. The team that was psyched out convinced themselves that the situation was hopeless, and it was beaten before the contest began. As a general rule Marine Corps combat units do not fall prey to this form of fear. The entry level training given our enlisted Marines and officers instills in them a sense of superiority and self-confidence that insulates them from this type of fear. If anyone questions why Marine Corps recruit training is structured the way it is or why we spend so much time and effort in training our young officers, the answer is simple: we are building a self-confidence that makes a fighting man less susceptible to fear. Although, as a general rule, Marine units are not susceptible to this type of fear, there have been exceptions, units no better or worse than the next that always seemed to get mauled. These units possessed an attitude that invited the enemy to get the better of them. Once this attitude infects a unit it is very difficult to overcome. Thus, it is critical that the self-confidence our young Marines have when they initially join the unit be reinforced, not eroded. It is important that Marines trust and respect their leaders; however, there is a difference between a leader establishing credibility and a leader establishing dominance. The former is never

achieved at the expense of the Marine's self-confidence; the latter always is. Unit effectiveness is never a one man show.

A feeling of helplessness will also overtake men when they realize that they have been put in an untenable position. When the situation is so bad that the men cannot fight back, they are susceptible to fear. The situation can be critical, but as long as they can fight back, fear normally will not overtake them. The solution to this problem is don't put your men in untenable positions. Granted, in every battle some men in a unit will find themselves in a situation where they can't fight back. This is inevitable especially in an attack. Proper use of fire team, squad, platoon, and company formations, as well as intelligent use of terrain minimizes the danger of a large portion of the unit being pinned down to the extent where the men cannot return fire. If you are tactically and technically proficient, use common sense, apply the principles of war, and employ the firepower available to your unit, untenable situations can be avoided. Simply stated, KNOW YOUR JOB.

► The second type of fear encountered is fear brought on by fatigue. S.L.A. Marshall in his book *The Soldier's Load and the Mobility of a Nation* made the observation that "fear and fatigue produce an immediate effect which appears to be identical; a feeling of physical weakness." This observation, in addition to describing the effects of fear and fatigue, gives us a hint to a further relationship between these elements. Men who are tired are more susceptible to fear than men who are rested. If contact with the enemy is made while a man is at the point of exhaustion, the chances are very good that fear will render him ineffective. This is a critical issue because infantrymen, day to day, are at best one or two steps away from complete mental and physical exhaustion. This is obvious to anyone who has observed an infantry company on the move in combat. The men may appear alert yet the minute the company stops, even for a short time, most of the infantrymen fall asleep. When exhausted they are not only more susceptible to fear, but they become careless. Leaders must ensure that their men get rest—whatever is possible; periodic 10- or 15-minute catnaps coupled with 2 or 3 hours of uninterrupted sleep a day. Similarly, men must not be pushed so hard physically that they reach a stage of physical exhaustion. Overenthusiasm on the leader's part or the part of higher headquarters must be avoided. Men in combat normally operate on the margin of exhaustion. This must be kept in mind as well as the need to retain a reserve of strength to cope with the unexpected. Men who are burned out do not cope with the unexpected very well. The leader must know his men, know their limits, and be prudent. A lapse of judgment is usually fatal.

► The final type of fear is one brought on by the realization that you are going to die. Notice that the words used were not "may die" or "can die." These thoughts cause anxiety; the idea that you are going to die causes fear. This realization hits you when you do not see any options, any escape, or any alternative. All you can visualize is an inevitable event over which you have no control. You feel powerless to prevent what is to occur. We again see a linkage between a feeling of helplessness and fear. Surprisingly, this realization can come at any time. It is an image that appears without warning. It can overcome a veteran as well as the rookie. Unlike the two previous types of fear, there is nothing that a leader can do about this type. You can't see it coming, thus you can't take action to prevent it. Fortunately once this type of fear is experienced, men learn to control it, and it rarely happens to the same man more than once in a combat tour.

Of the three types of fear discussed, it is the third type that most Marines think about when fear is mentioned. Since nothing can be done about it in any event, perhaps we have discovered the reason why fear is rarely discussed. Thus, the two types of fear that we can control and that are the most dangerous are being ignored. When one member of a unit feels helpless because he cannot handle a situation, when he has been put in an untenable situation, or when he reaches a point of exhaustion, it is likely that the events that put him in that state have had a similar effect on others. These two types of fear are the ones most likely to affect the whole unit and make it susceptible to a massive failure of resolve.

What should be done when men succumb to fear brought on by the realization that they are going to die? Before discussing this, first let us look at the men themselves. There are very few men who can be classified as cowards. Most men have too much self-respect to let their buddies down. It is the rare man indeed who will willingly violate the trust of his peers. The vast majority of men will give their lives rather than violate this trust. Proper training of combat troops, prudent leaders who are technically and tactically sound, and the reluctance of men to violate the trust of their peers are the foundation of a solid combat unit. In this environment, courage and sacrifice are the rule, not the exception. At any given moment, anyone can be rendered ineffective by fear if one realizes that he is going to die. When this happens to a man, do not overreact. He knows he has let his buddies down, and he knows that his buddies and leaders know he has let them down. This is a very uncomfortable feeling for a combat Marine. The men around him will not make a big deal about his actions because they understand the situation. To make an issue of this situation will destroy the man and usually alienate the rest of your men. The man will most likely bounce back to his normal performance. The leader must keep in mind that today's coward is tomorrow's hero. If a man does not bounce back and continues to succumb to this type of fear, the Marines in his fire team will let you know when they have given up on him and no longer consider him trustworthy. Situations such as this are rare, so there is no need to make an example of the man. The biggest pitfall to be avoided is to judge the man's actions as a failure of your leadership as this will indeed cause you to overreact.

Fear is a major force on every battlefield. Leaders must study it, understand it, and be prepared to cope with it within their units. To do less is to neglect combat readiness. USMC

Reflections of a Platoon Leader

by LtCol James R. McDonough, USA

The young lieutenant arrived in Vietnam in August 1970, and was assigned to the 173d Airborne Brigade. For five years he had been preparing for this moment—four years at West Point, followed by airborne, ranger and jungle warfare schools. Now he would face the reality of war.

Official U.S. Army photos show soldiers of the 173d Airborne Brigade in action in Vietnam.

From the day that I took command of my platoon until the day I left, the one sensation that stayed with me throughout was the feeling of loneliness. Although I lived with my men, ate with them, shared their risks, came to know them well, and spent every moment for months within a few meters of them, I nevertheless felt alone always.

There was little about them that I did not know. Even those who lasted only a few days were eager to talk about themselves, and so I came to know them. They wanted someone to know about them, and that was my business. And so I listened, and where appropriate or when they wanted it, I added my comments. Even Killigan, the toughest of the tough, the quiet man, told me much about himself. His words were few, but men facing death want to communicate, and he did.

On the other hand, I told little about myself. Of course the men were able to observe my character and my idiosyncrasies. American soldiers are expert at sizing up their officer leaders. They can do it in a heartbeat. But although they knew my style of leadership and as much of my character as pertained to it, they did not know me. I saw it as part of my job to remain somewhat aloof. That idea was not born of snobbery. If anything, I delighted in the company of my men. My family background made me feel closer to enlisted men than to the officer corps since my father had been a career noncommissioned officer (NCO). My wife's father had been a career NCO as well, a friend and coworker of my father. But I knew that my men expected something different of me, and that it did not include my turning to them for comfort. They wanted leadership. They wanted strength. They wanted compassion. If I gave them these things, they would do whatever I asked of them.

They did not want to know my troubles, fears, or wishes, or the fact that I had a wife and child to whom I also wanted to return. Those things were important only insofar as they identified me as a human being. But no soldier would tolerate my pouring my heart out to him. That would have shaken him. So, I kept my inner concerns to myself.

When my men were hurt or killed, it broke my heart, but I could not show it. There were always the survivors to worry about, and they could not have coped with excessive remorse about the dead. I dealt with the death of a fellow soldier in any way pertinent to the morale of the remaining soldiers. If I knew a man to be religious, I turned to religion. If I knew a man to be vengeful, I turned that emotion toward the enemy. The dead were mourned in a military way. If it were convenient to do so, their boots were shined, and taps was played respectfully over them. A corpse was always evacuated as quickly as possible, long before any ceremony could be held over it.

When I knew a man had suffered or died because of a poor decision on my part, I kept it to myself. This was the loneliest thing of all. I could not talk out my remorse with anyone. That was a bitter pill to be swallowed silently, and so there was no relief from it—just suppression.

Because of the remote nature of our mission, I saw no other officers. The only one I spent any time with was the man who came to my rescue one dark night early in my tour, and he died for his concern a few days later. The platoon sergeant (I went through four during my tour with the platoon) was the closest man to me but only in a professional sense. Even with them I did not become personal. I felt it would detract from both our roles.

So my loneliness was self-imposed but something I felt extremely necessary for the success of my job as platoon leader. I could never see any value in trying to be "one of the guys." The men did not respect it; they did not trust it. I was "the officer," "the platoon leader," "that bastard," the "lieutenant," or a thousand other names, but I was never "Jim," and I was always in charge.

That brings me to another central point of my experience as a platoon leader. I was the man responsible for the actions of my unit. There was no one to turn to, to ask what I should do in a given situation. But, that was not quite what I had expected. Before arriving in Vietnam, I believed that as the most junior officer, I always would be acting under the orders and direction of an officer senior to me. I assumed that I would be told whom I could take under fire, where I could fire, and with what weapons.

But there was none of that. I never had a senior officer in combat with me the entire time I led the platoon. The decisions were always mine to make. Therefore, the responsibilities were also always mine. If anything, the senior officers held back from giving guidance, allowing me to make the critical decisions. As I was the senior officer present on the ground, this was only proper. But there were times that I wondered whether the hesitation on the part of higher ranking officers in the chain of command to intercede was less of a deferrence to my positional authority than it was a way of avoiding ultimate responsibility.

There were two times when this suspicion welled up strongly in me. The first was when my position was under direct attack. A major portion of my men were already casualties, and the pilot of a helicopter gunship offered to attack a village from which enemy fire was coming. Senior commanders were monitoring the conversation between the pilot and me, but they said nothing. If I had done the same thing and said nothing to the pilot, the village would have been taken under heavy fire and there would have been a multitude of civilian casualties. This was clearly a case of my having to decide what was right or wrong and act within a matter of seconds. If I disallowed it, my men and I might die. If I allowed it, many innocent villagers might die. In the instant of decision given me, I disallowed it and brought the fire of the helicopter in elsewhere. Prior to that moment, I was not even sure that I had the authority to direct the pilot's fire. Nothing the Army could have presented to me in a classroom or in training would have prepared me for that moment. But it arrived, and I had to make the call by myself even though more experienced hands were privy to the conversation.

The other time that I wondered at my superiors' silence was the night in which I ordered an attack upon an allied element of Vietnamese soldiers led by an American advisor. By my instructions I could have fired from the outset with legal impunity. I was setting ambushes all over the place. The territory I was patrolling was supposed to be devoid of any other friendly units. Yet, I became suspicious of the way in which the sighted element was moving and so inquired by radio as to who might be out there with me. Guidance or information was never volunteered to me although my conversations were monitored by higher headquarters. Responses were given only after I asked direct questions, and as it turned out in this case

Soldiers set off smoke bombs to identify their position.

the guidance was wrong. I was assured by both my company commander and the battalion operations officer that there were no friendly elements about, but when we did engage it turned out that we killed an ally. The matter was officially investigated. Would I have been found culpable had I not bothered to check further? Perhaps. Would those listening quietly have been implicated? Doubtful!

The need to make a decision on my own and without guidance from higher headquarters was a recurring phenomenon in Vietnam. Many times a day I made decisions that determined life and death both for my men and the Vietnamese in my area. I always sensed that my men were looking for me to make a call. There was no one to whom I could turn. Good people died on several occasions because of error in my judgments. I could only hope that several people were spared on the occasions that I made a proper call, and that that number outweighed those who suffered from bad calls. You can never be sure of that, however. You only can be sure when the worst happens. Then you see the wounded and dead and realize as clearly as day that the wrong approach was taken. Nonetheless, the leader must fight against self-recrimination if he is to preserve the confidence he needs in himself and from his men so that he can make future decisions.

Closely related to the question of confidence is the effect of fear on the leader. I knew from the outset that the chance of my getting severely hurt (I defined that to be maimed or crippled) or killed was high. As soon as I was wounded (and that came within 48 hours of joining my platoon) my awareness of the risk increased. I never lost that sense; nor did I take it lightly. I wanted to live as much as any man. I had a lot waiting for me: a beautiful wife, an infant child, and a bright future. I had always been athletic and looked forward to a healthy and active life. I dreaded the thought of having to live in constant pain or with an eternal handicap.

Therefore, I was not a particularly brave man, but I knew that I had to suppress my fears so that I could function, and so that my men would have confidence in my seeing them through. My approach was to do what had to be done. I had defined for myself certain tasks to be done by the platoon leader and not by anyone else, and so when those tasks surfaced there was no question over who should do them. The job requirements had already been set, and it remained for me only to fulfill them.

I did not act recklessly. Although I believed that the platoon leader should always go with the maneuver element in an engagement, as opposed to remaining with the supporting (by fire) element, I did not place myself on the point. I only took point when I felt that I had no right to ask another to take it. Those times were limited to finding patrol members who had become separated from the main body, in threading our way out of heavily boobytrapped areas once we discovered that we were in the midst of one, and in unusual circumstances where the chances of an error could prove fatal. In all, I took point no more than five times that I can remember. Some men in the platoon, Killigan for example, took it on every mission for weeks at a time. Those were brave men. They were not told to take it. Generally they volunteered. I set the policy of not taking point except under extraordinary circumstances for my squad leaders as well. Leaders were simply not that expendable. Their first mission was to control their subordinates, not take all the chances.

When the platoon came under fire, I had to move around. I tried not to be reckless, but I had to size up the situation myself and give appropriate orders. That necessitated moving under fire. Only when clearly under the direct fire of an enemy who had drawn a good bead on me did I defer movement due to the certainty of being hit. I could not be effective as a leader with bullet holes in me. But short of that certainty, I had a responsibility to direct the action of the platoon in order to

accomplish our mission and minimize casualties. I relieved one platoon sergeant for his timidity in the face of enemy fire. Otherwise a good man, he could see no sense in exposing himself unduly, and to him moving around in the midst of a firefight to check on his men was "unduly." There is a fine line between what is sensible and what is obligatory under the mandate of the job. But that line has to be drawn, and within the platoon the platoon leader is the only man to do it.

The quieter moments always seemed to be the most unnerving. When an action began, decisions had to be made quickly with no time for painstaking reflection. Like a person jumping into a frigid lake, as soon as the initial decision is made to jump, the jumper is propelled along by the momentum of events. There is no need to mull things over. But in the spells between fighting or patrolling, the questioning of one's self would begin. Why am I doing this? Am I doing it right? Will I be able to face the next thing that happens? During these moments, both physical and moral fears were the greatest.

The inner conflicts could not be completely resolved merely by a resignation to what fate might bring. Quite clearly there were days in which I knew with a terrible certainty that I would die. There did not seem to be any need to question it, nor even mourn the eventuality. But ironically there were just as many days in which I knew I was immune to any harm. A certain smugness would creep into my being as if an impenetrable shield had been placed around me, and I knew with a quiet scorn that the grim reaper would have to wait for another time to get me.

But on balance, I knew that it was a combination of fate *and* skill that would determine whether I or anyone else would live or die. The stray round might get me, or the well-concealed boobytrap. But quick reflexes and a keen eye could compensate for a lot of close calls. The odds might be set, but there was still an opportunity to beat them.

I had another belief that sustained me in the struggles with my fears. To a great degree, I believed in the ability of will to tip the odds in one's favor. It may have been a straw I was grasping at, but I convinced myself that if I refused to die, only a pulverizing wound would kill me. I believed that I had seen the power of human will on several occasions. Men who were blown to bits survived with a stubborn determination. Others who were lightly hit expired from seemingly inexplicable causes. One of my men, Killigan, hoisted himself on an evacuation helicopter despite a myriad of gaping wounds. My radio operator lay down in the surf and drowned after having made it in to the shore. Will had to play a part in the mysterious equation of life and death, and I was determined to make it work on my side. In this way, I faced my fears and screwed up the courage to do my job.

There were times when courage was beside the question, when I was filled with such a rage to strike out at the enemy that I wanted to get at him at all costs. These events occurred after unusually atrocious acts by the enemy, such as the tortured killing of an old village woman, and were for the most part short lived. When one of my men was killed or wounded in the course of an engagement, my anger did not swell to the point that it drove me to irrational actions. For the most part, I recognized casualties as the natural outcome of our activities. Excessive brutality by the enemy did incur my wrath, however, and a sinister determination would overtake me to punish them. Anger, however, was a dangerous emotion. It was better to approach contact with the enemy with an objective sense. It was best to suppress frustrations.

We were fighting both the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese regulars but much more of the former than the latter. This pitted me against an enemy whose ties to the people were extremely close. Understandably, the people would assist their war effort, to include the provision of intelligence on American patrols and setting of boobytraps in our path. All these activities contributed directly to our casualties.

Nonetheless, I did not allow wanton acts of revenge against the local people who were caught up in the war. I understood the forces that tore at them and prompted them to do things that could prove fatal to my men or me. I would expect no less from my own family should I be a combatant in a similar environment. So, I could not allow my men to harm the villagers near us. When they engaged us directly, we engaged them, and there were occasional assassination attempts by them. If we saw someone in the act of setting a boobytrap, we attempted to capture him. But, in the main I took care not to vent undue anger against any of them. This was a confusing war to be in. In many ways we befriended the village people, and I believe that they honestly warmed to us. But from time to time it would be their business to try to kill us. Some of the boys of the village who looked upon certain American soldiers as father figures, although they were little more than boys themselves, would occasionally be directed to set boobytraps against us. And when these traps were successful, it seemed to me that they honestly mourned the deaths they might have caused. They fought us out of a sense of duty, not personal animosity. This was a difficult state of affairs for Americans to cope with.

As to the enemy, I cannot say that I hated them.

There were times when the bloodlust welled up in me, and I wanted to kill as many of them as possible. But I did not hate them. Killing was the nature of our business. If we did not kill them, they would kill us. I did capture a number of Viet Cong during my tour. I tried to treat them properly, although I took no chances with them. This meant that on one occasion I tied up a prisoner extremely tight lest he come loose during a firefight and interfere with our efforts. The brutal manner in which I tied him, hands behind the back, cord through the arms and looped over his neck, was prompted by concern of the consequences of his working himself loose while we were engaged with the enemy—not by dislike for him. But the act did not cause me any regrets either. I found no need to show kindness to the enemy. In this regard, some of my men were better than I.

If I did not hate him, neither could I say I respected him. Although I could acknowledge that he was merely doing a job, just as my men and I were doing a job, I could not condone his tactics. He knew no constraints. I could appreciate the different political/socialization process the enemy went through and brought with him to battle. It was much different for the American soldier who just did his time, and if he survived, went home. But though I could appreciate the different culture and values our enemy possessed, I could not forgive the barbarity of the actions he sometimes took, such as the symbolic killing of noncombatants or the deliberate killing of his own people.

A village search operation.

Vietnam was certainly political, but politicization did not excuse dehumanization.

This brings me to the subject of morality. I believe that the platoon leader has a heavy obligation to maintain the moral standards of the society from which he and his men come. War is a terrible thing. It brings out the worst in men. Actions that would be considered abominable in civilized society become commonplace in the war zone and can even be praised as an admirable practice. Men kill men because it is their duty, because if they fail, they will be killed instead. The violence is excessive, and men are not killed with minimal force. They do not die with little holes neatly piercing their skin. They are torn open. They grovel in pain, screaming for help, for mercy, for an end to their suffering. It is all very shocking, and each man knows that what he is witnessing could recur with him as the subject the next time.

Combat is of such emotional intensity that strange elations can come from the act of killing. Opponents pit themselves against each other with the certain knowledge that one will be vanquished, one will be victor. The conflict is often at close quarters. You can hear, see, smell, and ultimately touch your antagonist. Sheer terror propels the violence emitting from both sides. All want to live, but one can live only by the death of the other. And when that death does fall to the opponent, there is a great sense of relief. How curious the fallen look. Instantly their ashen bodies begin to meld with the ground. It is uncanny. As you look, you sense a great deal of pleasure in your being alive. He who was so full of animation a few moments ago now lies eternally inanimate. You are alive; a future is still yours. Countless times the survivor has that sensation until the pleasure of life is confused with a pleasure of killing. The good feeling comes when the enemy is killed, and soon the confusion sets in that the good feeling comes because the enemy is killed, not for the real reason: that you are still alive. Only by killing is life sustained. This is the way of war. And it is amid this topsy-turvy world of war in which violence provides a chance to live for another day that the combatant must be on guard to preserve his own morality.

Recognizing the dangers to my men and me, realizing that we might live only to become something less than human, I drew my lines early and drew them hard. I would not allow my men to take anything from the local people, not so much as a piece of fruit or a local bottle of soda pop. This could lead to gradations of misconduct until a serious crime might be committed. It was too easy to go one step further and rationalize it as all right. I cut off the steps that could be taken early in the

journey to immorality. There would be no degrading of the enemy dead. Ears would not be collected, teeth would not be pulled, and snapshots of American soldiers posing with enemy dead would not be allowed. If I suspected a violation of any of these prohibitions, I would warn the suspected violator sternly, and often enough that by itself was enough to deter further infractions.

When I joined my platoon, there was in our position area a skull with a 173d Airborne unit patch painted on its bleached crown. No one knew where it had come from, but it had been passed on within the platoon since before the time of any man then present. In many ways it had become a sort of macabre mascot of the platoon, and in my one concession to the bravado of the platoon that bordered on the grotesque, I allowed it to stay on. A mocking symbol of death, it hardened our outlook to the tasks at hand.

We asked no quarter of the enemy and gave none but did only so much of our gruesome business as it took to defeat whatever enemy came at us, and no more.

Hatred would sometimes incite men to a certain zeal in their combativeness, but when the fighting ceases, so too must the brutality. Enemy wounded were treated with the same care as friendly casualties, though their treatment would come after our own wounded had been tended to, unless the seriousness of the wound made it obvious that not to treat one of them right away might prove fatal. Enemy prisoners were guarded but not molested. Although there were some of my men whom I had to watch more than others, there were some who would shame me with their high standards of morality. Once shortly after we had taken a prisoner, we came under heavy enemy attack. He had been a scout for the enemy element, and he lay beside me behind a mound of earth as the rounds beat down on us. One of my soldiers had been hit and lay exposed on the other side of the earthen mound where we could not get to him. The pain from his wounds was wrenching, and he called out in his agony for help. After several minutes of this, I momentarily lost control of myself and turned my weapon toward the captured V.C. The arresting eyes of one of my soldiers immediately shamed me back into a proper frame of mind. Some time later he quietly said to me, "Sir, that man is just a soldier. He was doing his job—just like us." His words were quietly spoken, his manner respectful, but they tore through my soul like a hot knife. He was right, of course, and the obligation was mine ever so much more than his to recognize that and maintain the morality of the platoon's actions.

I cannot say that throughout my tour my platoon or I were blameless of any moral indiscre-

Pinned down by enemy fire.

tions pertaining to combat. Morality is not like virginity, once lost never to be regained. I made mistakes, as did my men, but I tried to recognize the mistakes and correct them, and my men did too.

At times, morality did not seem like a matter of conscious choice. Inadvertently things could happen that only in retrospect clearly revealed a decision point on goodness or badness. One time I maneuvered a squad behind an enemy force engaging some other group of my men. As we closed in for the kill, as yet undetected by the enemy, two children walked into our position. One called out in Vietnamese in a manner that indicated a warning to the Viet Cong (although I could not be sure). Immediately I grabbed the boy (about 8) and one of my soldiers captured the girl (about 12). I covered the boy's mouth with the palm of my hand so that he could not cry out and watched to see if the enemy had heard the outcry. When I turned to look at the boy some time later, I saw that he was about to suffocate. Inadvertently I had covered his nose as well as his mouth, and he had been unable to breathe. Although he had struggled, I assumed he was only attempting to get away and call out. Had I held on for another few seconds he would have passed out, stopped struggling, and within a few more seconds been dead. Fortunately I happened to notice what I was doing, and I shifted my hold in time. Eventually I let him go when it was safe to do so. But what if I had not noticed that I was suffocating him? His death may not have been immoral in the accepted sense of the word.

Yet, despite the utter evil of war, those who

have seen it remember it sometimes with what can only be identified as nostalgia. These are not the warmongers. Among those experiencing this phenomenon are those who hate war with a passion. But they remember the one face of war that can be seen only seldom in other circumstances. That is the utter nobility that can be shown by the most ordinary of men. It is a sign of humanity that transcends the savagery of battle and marks the common soldier as the most extraordinary of human beings. It reveals itself in moments of stark terror, when a humorous remark by a comrade can bring one back from the brink of desperation. It is revealed in the ultimate of altruism, the sacrifice of one's own life for the chance that others might live. It is shown in the fellowship that causes one soldier to share his last cigarette, his last tin of food, with another fellow traveler. When Lee remarked that it is good that war is so terrible lest he come to love it too much, it must have been this side of it that he had in mind.

Personally, I stood in awe of my soldiers. Often they were marked by a nobility that I could never hope to emulate. They knew fear. They knew hatred. They knew discomfort and fatigue. They knew the pain of brutal wounds and the horror of ghastly disfigurement. But they always knew the humanity of their soul. They always did what was asked of them—and much more!

In all of the characteristics for which a leader is marked—courage, judgment, steadiness, morality, intelligence—I could sense that, collectively, my men possessed them in greater quantity than I. When I was afraid of what I had to do, I could see others with greater fear doing more. When I tried to calm my men at critical moments, I was always able to do it because the example of one of my men had calmed me. When my moral standards dipped, I was always shamed into correcting them by the silent admonition of a soldier.

The men of my platoon made me a better leader than I otherwise would have been. Although tolerance for the shortcomings of other men was one of their outstanding attributes, their dedication to their job made it inconceivable for me to do less than what my job called for. I always felt challenged by them to produce, or at least reach for, an excellence of leadership. They certainly deserved it. When I failed them, it was with deep regret.

America is fortunate to be served by the young men it has. Vietnam, an overwhelmingly unpopular war, did not fail in bringing forward dedicated youths to fulfill the national objectives of their country. Scorned by their fellow Americans as warmongers, sadists, saps, villains, or fools, they nevertheless put forth a superhuman effort in a war they themselves had no commitment to other than that their country sent them there, and their buddies depended on them to get them through. There is no shame for those men who went. One can pick the villains he wants but certainly not from among the selfless American fighting men I had the privilege to lead in Vietnam.

For me, the villains fall among those who let them down, the leaders who mislead them in combat, the leaders who sent them off to fight while sparing the more pampered young men of our society, the friends who scorned them for going, and the countrymen who forgot them after they were gone or after they came home torn and broken.

Our Nation was served by noble young men in that unforgiving conflict. I suspect that we always have been and always will be. The rest of us need to ask ourselves how *we* can best serve them.

USMC



A Letter Home

by LtCol James B. Chandler, USMCR

A moving tribute to the Marines who fought, froze, and died in Korea, on the road from Hagaru-ri, while the outside world waited . . . .

Completed 24 Jan 51
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My darling:

As promised here is the account of our trip back from Hagaru-ri as seen through my eyes. I will give you some of the background before the Tenth Army Corps ordered us to Hungnam, and then a blow by blow description of our fight off the freezing, windswept plateau in the vicinity of Chosin Reservoir. Please save this original for my personal records, and please show it to dad. He may want to have Margo make a copy of it. The story is about my battalion, 2nd Bn. 7th Marines

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On the night of 27 Nov. 1950 at 2230, the Chinese Communist Forces assaulted Hagaru-ri in approximately division strength. At this time Hagaru-ri was defended by 3rd Bn., 1st Marines and only our H.&S. Co. and Weapons Co. were in that area. The 3rd Bn., 1st Marines had only two rifle companies, their third rifle company still in Koto-ri nine miles south of us. Our three rifle companies were located as follows. Two companies had been attached to the 1st Bn., 7th Marines and were defending north of Yudam-ni, and our other rifle company was guarding a mountain pass 8½ road miles northwest of Hagaru-ri. We were to join them on 28 Nov. 1950. The elements of the marines at Yudam-ni, in the mountain pass, and at Koto-ri were attacked approximately at the same time by three enemy divisions. Needless to say, against vastly superior numbers, we held Hagaru-ri while the marines at Yudam-ni fought back to us. Our company in the mountain pass held out alone for six days, supplied only by air, against sustained attacks by a regiment of the enemy killing over 500 C.C.F. (Chinese Communist Forces) actual count. They made history themselves and the company commander was recommended for the Congressional Medal of Honor. Our other two companies at Yudam-ni, though overrun by the C.C.F., retook the high ground they lost and counted 1100 enemy dead in front of them and in and all around them. Due to casualties, both battle and non-battle, we had to form one understrength company of what was left of our two companies at Yudam-ni. As this fighting was going on, the Chinese cut all roads from Yudam-ni to Hagaru-ri, from Hagaru-ri to Koto-ri, and from Koto-ri to the bottom of the pass. One battalion of the 1st Marines held Koto-ri, and another the bottom of the pass.

One company of marines and one company of British Royal Marines were able to fight their way to us at Hagaru-ri on the 28th, but an army convoy accompanying them, hindered by many trucks, was decimated with those who were left returning to Koto-ri. This was the situation as the marines from Yudam-

ni gathered with us for the fight back to Hungnam. Many of these men were wounded or frostbitten and were evacuated by air from Hagaru-ri, a terrific operation of supply and evacuation engineered by the U.S. Army Air Force. All of this is a story in itself, but I pass over it swiftly to give you only the background for our attack to Hungnam. The marines who returned from Yudam-ni accomplished a job against overwhelming and bitter odds of enemy and weather, and we in Hagaru-ri held out in the same manner from 28 Nov. 1950 until 5 Dec. 1950.

We received orders to jump-off in the attack at first daylight 0642 (6:42 A.M.) with the mission of joining with the battalion of 1st Marines at Koto-ri. The assault would begin on 6 Dec. 1950. My battalion (2nd Bn., 7th Marines) was to be the advance point followed by the convoy and the other marine elements, and some elements of the army. We made every man available to our rifle companies, which now numbered two instead of three, using personnel from H.&S. Co., supply, cooks and bakers, artillery, engineers and our service battalion. Even with that influx of men our two companies were under strength. We were supported by artillery, air, tanks, and the heavy machineguns and 81MM mortars of our own weapons company. Facing us was a road surrounded on both sides by mountains occupied by two known Chinese Divisions. All bridges on the road had been blown by the enemy, and wrecked trucks made natural road blocks where the convoy had been attacked. Our convoy speed was set at 4 M.P.H. to travel the nine miles to Koto-ri. Now for the story.

6 Dec. 1950 we were up at 0300 (3:00 A.M.) burning documents we did not want the enemy to have, and all equipment we could not carry. The weather was bitter cold, somewhere below zero, with about a foot of snow covering the ground. We prayed feverently for a clear day for, without air support, the odds against us getting through mounted greatly. There was not one marine who thought we would not get through, but we did feel like a rejuvinated, old racehorse going to the polls at odds of 20 to 1. The men joked, cursed and laughed as they prepared themselves for the ordeal that was ahead of them. They were a mixture of "The Old Breed," marines who had written the glorious history of The 1st Marine Division in World War II, and new, young men carrying on in The Corps' tradition, all battle veterans of Korea. They were cocky, confident and, though they knew the Chinese were tenacious and canny fighters, they held them in contempt. The men knew the power of their supporting arms, they knew their own power as well directed and commanded individuals, and they were above all else, Marines. Many other times marines had accomplished the unbelievable—Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, Saipan, Tinian, Okinawa, Bougainville, Cape Gloucester, and they would do it again. They were sure they could kill the enemy 10 to 1 and let the supporting arms take care of the rest. The marines had never been beaten. They did not consider that they were withdrawing or retreating, but firmly believed in the words of their Division Commander, "Retreat hell, we are just attacking in another direction." The men formed into their squads, companies and platoons, vehicles began to cough, come to life and move into line; tanks roared into life spewing flames from their exhaust; and the snorting, ungainly bulldozer moved to the front of the line. The column moved, shadows in the darkness, and took their place at the line of departure. They now stood silent in the road, the point of a vast column to follow, and they knew they would be the first targets for the enemy, and the first to know where the enemy was hiding and waiting a chance to kill. Many a silent prayer was said as H-Hour approached for, with the coming of the first rays of dawn, blood would be shed, men would die, and no one knew who.

At precisely 0642 we moved out of our south road block of Hagaru-ri. To our left was a large mountain, a valley, and then



Map by Arlo and Dewaine Greer, courtesy Times Books

another large hill mass. An army outfit was to protect our left flank, but failed to jump off on time. We walked less than 50 yds out of Hagaru-ri and the first marine dropped dead, the Chinese pouring fire on us from a well dug-in strong point. Our advanced was stopped almost before it started. Bullets whispered by, some found flesh and bit deep, others dropped spent finding no human target. The familiar cry of "corpsman" split the air, and the "does" crawled forward to tend the wounded. Our heavy machine guns went into action adding their horrible chatter to the din. One gunner dropped dead by his gun, the pale palor of death quickly changing his features, and the assistant gunner leapt into his place. Three tanks moved off to the right, roared on across a field, came up on line and started throwing machinegun and 90MM fire into the Chinese positions. The blast of their guns shook the ground. Lt. Austin of Media, Penna. brought his 81MM mortars forward and began firing. Dawn had finally come and the Chinese, running to escape this terrible fire, became easy targets for riflemen and machinegunners. Planes orbitted above and, controlled by our Tactical Air Support Officer, peeled off to strafe, bomb, and drop napalm on the Chinese. Some of the enemy were seen to burst into flame and crumple into a black, unrecognizable mass. The Chinese were now receiving the accurate, powerful fire power of well trained marines and their supporting arms. Fox Co. moved out along the defilade formed by the railroad tracks and the road. Quickly the Chinese dropped mortars on the marines and, with each deadly puff of smoke, men fell wounded or dead. I saw a radio operator and a platoon leader crawling back both hit in the legs. I went forward to assist them. I spoke to the radio operator and said, "Miller, do you need some help?" His reply was typical. "Hell no, Lieutenant, I got my airplane ticket out of here and I will crawl to the airfield if necessary." They were still evacuating our wounded by air, but later we would have to carry them with us. Lt. Sidor grasped me around the shoulders and I hauled him back to safety. He laughed for he knew his part in

the fight was over, and he would fly over the torturous and treacherous miles facing us. He wished me luck as I passed him into the hands of the waiting corpsmen. He had what we called a "million dollar wound." Not bad, but enough for evacuation, probably to the States. Many of us were envious. The Chinese had been blasted out of their holes, many of them lay grotesquely dead frozen quickly into awkward positions. Our column and convoy started moving. The attack to the sea was once again underway. Some marines would never see the sea, but their sacrifice would never be forgotten by their buddies. The first obstacle in our path had been overcome. The troops and convoy gathered speed and left the cold, miserable town of Hagaru-ri behind them and many memories of freezing nights and days of combat. The marines were on their way and nothing could stop them.

We moved rapidly across flat terrain always keeping a wary eye on the highground to our left flank. Our own 1st Bn., 7th Marines was on our right flank, but the unit who was to protect our left never did get there, and it was from this direction we received all our attacks by the Chinese. I moved through a little village and saw a dead marine lying in the middle of the road. I remarked to Lt. Davenport that we should receive fire any moment, and my sentence was punctuated by the blast of a comunist machinegun. My draftsman fell with three bullets in his arm, Lt. Dunne was dead shot through the head, other men dropped and we dispersed quickly to the safety of a stream bed. Two marines rushed over and joined Lt. Davenport and myself. Two enemy mortars crashed in behind us and both men went down. Why the lieutenant and I were not hit we will never know. "For God's sake don't bunch up! They have this spot registered in!" We crawled forward, ever forward, and machinegun bullets clipped off the brush above our heads. The exitement and exertion made you perspire, but, as you huddled against the bank of the creek in the snow, the cold crept through you and your body shook violently. Men's mustaches and beards froze displaying little icicles matted in the hair. Tears, caused by the wind, formed ice on your eyelashes and cheeks. It was cold, bitter cold, and yet it was death to move. "Where in the hell is the air officer? Why don't they bomb the dirty bastards?" The Chinese were so well dug-in that our flat trajectory fire wasn't even bothering them. "There comes the planes! Call them in, Johnny, and give those goddamn laundry men hell! They are cold and need a little fire. Give'em hell!" Five Corsair planes plunged earthward and 50 cal. tracers, rockets, bombs and napalm rained on the Chinese. Hands, arms, and legs flew in all directions from a direct hit. The marines cheered as though the pilots could hear them. Some Chinese got up to run but were killed immediately by rifle fire. Sgt Westerdahl, one of the best shots in The Marine Corps, was having a field day. Slowly the marines began to move on towards Koto-ri. Westerdahl came over and said, "Jerry is dead, sir, shot right under his chin and out through the top of his head." I cursed softly and uttered a small prayer. Jerry had been married only two weeks before he left for overseas. Oh, God, war is horrible!!

As Fox Co. moved on in the stream bed more fire was received from the left. This strongpoint was close, very close to the road. Word was passed that we would have to assault it. The marines waited g.imly while artillery softened the positions up. Assault is what the marines knew best and they were ready. Lt. Able jumped forward as the fire was lifted and marines, bayonets fixed, followed after him. They took the Chinese entirely by surprise and, after exchanging hand grenades, moved in rapidly bayonetting and shooting the enemy as they huddled in their holes. Every Chinaman was wiped out with the exception of 18 prisoners of war. The marines were magnificent as they spread death and destruction among the C.C.F. These fine, young men were a well coordinated group of killers taught to kill or be killed. Three months previous they had probably been holding the hand of some sweetheart or their wife, no hatred in their souls. Now they raged as animals, fought like animals and lived like animals. It brought to my mind the old saying, "Dame Nature in the raw is seldom mild." Nature in Korea was certainly raw and these marines were anything but mild. They killed quickly and efficiently.

Night came and we were still only half way to Koto-ri. We waited for the bulldozer to push wrecked vehicles out of the way, combat engineers to rebuild bridges or make by-passes, and we protected them as they worked. With darkness came the knowledge that we could expect the Chinese to attack, for all their previous attacks had been under the cover of darkness directed by flares, bugles and whistles. It was black, pitch black, and with blackness all warmth whatsoever left and the biting, vicious cold of night held every living thing in its grasp. The water the men carried had long since frozen in their canteens, food had frozen, and they munched a little on frozen pogey bait (candy) and drank hurriedly from the stream. They moved like so many shadows in their green parkas, softly cursing the cold, Korea, the Chinese and everything in general. These men were tired, dead tired, and some of them held on to vehicles letting themselves be pulled along one foot listlessly following the other. An enemy machinegun barked and the marines, some who looked as though they could barely move, sprang into life and dove into the ditches by the side of the road. They crawled on out on either side to protect the flanks. "Kane! Killer Kane, goddamnit, where the hell are you! Let's get some artillery on that damn gun!" We waited, freezing in the darkness, and then heard the familiar words, "On the way!" A 105MM shell whispered overhead and splashed its white phosphorous on the highground to the front. "Come right 200 and down 200." Men shifted uneasily. Artillery is hard to control at night. Was the next shell going to land on us? It was right on. "Fire for effect!" More shells whispered as the battery opened up singing their song of death. Crash! Crash! went the H.E. (heavy explosive) shells. The machinegun was quiet and the column moved on.

The long march begins at Yudam-ni.

We moved into the area where the army convoy had been hit. The bulldozer busily began clearing the road of smashed vehicles. The same driver had led the convoy all day. The man in that driver's seat had more stamina and no nerves. A great example to the other marines. We waited in the cold and dark. Word was passed the center of the convoy had been attacked and overrun by the Chinese. How were they making out? Later we found out that How Battery brought their guns up quickly, fired point blank with a 2/5 of a second fuse into the attackers, and literally thousands of Chinese died swiftly and agonizingly burned by white phosphorous, or torn by shrapnel. It was a ter-

A first lieutenant in Korea.

LtCol James B. Chandler, USMCR, died of a heart attack 12 May 1987. During World War II, he was Chesty Puller's intelligence officer (1st Marines) at Peleliu and Okinawa. After postwar service in China, he returned to Philadelphia, PA., and worked with his father in the insurance business but remained active in the Reserves. When his unit was called to active duty in 1950, he left his wife and two children to again fight with the Marines, this time in Korea with 2d Battalion, 7th Marines. After that war he coached football (he was a single-wing quarterback at the University of Pennsylvania) and taught algebra at Peekskill Military Academy in New York, where he later became the superintendent. For 10 years prior to his death, he and his wife, Margaret, worked as counselors at Ranch Hope, a school for disturbed boys in New Jersey. His devotion to the Marine Corps is apparent in the letter to his wife, written in January 1951.

IN REPLYING REFER TO No.
P16-7
7-3/jeo
Ser 35682

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

HEADQUARTERS
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REINF) FMF
c/o FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

5 September 1951

From: Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Reinf) FMF
To : Captain James B. CHANDLER, 022693, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve
Via : Commanding Officer, 7th Marines

Subj: Award of the Bronze Star Medal - Temporary Citation

Encl: (1) Bronze Star Medal
(2) Temporary Citation

1. It gives me great pleasure to forward the Bronze Star Medal and Temporary Citation to you. I extend sincere congratulations at this recognition of your courageous action during operations against the armed enemy in Korea.

O. C. THOMAS

A letter from the division commander.

An intelligence officer at Peleliu.

A letter home from Okinawa.

Receiving the Bronze Star Medal as his proud father looks on.

rific fight, but once more the courage and coordination of the brave marines had won.

Two more bridges were repaired, the point received the word "well done," and we were ordered into the town of Koto-ri. Marines, tired beyond belief and half frozen, moved doggedly into the protection of the lines of the 2nd Bn., 1st Marines. There, haggard and with sunken eyes, the marines sought the warmth of their buddies' tents and, after a cup of joe, fell instantly into a dead sleep. They were safe for the moment and temporarily could relax. The first elements of the marines reached Koto-ri at 0545 (5:45 A.M.) exactly 23 hours after they had attacked out of Hagaru-ri. The roughest fight was over, but there was more to come. Sleep well, men, and dream of home and your loved ones. Tomorrow we again will fight and die so others may survive.

The next morning I could not believe my ears and stared at Major Sawyer, our executive officer, incredulously. The 2nd Bn., 7th Marines had been ordered back to Hagaru-ri, if necessary, to aid elements of the 11th Marines who were engaged in a fierce firefight with the Chinese.* "My God," I said, "how will the men ever make it?" We formed up and pride swelled my heart as we moved north again over the ground we had fought so desperately. No sacrifice was too great for marines to help marines. Right there, as those tired, battle weary, exhausted marines marched from Koto-ri, I was witnessing the Esprit de Corps. A spirit that makes the marine indominable and unbeatable. I was proud to be one of them and knew that no marine would let another marine down. I was glad I had chosen the Marine Corps to fight with.

Luck was with us as the 11th Marines had fought clear, and our orders were changed to guard the convoy about 3 miles north of Koto-ri until relieved. This job was accomplished without receiving any enemy fire, but it was heartrending to see trucks, trailers and vehicles bringing in our dead, bodies frozen in the position they fell. Hands and legs stuck up into the air grotesquely as if the man was part of an intricate ballet when he died. Other vehicles carried the wounded, men who had suffered through the cold, heartless night while their bodies were wracked with pain. Other marines, the ones with frozen feet, walked stiffly on feet they could not feel. It was a sad picture, but one of the utmost bravery. Not one dead or wounded marine had been left behind, and those who were not hurt or weather casualties, guarded their fallen comrades jealously. Later some Chinese were noticed moving along a ridge line to high ground by the road. We took them under fire with the 81 mortars and heavy machineguns. The Royal British Marines, a fine, well trained body of men, attacked the positions supported by our tanks and drove them off. A mutual admiration had already been formed between the Limeys and the Leathernecks. They spoke and acted the same way. Our relief arrived and we moved back into Koto-ri for the night.

The next morning was warmer, maybe a bit above zero, and we knew it was going to snow. We received our orders to move out to the pass and, as we started the march, the snow came. It snowed so hard that visibility became zero, no air support was possible, and we knew the engineers would not be able to drive down the pass to put in the all important bridge the Chinese had destroyed. Without that bridge no vehicle could leave the plateau. We faced another heartless night in the snows of Korea. Slowly the men of our rifle companies, the men who are the magnificent heart and soul of the Corps, slipped, slid and plodded up the slopes flanking the road so they could protect their road-bound comrades. They disappeared immediately, a green shadow against the white growing dim rapidly. Those men lived in snow, fought in snow, and died in snow. At night, because of possible attack by the enemy, they could only put their feet in their mountain bags, the upper part of their bodies lying in the snow. These men were dressed warmly, woolen scivvies (underwear), sweaters, wool shirts, field jackets, shoe packs, windproof pants, two pair of ski socks, and fur-lined, hooded parkas; but it seemed that nothing would hold that damp cold out. It crept in, took possession, and your whole body shook violently in protest of the freezing, grasping, overpowering clutches of winter. Warm up tents with a stove were erected where possible, but few men could leave the lines at a time to use them. The weather was as great an enemy as the Chinese.

About 1700 the enemy attacked our Fox Co. in the waning light of early darkness. They used fast-firing Thompson Submachineguns which The U.S. had equipped the Chinese National Army with to fight in World War II. At no time during this ghost-like encounter did the marines see the white cloaked Chinese, but fired at sound, voices, exercising good fire discipline and control. Our heavy machineguns, which had served so faithfully into Koto-ri, added their chatter of death to the small arms fire. Soon our 81MM mortars were landing in covered approaches and draws. The marines who were on the ridge, though badly outnumbered, knew that the enemy was once again facing the coordinated and fire-planned defensive fire of trained and determined men. Grenades crashed in a flurry of exchange, and the fighting quieted down. The Chinese had gone. Volunteers quickly grabbed stretchers and started up the slope to bring out the wounded and the dead. This was an agonizing task, but one that was done willingly because the men who were hit would freeze to death before morning if they did not get help. I lost a good friend in that fight, a staff sergeant whose company and comradeship I had enjoyed since Camp Lejeune, N.C, a man with 18 years in the marines behind him, and a man who had taught me much about the lore and tradition of The Corps. They brought him down almost unrecognizable in death. I felt like crying, but continual sudden death all around you protected your heart with a certain callousness. It was a dull, aching pain, but you knew those brave marines were now at peace, they had warmth, and the conflicts of the world would no longer disturb their lives. A quick prayer for a lost friend, and then back to your job. Work helped you forget.

The next day and night passed quickly, and certain marine elements started down the pass. The engineers had repaired the bridge, and other marines had established strong outposts along the pass to guard us on the way down. This was the final move, the move to the valley where the temperature would be 20 to 30° higher, and we would know warmth we had all but forgotten. Our hearts beat high with hope and we eagerly awaited the coming of dawn.

With the first ray of light came the most bitter cold of the northern campaign. The termperature was better than 20° below zero. Under these extreme conditions men had to take care of their toilet, keep their weapons operating and vehicles running. All food was frozen solid and pogey bait was still the main diet of the fighting men. Canteens had to be carried inside your clothing so your body temperature would keep the water from freezing and drinkable. Fires during the night were not allowed but, during the day, any stop of over ten minute duration would find little fires springing up all along the line. Men huddled around them while others watched, ever alert to the dangers around them. The position of a squatting marine with hand extended over the fire soon bore the nickname of "The Hagaru Clutch." The tremendous adverse conditions had not destroyed the men's sense of humor. They were typical Americans, the boys of Americans.

The movement down the pass, through tedious and bitter cold, was completed by the 2nd Bn., 7th Marines without enemy opposition. A fierce wind whirled the snow in vast clouds and progress was painfully slow. The vehicles had to be com-

* For an account of this action, see Col Francis Fox Parry's article in *MCG*, Nov87.

pletely cautious while navigating the tortuous hairpin curves with steep cliffs and ice covered road. Vehicles that broke down were destroyed and pushed over the side to enable the seemingly endless column to continue to move. The marines manning the strongpoints for our protection shouted words of praise and encouragement to us. Every marine's heart knew that we had won. The column continued like a huge snake winding, slipping, sliding and crawling down and around the huge mountain, finally slipping into the valley we had left so many days before. We moved back through Massacre Valley where we had first fought the Chinese and where, though they had overrun our C.P. (Command Post), we had routed them and driven them back up to the plateau. Some unpleasant moments and memories were recalled, but they were overwhelmed by the experiences we had suffered since. On we moved to the waiting trucks of marines and army, and the trains efficiently run by army transportation personnel. The trip was rapid to Hungnam, warm tents, and hot, fresh food followed by exhausted sleep. The situation, once so precarious, was well in hand.

The attack from Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri to Hungnam will never be forgotten by the brave men who made it, nor will the sacrifices of those who dropped and died on the way. Those men are hallowed in our memories and revered by all marines everywhere. The job was well done. No wounded or dead were left behind us without evacuation or proper burial, and no usable vehicles, material, equipment, or arms and ammunition would fall into Chinese hands. We simply destroyed what we couldn't bring, and we brought out more than anybody expected us to. To the quick and the dead of that fight to the sea the Nation owes a tribute for their fortitude, courage, bravery, spirit, and sacrifices. The accomplishments of the Marine Corps should never be forgotten, and her traditions and Esprit de Corps should never be destroyed.

Darling, this is the story of marines who fought, froze and died, while the outside world waited with abated breath, to succeed in a mission against overwhelming odds of enemy and weather. Yet, in the Pentagon Building in Washington D.C., they still talk of abolishing the Marine Corps. We have proved again and again our usefulness and readiness, that no fight or sacrifice is too great for us, and we cannot understand the reasons of those who would terminate this glorious arm of our Armed Services. I hope in some way this letter will help the people of our country to realize what the Marine Corps means to them. I hope many of them will write their Congressmen and Senators and express their feelings. We accomplish the unaccomplishable on miserable appropriations and with no seat on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. To destroy the Marine Corps would be the destruction of part of America and her glorious history.

Your ever devoted, adoring and
loving husband,

Jimmy

P.S. Dear, a couple of the officers read this and liked it very much. If dad could send me back a couple of carbon copies, I would sure appreciate it.

More 'n more love,
Your Jim

It is my desire that every Marine and Sailor serving in our Corps should have the opportunity to read the above letter. To me, it says it all — in terms of what our Marine Corps is all about!

COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

Chapter Two

THE CHALLENGE OF PEACETIME LEADERSHIP

In peace we should do everything possible to prepare the minds of our soldiers for the strain of battle. We must repeatedly warn them that war brings with it surprise and tremendously deep impressions. We must prepare them for the fact that each minute of battle brings with it a new assault on nerves. As soldiers of the future, we ourselves should strive to realize that we will be faced in war by many new and difficult impressions; dangers that are thus foreseen are already half overcome.

Captain Adolf von Schell
Battle Leadership

We have, in my view, too much careerism creeping into the officer corps. What do I mean by careerism? Officers who worry more about themselves and how they are going to get ahead than they do about the people they are privileged to lead. Gen Kelley spoke to officers for three years on this topic. We let him down and obviously haven't done enough about it. We are going to continue the effort; we're going to stamp out careerism in your Corps.

General A. M. Gray
29th Commandant of the Marine Corps

As a leader in peacetime, your primary mission is preparing your Marines for war. All other missions are secondary, no matter how important they may appear. Marines are the nation's front-line warriors--*the first to fight.* Since our nation's birth more than 214 years ago, Marines have always been among the first into battle in times of crises. In today's rapidly changing world, your unit could find itself in combat with little or no warning. How you prepare for combat now will determine how well you fight then.

As all Marines know, preparing for war during peacetime can be an extremely challenging task. The hectic tempo of many FMF units leaves little time for small unit leaders to train their Marines. Often, day-to-day matters unrelated to combat take up so much time that you find little left over to train for your combat mission. Sometimes, it seems that **everything** else has priority over preparing for combat.

Let's study some of the difficulties that prevent you from preparing your Marines for war. First, we will look at two that are inherent in the nature of your profession as a Marine--the absence of deadly force in training, and the uncertainty over who, when, and where Marines will next fight.

THE WARRIOR PROFESSION

Imagine that you are a college student studying to become a civil engineer. Your curriculum includes classes that are both educational, teaching mathematics and engineering principles, and practical, designing buildings, bridges, and roadways, based on the knowledge that you've been taught. Your curriculum may include an apprenticeship with an engineering firm working on real engineering problems, not just those of the classroom. By the time you graduate, you will have at least some practical experience doing the things civil engineers do. Likewise, doctors, lawyers, and teachers also receive as students at least some practical experience in their respective fields.

The military profession is different. Because combat is a test of wills where men fight and die, you don't train for combat like a medical student trains to become a doctor. While law students may hold "moot court," simulating the things they will do in a trial, Marines don't train for combat by doing live fire, free-play exercises.

The gap between training for combat and combat itself causes a number of difficulties for a leader charged with training his unit. Perhaps the biggest challenge is creating the level of stress in training exercises that men will experience in combat. No one can do this completely because of a fundamental paradox: While casualties are inherent in combat, you cannot design a training exercise where men try to kill or wound each other.

The absence of deadly force in training can teach bad habits. Two infantry forces engaged in mock combat and firing only blanks develop a problem called the *blank fire syndrome*. Because men are not being hit with real bullets, they may do things in a training exercise that would kill them in combat. Even MILES equipment that simulates "kills" is not a perfect solution. The laser beam from a MILES transmitter doesn't penetrate smoke or foliage, so a Marine using concealment, but not necessarily cover, can avoid being "killed." Similarly, a MILES battle is a direct fire war. Indirect fire, the main killer on most modern battlefields, plays little or no role. Unless carefully monitored, Marines using MILES equipment learn some bad habits.

Similarly, the absence of deadly force in training prevents you from conclusively testing the mettle of your Marines. In combat, many of your Marines will surprise you. Some whom you count on to lead bravely will disappoint you. Others, who under peacetime conditions are more reserved, will surface in a crisis and lead valiantly. As S. L. A. Marshall noted in *Men Against Fire:*

> *. . . no commander is capable of the actual leading of an entire company in combat, . . . the spread of strength and the great variety of the commander's problems are together beyond any one man's compass, and . . . therefore a part of his problem in combat is to determine which are the moral leaders among his men when under fire, and having found them, give all support and encouragement to their effort.*

Other difficulties also hinder you from preparing for war as well as you would like to. Imagine that you are the coach of a football team which is about to begin practicing for the fall season. Like other coaches, you have complete knowledge of your schedule, whom you will play, and when and where you will play them. This allows you to watch game films, scout each team, and practice for them in a logical sequence. But suppose that the day before your first game, your schedule gets rearranged and you discover you're playing a team different from the one you prepared for? Suddenly, your defense has to go against an offense that uses a pro set and passes a lot, instead of one that runs primarily from the wishbone formation. Do you think you'll have much success stopping the other team's offense?

In the Marine Corps, such occurrences are the rule, not the exception. In October of 1983, the Marines of BLT 2/8 left Camp Lejeune, N. C., headed for Beirut and a defensive-oriented peacekeeping mission. Their training leading up to this deployment focused on preparing them for this mission. But shortly after leaving port, they were suddenly tasked with securing the northern half of the island of Grenada in an amphibious landing. They had less than 48 hours to plan and prepare for the operation. As the nation's foremost expeditionary force, Marines must anticipate future occurrences like this. Expeditionary warfare demands that forces be flexible enough to fight practically anyone anywhere on a moment's notice.

The dangerous nature of the warrior profession, your profession, demands excellence more than any other. Bad lawyers lose court cases, and poor businessmen fail to make money. But poor military leadership gets men killed unnecessarily in combat. That is why it is so important that you never forget your primary peacetime mission: *preparing for war.*

PEACETIME PRESSURES

Some of the things that divert your attention from preparing for war are inherent to the nature of your profession. You have learned two in the preceding section: you cannot employ deadly force in training and you cannot know who, where, and when you will next fight.

But there are some other detractors that are largely created by Marines. It is especially important to recognize what these are, because you and other Marine leaders can change them. One of the most dangerous is peacetime pressures on ethics.

As a Marine Officer or NCO, you think of yourself as a professional. One of the characteristics that defines a professional is a strong sense of ethics. Each profession--medicine, law, the clergy--has a formal or informal code of ethics. In fact, such a code defines a profession. Without a strong commitment to ethical behavior, no group has a right to think of itself as a profession.

The Marine Corps does not have a formal code of ethics. But every Marine leader must have a strong sense of ethical behavior if he is to be worthy of the name "Marine." In combat, ethics are critical to success. For example, you want Marines to value honesty and selflessness because these qualities help develop trust. Trust is a vital part of unit cohesion--of the unit becoming a tightly knit team--which is in turn a major part of your Marines' willingness to fight. A unit where Marines do not trust each other probably will not fight well. They are likely to panic when faced with danger.

Ideally, the ethics that Marines follow in peacetime should be those they will need to succeed in war. Peacetime values are important because when war comes, you cannot quickly instill new values. But from experience, you know that in peacetime some of the values that are tolerated, even admired, are not those that will win in combat. Let's look at a few of these negative values and how they detract from preparing for war.

Selfishness

In combat, the unselfish man is capable of extraordinary deeds. If necessary, he places himself at great peril, risking or giving his life to accomplish the mission or save fellow Marines. Selfless service to Corps and country is one of the highest virtues any Marine can strive for. It is especially important in leaders. A Marine leader should seek to serve others, not himself.

But in peacetime, there are many pressures that lead toward selfishness. Perhaps the most dangerous is careerism. A careerist is a Marine who puts personal career success ahead of the well-being of the Corps and his fellow Marines. He uses other Marines rather than serving them.

You have undoubtedly seen careerism in action. One way it often shows itself is in pressure to make looking good your goal rather than actually being good. When something happens that will make the leader look bad, if he is a careerist, he covers it up instead of really fixing it. You may have seen careerists falsify training records, "hide" Marines during inspections, or manipulate the MCI Unit Activity Report (UAR) to increase the unit's completion percentage. Such actions, no matter how the leader explains them, are rooted in careerism.

Careerism strikes directly at ethics. It encourages professional dishonesty. Falsifying training records may seem minor, but it establishes a precedent of dishonesty that can affect far more important things. As Col. David Hackworth wrote on the peacetime Army of the 1950s in *About Face*:

> *. . . A CO simply couldn't fail. His troopers' shooting ability, their parade-ground skills, even their attendance at Troop Information classes over the past year all had to be 100 percent, or at least look 100 percent, if a commander was to survive on the peacetime battlefield. Everyone knew it, and as we got better and better at stretching the truth, we came to believe that some lies were even "okay." We never failed, and in the quest for "zero defects," we made sure our subordinates never failed. Our sham of perfection set an unspoken precedent for bigger lies and far more serious half-truths; little did we know that just a few years down the road, each and every one of them would ricochet back on the Army as an institution, with the repercussions of it all enough to shake America to its core.*

Careerism also works against several other qualities Marines need to win in combat. For example, it discourages boldness. Leaders who worry most about "looking good" avoid anything that may result in mistakes. They avoid taking risks, which requires boldness. They are the people who are always demanding "zero defects," instead of demanding initiative and allowing subordinates to learn from mistakes. In the *Marine Corps Gazette* in 1989, General Boomer, Commanding General of the 4th Marine Division, wrote:

> *. . . The zero defects state of mind, while certainly not crippling our organization, has dealt it a hard blow. I did not realize how insidious and pervasive the disease of zero defects until I began to examine it carefully, especially as it affects the 4th Marine Division. I suspect all parts of the Corps are experiencing the same symptoms.*
>
> *. . . The problem is that we are not close to realizing our potential, and one of the primary reasons is the mindset that has quietly crept into our consciousness in the past decade and a half. We have become more interested in form than substance, statistics than truth, fear than trust, inspection grades than true capability, and burdened with "CYA" paperwork that is "strangling" commanding officers at every level. I believe all of this is related to zero defects.*

Another quality that careerism works against is candor. Candor--the ability to speak up and give your honest opinion--is a must for any leader. The careerist lacks candor, because he fears that if his superior does not like what he says, it may endanger his career. Too many Marines simply "go along with whatever the boss says" because they lack the courage to speak up. Ultimately, this leaves superiors blind as to the weaknesses in their unit, which can have disastrous consequences in wartime.

Popularity over Respect

Careerism is not the only ethical failing Marine leaders must guard against. Another is a desire to be popular at all costs. By itself, popularity isn't a bad thing. No one strives to be unpopular. But when the desire to "be a nice guy" prevents a leader from enforcing standards, popularity becomes a problem. In "*Notes From Vietnam,*" Col Hackworth explained how this trait detracted from junior-level leadership in his battalion:

> *The biggest shortcomings of the young infantry leaders (including NCOs and officers--01-03s--with an average of less than four years service) are the failure to be demanding, and their reluctance to insure that their men do the basic things which keep them alive on the battlefield.*
>
> *I believe one of the reasons for this deficiency is that many of the social values acquired as a civilian, conflict diametrically with what is expected of a leader. Our training system should recognize this conflict and alter those values. A case in point of just one civilian instilled value which drastically conflicts with combat leadership--this value is popularity.*
>
> *Great emphasis is placed in the American society to instill the "virtue" of being a popular fellow. The formal part of this training starts at kindergarten when the importance of socializing is first introduced and is thereafter never ending. The informal training begins at mother's hand almost at first breath. Hence, the young man when first entering the army has had about twenty years indoctrination of "being a nice guy." After four years of college*

ROTC training or forty-six weeks of BCT, AIT, OCS training, he is supposed to be the well prepared leader who always places the welfare of the troops just below the accomplishment of the mission. But in actual fact, the average leader has a virtual Pavlovian instinct towards being popular. He must be a good guy! Thus, he becomes a "joiner" instead of an "enforcer."

In Vietnam, good guys let their people smoke at night and take portable radios to the field; allow night ambushes to set up in the abandoned hootch, so they can have protection from the rain and will only need one guard by the door so everyone else can get a good night's rest. Good guys let their men leave their boots on for several days, resulting in inordinately severe immersion foot. Good guys don't check to insure that their men protect themselves against mosquitos or take the required malaria pills and salt pills. Good guys end up killing their men with kindness!

The Bottom Line: Moral Courage

Col. Hackworth rightly sees the root of the problem as a lack of moral courage. Marines are noted for courage. But they tend to think of courage primarily as physical courage. In war, physical courage is very important; it requires great physical courage to act in the face of deadly enemy fire. Physical courage is also demanded in peacetime, as any Marine who has rappelled at night from a helicopter knows.

But physical courage alone is not enough in war or in peace. Moral courage is also required. In peacetime, the need to be courageous morally is likely to be the greater challenge.

What is moral courage? *It is the courage to say and do what is right regardless of the personal consequences.* Physical courage requires you to do what is right--what is necessary to perform your mission--despite the danger of physical injury or death. Moral courage also requires you to face dangers, but the dangers are more subtle. They may be dangers to your career, to your popularity, to your acceptance by your peers, or to your personal image. But the essence of what courage means is the same. It is the willingness to accept possible injury to yourself in order to do what you must to serve your fellow Marines, your Corps, and your country.

Moral courage, however, can often be an even tougher challenge than physical courage, especially in peacetime. For example, if you have been ordered to attack an enemy machine gun nest, you and those around you all know what must be done. If you do not have the courage to advance in the face of enemy fire, you will fail in a mission your commander has assigned you, and everyone else will see your lack of courage. But in situations that demand moral courage, like telling your boss that the unit's tactics are poor, only you may know what you should do. No one else will see your lack of courage if you simply keep your mouth shut and allow the problem to continue. No one will know you have failed in your mission--the mission of preparing your unit for war. Moral courage is a private courage, a form of conscience. It is usually only you who knows when you have been cowardly. That makes cowardice comparatively easy, and courage comparatively more difficult.

But moral courage is just as necessary as physical courage if the Marine Corps is to win in combat. Only moral courage can maintain the high ethical standards that the Corps requires. Only moral courage can make certain that deficiencies are uncovered in peacetime and fixed. Only moral courage can ensure that you prepare effectively and realistically for combat, instead of just "looking good." And if Marines do not have the moral courage to do these things in peacetime, then they are not likely to have the moral courage to make difficult decisions on which may hinge the outcome of a battle or a campaign.

WHAT'S REALLY IMPORTANT?

One of the places where moral courage is required is in answering the question of what's really important. As a Marine, you know how many demands are placed on your time and attention. There is more to be done than anyone can do, even working eighteen hour days. To deal with all the demands, you have to set priorities. That is, you have to ask yourself, *What's really important*?

In the last section, you saw that there are some negative pressures in the Marine Corps, pressures to act unethically. Similarly, there are pressures to give the wrong answer to the question of what's really important.

You already know what the right answer is. It is the theme of this chapter. The most important thing is *preparing for war.* Unless you and other Marine leaders always realize this and act on it, the Marine Corps is likely to find itself in trouble the next time it goes into combat.

But from experience, you know that other things often take priority over combat training. Constant personnel demands for working parties, guard duty, and the Fleet Assistance Program (FAP) often leave you with only a fraction of your Marines available for training. Similarly, administrative demands and frequent inspections cut into the time you have available for training. Sometimes these demands contribute to combat readiness, but usually not. Too often, you spend most of your time and resources doing things that contribute little to your wartime mission.

You need to recognize what these things are because they are minefields. In combat, you need to recognize a minefield so you can go around it. Similarly, you need to recognize the minefields in peacetime routine so you can avoid them. Just like a real minefield, they can kill you in combat.

There are at least three major wrong answers to the question of what's really important, answers common enough that you have probably encountered them. The first relates to what you learned earlier about ethics. It's the answer, *What's really important is looking good.*

There are many ways a unit can look good---without really being good, without being able to fight effectively and win. One common way is through numbers. Statistics can make a unit look good: blood drives, charitable contributions, UA rates, and rifle range scores, to mention just a few. Each of these taken alone has merit, but when they are used just to "look good," they can easily be misleading. A unit can score at the top in every one of them and still not be ready for combat. Of course, when people leading the unit have an ethics problem and the numbers are falsified, then the difference between "looking good" and **being** good is even greater.

Another way of looking good is physical appearance. Some units put great amounts of time and effort into this. Everyone has spit-shined boots and starched utilities. You could eat off the guard room floor. All the rocks have been freshly painted. If these are things Marines do on their own to show their pride in their unit, then they can be part of being good. But too often, they are "by direction," so someone up top looks good. Again, there is a tie-in with ethical problems. That person may be trying to look good to advance his own career.

One more common way of looking good is "dog and pony show" training. This training has little or no value in preparing for combat; in fact, it often detracts from combat readiness because it wastes valuable time and resources (fuel and ammunition) on a VIP "demonstration" that usually demonstrates very little. Unlike combat training, dog and pony shows are often carefully rehearsed to "look good," not to demonstrate real fighting ability.

Looking good instead of being good is one wrong answer to the question, What's really important? Another wrong answer is measuring input instead of output. The Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES) can be an example of measuring input, not output. Used correctly, the MCCRES can be a valuable training tool. But sometimes, evaluators focus on how well the unit completes the task list, not on how the unit actually performs against the enemy--its tactical results. Some units score well on the MCCRES and yet are not really ready for combat. Good units want MCCRES to tell them whether they are ready for combat, whether they can produce real tactical results. What counts in combat is results, not how you get them. But too often, the MCCRES is used just to see how well a unit can perform steps on a checklist.

A third common wrong answer to the question of what is important is safety. This is not to say safety is unimportant. The life and health of every Marine means a great deal to every other Marine. Safety is a major consideration at all times. But when it becomes the **only** consideration, you can get into trouble. After all, a unit could train in perfect safety if it only fired squirt guns. But it wouldn't be very well trained for combat.

The challenge to Marine leaders is to design training that is safe **and** realistic. A good example is live-fire training. Until recently, whenever an exercise was live-fire, all Marines were carefully kept "on line" for the sake of safety. Unfortunately, this resulted in linear tactics. You will remember from the first course, *Tactical Fundamentals*, that linear tactics are obsolete. In combat, they will lose battles and get Marines killed unnecessarily.

Recently, a number of schools and units have moved to safe, non-linear live fire training. A good example is found at the School of Infantry (SOI) West, in their "Fighting Penetration" field exercise. It is a modern, three-element assault, with the goal of punching a small hole, then blowing on through into the enemy's rear. In it, the Marines making the breach go forward with a satchel charge while their comrades keep up suppressive fire. Bullets are impacting just a few meters from each side of the breaching team once they reach their assault positions. This is realistic. But it is also safe. During 1989, over sixty squads completed the exercise with no injuries. The Marines providing the suppressive fire know the bullets are real, and they are careful not to hit their fellow Marines.

Training that is both safe and realistic is possible. It requires trust, especially when it is live fire. At SOI West, the school trusts the instructors and students. It requires judgment on the part of leaders, rather than simply following fixed rules. **And** it requires very thorough planning.

If you again consider the question of *what's really important*, you return to ethics. You know the right answer. *What's really important* is what best prepares you and your Marines for combat. You also know the pressures to give other answers, like the answers discussed here. You know those answers are wrong. As Marine leaders, you must have the moral courage to refuse to give the wrong answers and to insist on the right one, not only in words, but in deeds. At whatever level you lead, you must act to ensure you make *preparing for combat* your top priority. You must remind yourself and, when necessary, others that the price for giving the wrong answers is eventually paid in the blood of fellow Marines.

THE CHANGING NATURE OF WAR

The peacetime challenges which you have learned thus far require you to look hard at yourself. But as military professionals, Marines must also look outward, at the world around them in which they may have to fight. Throughout history, no military has been able to determine perfectly beforehand what the next war would be like. Today, the problem is even greater than it was in the past. German General Franz Uhle-Wettler has written:

> *. . . Modern weapons, however, have dominated the battlefield for only a short time and must then make room for ever newer weapons. The rapid-firing breechloaders determined the outcome of the German Wars of Unification, machine guns the First World War, tanks as well as aircraft the Second World War. New weapons systems--nuclear weapons as well as anti-tank guided missiles, area fire weapons, new forms of armor and new types of minefields--will affect a future conflict without our being able to safely say which one of these new weapons is in the forefront and how it will affect tactics. At an earlier time, a commander could be certain that a future war would resemble past and present ones. This enabled him to analyze appropriate tactics from past and present. The troop commander of today no longer has this possibility. He knows only that whoever fails to adapt the experiences of the last war will surely lose the next one.*

If the Marine Corps is to prepare as well as possible for the next conflict, it must have leaders who are thinking about what it may be like. This should cause you to reflect again on what it means to be a military professional--a leader of Marines. The military professional knows his field. He reads and studies military history and the current ideas on leadership, tactics, and strategy. That is why the Commandant has established a professional reading program for all Marine Officers, SNCOs, and NCOs.

But a professional does more than that. On the basis of what he learns through reading and his own personal experiences, he undertakes to think originally about his field. He does not simply wait to be told what to think and what to do. He anticipates the future as best he can by using his own creative intellect and imagination. This is one of the most important tasks in a peacetime military, because it relates directly to how well that military is able to anticipate the nature of the next conflict and to adjust to it rapidly, at every level, when it comes.

How can you do this? There is no right or wrong answer to this question. You may have ideas of your own, based on your own professional study and reflection. One way that may be useful is to think again about the three generations of warfare discussed in the first course, *Tactical Fundamentals*. The Marine Corps is currently attempting to change from second to third generation warfare--maneuver warfare. But it is not likely that generational change will cease with the third generation. What might come next? What might fourth generation warfare be like? Those questions may help you think about the future.

If you look around the world at recent conflicts, you can see some things that may point toward the fourth generation. One is the growing importance of the media, especially television, as a weapon. One of the reasons people commit terrorist acts is to get media attention for their cause. The media are likely to play a major role in any low intensity conflict, as they did in Vietnam.

This may seem to be "above your pay grade," but it is not. For example, let's say you are entering a village with your squad or platoon in a low intensity conflict. You take fire from the far end of the village. You notice that the wind is coming strongly from behind you, so you decide to set fire to the village and burn the enemy out. But a news crew is filming your actions. That night, all across the country, Americans see Marines setting fire to a village. You may have succeeded in driving out the enemy with the flames, but who do you think will have won that battle?

Another signpost pointing to the next generation of warfare may be the drug war. Drug lords do not have tanks, fighter planes, uniforms, or flags. They do not officially have countries. But they are waging a deadly and effective war against America. Just as third generation warfare goes around the enemy's infantry and other front line forces to strike deep in his rear, so drugs go around our government, military, courts, and police and strike directly at the American people. They can strike at the Marines in your own unit, with deadly results. How can America defend itself against drugs? How can the Marine Corps best contribute to this defense? These are questions that every Marine leader should think about.

As a leader of Marines, you should not only think about the future of warfare, but apply your thoughts to the training and education of the Marines under your charge. In areas like the drug war, you and they can do much to help your local community. In other areas, you may come up with some innovative training ideas. If the Marine Corps is to prepare itself for tomorrow's battlefield, the time to start thinking about what that battlefield may be like and training for it is now.

CONCLUSION

FMFM 1, *Warfighting*, has a chapter on preparing for war and another on the conduct of war. It recognizes that while these two things are different, they are equally necessary parts of the same whole. If Marines do not prepare effectively for war, they will not fight well when they go to war.

The challenge of peacetime leadership is the challenge of preparing effectively for war. In this chapter, you have learned a number of obstacles to preparing effectively for war. You have seen some of the things that you, as a Marine leader, must do to prepare your Marines for war.

Now, the challenge is yours. You must decide whether you are going to have the moral courage necessary to prepare you and your unit for war. You will undoubtedly face pressures to take the easy way out, to prepare only to look good, not to be good. You may help your career if you decide to take that easy way. You may be more popular with your men, your peers, and your seniors.

But if you do that, you are not a Marine leader. You may look like one on the outside, but inside, you will not really be a Marine. Marines do not take the easy way out when that means sacrificing what Marines are all about: winning in combat. In peacetime as in war, Marines do what must be done in order to win, regardless of the cost to themselves.

Do you have the moral courage to really be a Marine? Or are you content just to look like one?

ANNEX B

Selected Articles

All articles reproduced courtesy of *Marine Corps Gazette* Magazine.

Zero Defects—Listen Before It's Too Late

by MajGen Walter E. Boomer

The Commandant has tried to foment a quiet revolution within our Corps by telling us to eliminate the zero defects mentality. But at times, I despair that not all Marines are listening. The zero defects state of mind, while certainly not crippling our organization, has dealt it a hard blow. I did not realize how insidious and pervasive the disease of zero defects until I began to examine it carefully, especially as it affects the 4th Marine Division. I suspect all parts of the Corps are experiencing the same symptoms.

The 4th Division is probably the best Reserve division in the world—well equipped, fairly well trained, and comprised of talented, motivated people. So what's the problem? The problem is that we are not close to realizing our potential, and one of the primary reasons is the mindset that has quietly crept into our consciousness in the past decade and a half. We have become more interested in form than substance, statistics than truth, fear than trust, inspection grades than true capability, and burdened with "CYA" paperwork that is "strangling" commanding officers at every level. I believe all of this is related to zero defects.

The effect of the disease is reflected clearly in the training schedules of the 4th Marine Division. They are the only pieces of paper that no one seems interested in, despite the fact they reflect the heart and soul of the division. In many of the training schedules you find things such as a weekend devoted to a mobilization exercise. This doesn't look so bad until you understand what it means. It is a practice for an inspection. It reflects inspection paranoia. Mobilization and Readiness Deployment Tests (MORDTs) are no-notice inspections in the Selected Marine Corps Reserve that examine, among other things, personnel recall and administrative and logistical readiness to deploy. In some cases the unit is loaded aboard aircraft and flown to a training site. The fear of not being perfect on these inspections had been so inculcated into the psyche of the division that it wasn't uncommon to find one or more precious drill weekends—we only have 12 plus a 2-week training period, usually in the summer—wasted on practicing for the inspection. Before the inspector general's inspection was incorporated into the division's inspection program, it too gobbled up at least two weekends when units should have been in the field. Now the commanding general's inspection is combined with the no-notice MORDT, and practices for it are not allowed.

782 gear is issued piece by piece to weekend warriors.

What's the result? Well, all our units are not perfect, but they never were, even when they practiced for the inspection. I am not concerned that a unit has weaknesses, as long as the commanding officer knows, cares, and is trying to correct them. Striving for excellence is what we should be doing. Demanding perfection is foolish. But the zero defects sickness caused this inspection paranoia.

Despite the fact that today's young Marines—by anyone's standards—are damned good, many of us are still treating them like children, instead of expecting great things from them. This, too, is caused by the disease. Much to my chagrin, I discovered the 782 gear of the division locked up in supply spaces and issued to Marines piece by piece when they came to weekend training. I call it "canteen cup mentality." The problem with such a procedure is it takes two or three hours to issue 782 gear out and the same amount of time to turn it in—precious training time! When I directed units to issue it permanently to their Marines and let them take it home, the hue and cry was surprising. The sorry excuses I heard as to why it shouldn't be done from some of our leaders was disheartening. We are going to have a few individuals who walk away with their 782 gear, and we will not recover it. But is that any reason to treat an entire division like recruits instead of Marines? The minuscule loss is the cost of doing business. It is not lack of concern over supply matters. We must instill a sense of responsibility in our Marines. A "canteen cup mentality" subconsciously erodes their belief in themselves. There probably was a time during the late sixties and seventies when we needed to lock up everything we owned, but those days are over and our thinking must change.

The intelligence of young Marines is unsurpassed in my experience, yet they continue to tell me they are not solicited for ideas and thoughts by their leaders, nor are they really turned loose to do anything. I realize this isn't true in every unit, but I know we have not made enough progress in this area. In combat, corporals and sergeants do the fighting and carry the battle. Make no mistake about that. They are begging to be loaded with commensurate responsibility in peacetime, and we had better give it to them if we expect them to perform in war. If we allow young Marines to do what they should be doing, are they going to make mistakes? Of course! But that is the only way they will learn. We have a moral obli-

gation to let them try. If your unit is still afflicted with the zero defects disease however, there is little hope. Officers are going to continue to do staff noncommissioned officers' work, and they in turn, are going to do the corporal's job.

The mind-numbing flood of absolutely useless paperwork that is drowning the Marine Corps is another symptom. If you examine it closely, the majority is simply CYA garbage. Often, we don't have the courage to give someone a mission and let them get on with it. We feel better when we have a piece of paper from them in our files telling us they did what we told them to do. It's crazy, and we are all guilty. We have eliminated 22 4th Marine Division reports. More will go. These useless reports exist in your unit, too. Attack them as an enemy, and we will make progress; unless of course, you don't trust your Marines and are afraid some inspector will want to see that piece of paper that will certify you didn't (heaven forbid) make a mistake.

The Commandant has done all he can. The rest is up to us. We can eradicate the zero defects disease. I suggest we get on with the job before it's too late and we become a Corps of sheep, afraid to take reasonable risks, afraid to let our subordinates do anything, and afraid to trust each other. USMC

>MajGen Boomer is commanding general, 4th Marine Division.

A 1984 MajGen Harold W. Chase Prize Essay Contest Entry

Coping With the Big Picture

by Capt R. Scott Moore

As I stood in front of my commanding officer, all I could think of was the class at The Basic School just a few months ago, the one that stated that training my Marines was the most important mission I would face as a platoon commander. Now, after complaining that a third of my platoon was on regimental working parties and questioning the usefulness of an upcoming VIP demonstration, I was hearing, for the first time, the phrase that has haunted many Marine officers—"Lieutenant, you don't understand the big picture."

Eight years have passed since I first heard that phrase and, to my horror, I have used it myself. During those eight years, as I have moved through a wide variety of billets, command and staff in and out of the Fleet Marine Force, I have diligently searched for the big picture and tried to make sure I saw it and understood it. A few times, I thought I had located it, particularly when assigned to the Washington area, but it ultimately eluded me. I realize now that the big picture may be too complex for anyone to truly master. Yet, I have managed to stumble across bits of the big picture—perhaps enough to help other Marines who have heard the haunting phrase, understand the reference and put it in perspective.

The key to the enigma of the big picture is that there is no single big picture but many, often mutually exclusive, pictures. One view of it can be found by spending 52 minutes listening to the Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare Presentation Team. During that short period, the team clearly outlines Marine Corps missions, force structure, newly developed weapons, and operational methods. The future of maritime pre-positioning is explained, together with the Marine Corps' critical contribution to national strategy. In less than an hour, one comes away with a clear appreciation of the Marine Corps' roles and missions and what it is expected to contribute to national defense. Reflection on this view provides simple explanations for a variety of questions. It clarifies confusing actions, such as the activation of additional combat service support units while combat units are pared. MPS requires additional logistics units to meet demands of forward-based equipment. Concurrent reductions in infantry battalion strength are compensated by additional firepower.

Unfortunately, the big picture portrayed by the Amphibious Warfare Presentation Team is altered into something else by day-to-day realities. Bureaucratic politics, embodied in a system known as PPBS (Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System) have twisted the big picture. Annual budget cycles, Congressional pork-barreling, and political jealousies combine with hundreds of pet projects living in the Pentagon—and Headquarters Marine Corps—to distort the big picture. The wonder is not that the big picture mends after innumerable distortions, but that it survives at all. One need only look at the recurring battles over Marine Corps missions, vehemently guarded from political trenchlines redug every 20 years, to realize the enormous pressures that buffet the big picture.

Yet, if the big picture faced only such external threats, it would probably remain clear to the average Marine. The greatest challenge to the big picture resides within the Corps, among the very Marines who espouse its virtues. The big picture, ironically, reels under the assault of thousands of disjointed little pictures. Well-meaning Marines, afflicted with understandable myopia as they struggle with daily problems, seldom realize the impact of their actions. Personal biases, outdated experiences, and well-intentioned mistakes combine to obscure the big picture. A visit to Headquarters Marine Corps reveals less a smoothly functioning brain than a disjointed anthill, with each ant apparently scrambling in a different direction. Marine Corps policies, designed to instill order, are subject to thousands of interpretations and applications.

Throughout the Marine Corps, the daily little pictures are painted over the master—some enhancing it, many simply covering and hiding it. Perhaps Marine Corps training illustrates this as clearly as anything. Training's ultimate objective is combat readiness, a concept accepted by every Marine. Yet, somehow, daily and weekly training schedules abound with activities unrelated to combat. Countless unprioritized requirements fill the hours, and such time-consuming events as Navy Relief drives, VIP demonstrations, multiple preinspections, and corroborating

paperwork eat at planned schedules. Even when training time is available, other requirements sap the strength of units as Marines literally disappear. No one argues that combat training is top priority, yet each day combat training is somehow overshadowed by other considerations. The little pictures, however contradictory, manage to obscure the big picture.

Scattered throughout the Corps are those Marines who have flourished despite the obstacles of the big picture. Perhaps not surprisingly, they can be found at all levels in the chain of command; often their measure of success is not symbolized by rank, rather it can be seen on their faces—a look of satisfaction and eagerness missing on many of their peers. Some are known throughout the Corps; others may never be known outside their platoons. Yet, they all possess a common characteristic, they have mastered the big picture.

The common traits exhibited by these Marines are surprisingly simple. First, each has demonstrated a clear sense of perspective. Able to appreciate what is possible, they waste little time attempting to change conditions beyond their control. Instead, they set about transforming that which is within their grasp. Many Marines know company commanders who spend most of their time trying to get the battalion staff to shift its priorities. The resulting frustration by the commander is predictable. The truly successful company commanders set about molding their units, over which they have control, into models of what the big picture says they should be. Vexing as VIP demonstrations may be, they are somehow transformed into training evolutions. As one successful company commander stated, "make your little corner of the Marine Corps the best it can be and don't worry about everyone else's." Such a sense of perspective has enabled many Marines to bring the big picture into clearer focus despite its contradictions.

Coping with the big picture problem also demands the ability to see through the daily fog and recognize what the big picture should be. This requires a level of professional expertise beyond that required to perform immediate duties. Beginning with a knowledge of the art of war and its history, Marines must be experts at amphibious warfare, combined arms operations, and the Marine Corps doctrine supporting each. This requires more than technical knowledge pertinent to a particular level in the operational chain. Particularly important is a keen appreciation of institutional and operational military history. This will often avoid the trial-and-error nature of problem solving employed by many. Given a thorough professional understanding of Marine Corps roles and of warfare and its history, daily problems that seem overbearing tend to mellow as the big picture assumes meaning and provides clearer guidelines. Military history offers a series of experiments from which men strive to find answers to conjectural questions. Without a clear picture to maintain direction, however, that striving becomes a pattern of narrow deadends.

The ability to maintain a sense of perspective, tempered with a clear sense of the big picture and its historical origins, will not, in itself, enable Marines to overcome the big picture problem. The final essential ingredient is a clear sense of what is important and what isn't, and the courage to differentiate the two. The baseline is the individual Marine, around which all decisions should revolve. This truism needs no further explanation, for it is drummed into every Marine. Yet, it often seems to be forgotten in a world full of inspections, operational commitments, and ambitious Marines. None of these are bad, indeed they enable the Marine Corps to remain healthy. They do, however, get out of hand and overshadow the truly important. The solutions are obvious and simple and have been the subject of numerous GAZETTE articles lamenting the encroachment of careerism and the seeming loss of "old Corps" values. They will not be belabored here. Yet, none of these solutions can be implemented without moral courage. This implies the courage to forego actions that neglect or adversely affect the big picture. Every Marine has stood (or will soon stand) an inspector general's or commanding general's inspection. Failure to pass can seriously damage a promising career. To an extent, this is necessary, for every inspection to some extent measures readiness. Yet, few Marines who have stood such inspections haven't worked long hours and at times threatened to compromise personal integrity, in order to compensate for inadequacies over which there is little control. Training may be disrupted for several weeks to overcome often superficial deficiencies brought on by operational commitments or lack of personnel. The resulting artificial picture usually pleases the inspection team but leaves behind weary Marines who doubt their role and clearly recognize they have been driven by a highly bastardized version of the big picture.

Coping with such situations demands a level of courage. While every reasonable effort should be made to meet an inspection's requirements, they should not become all-consuming. A commanding officer must be able to tell an inspector that his unit may not meet certain standards because of uncontrollable deficiencies. More important, he cannot allow such momentary demands to divert his unit from what is truly important. This type of moral courage will require some pioneers to exercise it, but if widespread, the pursuit of excellence would be better directed, and we would have a Marine Corps better focused on the true big picture.

Coping with the big picture problem in its numerous manifestations requires each Marine to combine a sense of perspective and broad professional understanding with the moral courage to act within the parameters defined by the two. While this may not always be easy, it will have two beneficial effects—it will ease many of the daily frustrations stemming from a distorted big picture and, far more critical, will tend to realign the daily little pictures with the bigger view. Combining the three ingredients may not be as painful as one might initially suppose; Marine Corps history abounds with individuals who have done so. "Chesty" Puller and "Howlin' Mad" Smith immediately present themselves. Today, despite all too common perceptions, the so-called "careerist" officers do not often rise to hold the critical leadership positions. Instead, the leaders of the Marine Corps are largely characterized by a deep sense of what is possible and proper. They have the moral courage to act within that realization. While their leadership styles may differ, they do have one common trait, they have mastered the big picture problem to the benefit of the Marine Corps. USMC

The 5.56mm Pencil

by Capt Paul H. Maubert, USMCR

Marine officers are entrusted with the welfare of many people, not to mention large amounts of Government money and property. Out of necessity, officers must be governed by a strict ethical and moral code. The integrity of the officer corps is vital to survival of the Marine Corps as a military organization and, in a broader perspective, even to the survival of the Nation. Yet how many times have we seen officers under pressure embellish lies and half-truths to present a rosy picture to superiors? The following sea stories are based on fact; the names and places have been changed to protect the innocent and others:

• *Camp Lejeune*: A nervous battalion commander paces impatiently in the early April morning chill at the 200-meter line of the rifle range. The first relay of his battalion is about to shoot for qualification. Throughout the week the command has been shooting well below the acceptable qualification rate. This morning there is a slight drizzle, and wind conditions are worse than they have been all week. Soon after his battalion finishes today, the statistics will be known to the regiment and division commanders. It is the agglomeration of statistics such as this that measures the ability of battalion, regiment, and division commanders in the peacetime Marine Corps.

The training officer, a captain particularly noted for his expedient methods of accomplishing tasks, reassures his battalion commander, "Don't worry, sir, we've got it covered. They always shoot better on qual day."

"I don't see how they can improve that much in a day, particularly with this weather," replies the lieutenant colonel, newly returned to the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) after a long hiatus in various non-FMF duties.

As firing progresses, the battalion commander's mood swings from dejected pessimism, to hope, to enthusiastic optimism. In the end, only 5 or 6 out of 400 Marines fail to qualify. However, something is nagging the commander.

"What happened?" the CO asks his training officer.

"Sir," the captain says somewhat smugly, "I'm not certain, but I believe the 5.56mm pencil may have something to do with it."

The battalion commander walks away smiling, pleased by the 98 percent qualification rate, but not without some pangs of guilt. The story of the miracle 5.56mm pencil may even be retold from time to time over beer at happy hour.

• *Aboard an LHA in the Mediterranean:* The second lieutenant is almost through teaching his troops a Marine Corps Institute (MCI) course on land navigation. Through oversight and inexperience, he enrolled his platoon as a group, not realizing the course would be beyond the comprehension level of more than 10 percent of his Marines. The platoon is carrying an MCI completion rate of 100 percent due to the diligence of his platoon sergeant not only in supervising, but in ensuring that no Marine enrolled for a course he could not finish. Now, noncompletion of the course by 5 or more of the 35 Marines in the platoon would bring the company rate below the Headquarters Marine Corps directed standard of 90 percent. To compound the problem, the battalion figure is hovering slightly below 90 percent. The lieutenant discusses the problem with the company commander who pressures him to "find a way" of getting the six academically weak Marines to pass. Considerable coaching and tutoring, however, brings only one to a level where he stands a reasonable chance of passing. The others simply do not have the ability to grasp the mathematical concepts involved. The lieutenant feels distinctly uncomfortable.

Fate intervenes when the battalion's training officer is evacuated for medical reasons to Germany and the platoon commander is transferred to the operations section to take his place. One month later, the graded final examination results come to the desk of the new training officer. He is surprised to see that all of the Marines in his old platoon have passed the examination by a comfortable margin. The examinations have obviously been pencil-whipped. The lieutenant points out the discrepancy to the operations officer and is told in subtle but certain terms to drop the issue, since there is no way to prove anyone had cheated.

• *Camp Pendleton:* A rifle company commander asked one of his platoon commanders into his office to discuss LCpl Smith's situation. LCpl Smith has been in the Marine Corps for four years. He has a young wife and two infant children. Despite constant guidance and coaching, he has shown no improvement in his professional performance, and his personal life has been characterized by a series of domestic problems and high debt. His performance in the field as a fire team leader is well below that of his contem-

Shooting for record—bullet holes or pencil punches?

poraries.

The captain explains to the second lieutenant that LCpl Smith has requested reenlistment for six years. The career planner has promised him a promotion to corporal and choice of duty station, which is for inspector and instructor (I&I) duty with a Reserve unit in his home state. An I&I tour requires the company and battalion commanders to sign statements that the Marine being transferred is suited for the particular demands of independent duty and representing the Marine Corps in the civilian community.

The captain also explains that the company, battalion, and regiment are well below the reenlistment quota and asks the lieutenant if he will recommend Smith for reenlistment. The captain already has an idea of what he will say. The lieutenant apologizes. "Sir, I'm sorry but I can't recommend Smith for either promotion or reenlistment. You know how I feel about him." The captain is also apologetic and explains that despite his concurrence with the lieutenant's position, he is going to recommend Smith for both. He is under tremendous pressure from his immediate superiors to increase his reenlistment percentage. Despite this, he does not further pressure the lieutenant; he understands but cannot as easily afford to be so moralistic, since he is in the zone for major this year.

What is the point of these three not-untypical sea stories? In my opinion there are two fundamental questions here—should these incidents have occurred? and why did they occur?

The answer to the first question is readily apparent to any officer with any moral credibility. *No!* At risk here is the integrity of those officers involved. An officer should not tolerate cheating or accept actions that are essentially fraudulent. Further, the incidents cut ultimately to the combat effectiveness of the Marine Corps and how it will perform in combat. Cheating in these areas may be of minor convenience in peacetime, but will result in catastrophy in combat.

The answer to the second question is more complex. The origins of these problems are as profound as the Defense and Armed Services Act of 1948. The end result has been the bureaucratization of the Services and the trivialization of most aspects of leadership. Numbed by a demand for more and more reports, paperwork, and inspection minutiae, we seem to have lost sight of what is truly important and what is not, grouping all quantifiable aspects of our work into "just another report to be pencil-whipped." We continue to do this even now as reforms may, to some extent, be reducing the pressures to do so.

Recently, there has been a great hue and cry for institutional reform aimed at instilling moral courage. But that is not what I am suggesting here. Looking at the situation realistically, it is unlikely that reform will ever truly flourish in the peacetime environment. It will almost certainly take a major war to really identify the current weaknesses in the system and lift the restraints of an overscrutinized, overdetailed, overregulated, and overreported system—a process that will cost untold lives before revision can be enacted.

" Men may be inexact or even untruthful in ordinary matters, and suffer as a consequence only the desertion of their associates, or even the inconvenience of unfavorable litigation, but the inexact or untruthful soldier trifles with the lives of his fellowmen, and the honor of his government . . . . "

Newton D. Baker
Secretary of War

When officers face a situation where the 5.56mm pencil can be applied, they must ask themselves what impact this will have on their real mission as Marines and its potential costs on the battlefield. Many current problems can be corrected by insisting on what is right, by acting honestly and straightforwardly. I am not claiming that this can be done without injury. It takes courage. Field Marshal Claude de Villars, under similar pressures, wrote in a letter to Louis XIV, "Sire, I am finding it very difficult to serve you well and please you at the same time."

If we make up our minds to adhere to a higher level of integrity, we will find a new simplicity in the application phase. All that is required of us as subordinates is that we:

- Take responsibility for our decisions and actions.
- Give our opinion honestly when asked. Do not tell our superiors what we think they want to hear or repeat the "party line."
- Act with honesty based on the criteria of what is best for one's unit and the Marine Corps' preparedness to fight and not on the pressures of peacetime expediency.
- Remind our superiors that the 5.56mm pencil does not serve the best interests of the Marine Corps by asking, "What effect will this have on the combat readiness of the Corps?"

All that is required of us as superiors is that we:

- Set the example.
- Not just encourage, but insist on adherence to the above principles by our subordinates.
- Serve as insulators for our subordinates from the pressures of careerism and expediency that may come from above.

Alexandre de Marenches, then chief of the French Intelligence Service, attributed the following remark to an Iranian source at the time of the revolution. "While no one dared tell the Shah's father a lie, no one dares tell the Shah the truth." The outcome of this policy is evident.

If we place the burden of responsibility for change on the system, we will wait a long time. There is something rather gutless about saying to ourselves passively that we cannot act honestly until the system allows us to. We should not wait to have moral courage instilled in us, we should instill it in ourselves and our Marines.

USMC

Chapter Three

THE ESSENTIALS OF LEADERSHIP

The essential thing is action. Action has three stages: the decision born of thought, the order or preparation for execution, and the execution itself. All three stages are governed by the will. The will is rooted in character, and for the man of action character is of more critical importance than intellect. Intellect without will is worthless, will without intellect is dangerous.

Hans von Seekt
Thoughts of a Soldier

The Marine Corps' style of warfare requires intelligent leaders with a penchant for boldness and initiative down to the lowest levels. Boldness is an essential moral trait in a leader, for it generates combat power beyond the physical means at hand. Initiative, the willingness to act on one's own judgment, is a prerequisite for boldness. These traits carried to excess can lead to rashness, but we must realize that errors by junior leaders stemming from overboldness are a necessary part of learning. We should deal with such errors leniently; there must be no "zero defects" mentality. Not only must we not stifle boldness or initiative, we must continue to encourage both traits ***in spite of mistakes.*** *On the other hand, we should deal severely with errors of inaction or timidity. We will not accept lack of orders as justification for inaction; it is each Marine's duty to take initiative as the situation demands.*

Warfighting, FMFM 1

In the first two chapters of this course, you learned the challenges facing the leader in both war and peace. In chapter one, you studied the demands of leadership in combat; the tremendous stress you and your men experience from anxiety, fear, and fatigue and the friction that results when equipment breaks, the weather changes, or the enemy surprises you. These challenges are extraordinary. In most men, combat leaves an impression that lasts their lifetime.

In chapter two, you saw that peacetime challenges are of a different nature. First, you learned the challenges inherent to the warrior profession; the lack of deadly force in training that prevents you from creating the level of stress that men experience in combat and the flexibility that expeditionary warfare, the Marine Corps' mission, demands: to prepare to fight practically anyone anywhere at a moment's notice. Then you studied the peacetime pressures on ethical behavior; how some of the values that are tolerated, even admired, are not those that will win in combat, and how these values can cause other things to take priority over preparing your Marines for war. Finally, you learned how the nature of warfare is changing and how difficult a job that makes preparing your Marines for the **next** war. In some ways, these challenges demand just as much from you as those inherent to combat.

At this point you might ask: "What qualities must I have to lead successfully in the face of these challenges?" This chapter addresses that question.

CHARACTER

> *Character is the sum total of your personality traits. It is the link between your values and your behavior. It determines whether you will have the inner strength and tenacity to behave consistently in terms of your values regardless of stress, danger, or consequences. It affects how well you learn and apply critical leadership skills. It is what keeps you going--driving you forward toward your goals--when all other sources of energy and motivation are gone. Character is the inner power source of leadership and, in this sense, it is the source of all good leadership.*
>
> *Military Leadership*, FM 22-100

Your **character** is the combination of factors that governs your behavior. It is the dominant quality that determines how you act in situations requiring leadership. Therefore, character is the most important quality in a leader.

How does character apply to leadership? The traits that make up your character act as reference points for all actions requiring leadership. For example, in *Tactical Fundamentals*, you learned that the commander's intent and focus of effort (main effort) are reference points for tactical decisions. When your situation changes, they guide you in deciding what to do. Likewise, your character acts as a reference point for all situations related to leadership. The traits that make up your character determine what you do.

Marine leadership demands strong character. Your subordinates assess your character as they see your day-to-day actions. They learn whether you are open and honest with them. They see whether you are indecisive, lazy, or selfish. They may test your will by cutting corners on a job and watching your response. They observe whether you advance yourself over their interests or whether you are supportive of them and the unit. Your subordinates' perceptions of your actions combine to form a continuing assessment of your character.

In stressful situations Marines want to follow leaders whom they trust and who strengthen, inspire, and guide them. They will trust you with their lives based on their assessment of whether you have strong character traits, such as decisiveness, selflessness, and courage. If you show character flaws, your subordinates will follow you *only* because of their own sense of duty or your coercive powers. Coercive power can take a unit only so far in the heat of combat. Historically, the most effective units have been those led by Marines of strong character.

What are the traits that combine to form strong character?

--**Courage.** Marines who are strong in character have both physical and moral courage. You learned about physical courage in chapter one. It is the courage that overcomes fear in the face of danger. In combat, your courage inspires others to act bravely. Moral courage, which you learned about in chapter two, is the courage to stand for what's right regardless of personal consequences. It motivates you to keep focused on your mission when various pressures would have you do otherwise.

In *Tactical Fundamentals*, you saw an outstanding example of moral courage when Captain Barrow ignored his battalion commander's order to advance. Captain Barrow acted according to the situation. As the commander on the scene, he knew best what action was correct and he did it. Would **you** have the moral courage to act properly in similar circumstances?

General Robert H. Barrow
27th Commandant of the Marine Corps

--**Integrity.** Integrity is the soundness of moral principles and the honesty to live consistently by them. The Marine with integrity has a sound code of ethics and lives by it. He can always be counted on to do the right thing, regardless of circumstances. In peace and in war, he recognizes his moral obligation to act at all times in the spirit of his assigned mission.

You have undoubtedly seen leaders with absolute integrity. Such leaders do not yield to the pressure to cut corners in order to look good. The fact that they don't hide problems may hurt their careers, particularly if peers are adept at making themselves "look good" in the bosses' eyes. Men who are weak in character may ridicule the man with integrity, saying that he is unwise and "ignorant of reality." But you know that the man with absolute integrity is greatly admired and an inspirational leader.

--Unselfishness. The unselfish Marine places the welfare of his Corps, unit, and men ahead of himself. When necessary, he risks his own life to accomplish the mission or save the lives of other Marines. In peacetime, he risks his career and his popularity when necessary to ensure his unit prepares effectively for war. He always looks upon himself, the leader, as a servant of his men, his Corps, and his country.

Consider the unselfish example of Lance Corporal Richard A. Pittman on 24 July 1966 while on patrol in the Republic of Vietnam:

> *Hearing the engaged Marines' calls for more firepower, Lance Corporal Pittman quickly exchanged his rifle for a machine gun and several belts of ammunition, left the relative safety of his platoon, and unhesitatingly rushed forward to aid his comrades. Taken under intense enemy small-arms fire at point blank range during his advance, he returned the fire, silencing the enemy position. As Lance Corporal Pittman continued to forge forward to aid members of the leading platoon, he again came under heavy fire from two automatic weapons which he promptly destroyed. Learning that there were additional wounded Marines 50 yards further along the trail, he braved a withering hail of enemy mortar and small-arms fire to continue onward. As he reached the position where the leading Marines had fallen, he was suddenly confronted with a bold frontal attack by 30 to 40 enemy. Totally disregarding his safety, he calmly established a position in the middle of the trail and raked the advancing enemy with devastating machine gun fire. His weapon rendered ineffective, he picked up an enemy sub-machine gun and, together with a pistol seized from a fallen comrade, continued his lethal fire until the enemy force had withdrawn. Having exhausted his*

ammunition except for a grenade which he hurled at the enemy, he then rejoined his platoon. Lance Corporal Pittman's daring initiative, bold fighting spirit and selfless devotion to duty inflicted many enemy casualties, disrupted the enemy attack and saved the lives of many of his wounded comrades.

For his heroic actions, Lance Corporal Pittman was awarded the Medal of Honor. How would **you** react in a similar situation?

Sergeant Richard A. Pittman receives
the Medal of Honor from President Lyndon B. Johnson

--**Commitment.** The leader with strong character is a person who has made an unreserved personal commitment to what he does. He cares genuinely about being a Marine, a leader, and a true professional. That care shows through in everything he does, and his Marines see it clearly. He is sincerely interested in them and their well-being; his enthusiasm is contagious. He is a Marine on the inside, not just on the outside, in his uniform and rank. The commitment is so deep that the self--the part of him that focuses on his own well-being--almost disappears.

--**Strong Will.** In chapter one, you learned that the leader's iron will is what overcomes friction. In tough situations, courage, integrity, and unselfishness are not enough. The leader must also have the conviction to press on and get the job done. *The leader makes it happen.* As General Vandegrift noted in the Pacific Campaign in 1944:

> *. . . there comes a point in every close battle when each commander concludes that he is defeated. The leader who carries on wins.*
>
> and
>
> *Positions are seldom lost because they have been destroyed, but almost invariably because the leader has decided in his own mind that the position cannot be held.*

One example of indomitable will was set by Lieutenant Lance Peter Sijan, USAF, after being shot down during the Vietnam War in 1967. Ejecting from his burning F-4 over an undeveloped region of Laos, Lieutenant Sijan broke both of his legs as he crashed through the jungle canopy. Eluding enemy patrols, he crawled backward through the jungle for six weeks. He maintained some degree of strength by eating slugs, insects, and leeches off his legs and drinking rainwater. When finally captured, he escaped two times with both legs in homemade splints, killing his guard with his bare hands on his first escape. Recaptured a third time on Christmas day, he was taken to Hoa-Lo prison where he later died under torture. According to his fellow prisoners, Lieutenant Sijan was never known to have broken while being interrogated.

Lt Sijan's extraordinary heroism was inspirational to his fellow prisoners. But war also demands strength of will in another sense: the will for independent action. It takes a strong will to accept the responsibility--and sometimes the consequences--of making independent decisions. But maneuver warfare tactics demand independent action, on a regular basis, from leaders at every level and from individual Marines. The ability to make independent decisions and act on them is the real test of a leader's strength of will.

--Decisiveness. War requires leaders to make difficult decisions. Frequently, the leader must act despite insufficient or wrong information. He must also take risks. The course that yields a brilliant victory is seldom either obvious or easy.

The Marine Corps' doctrine of maneuver warfare puts special emphasis on the need to make clear and unambiguous decisions. **Decisiveness** is central to choosing a focus of effort. Focusing your efforts to achieve a decision in battle requires you to make hard decisions--where to concentrate your efforts and where to take major risks in order to concentrate. Such decisiveness comes only to leaders with strong character. That is why Field Marshall von Hindenburg said "*An operation without a focus of effort is like a man without character.*"

--Humility. The humble man exudes confidence in a quiet, unpretentious way. He accepts criticism well, subordinating his ego to the benefit of his unit. Until he makes a decision, he is open to ideas from subordinates. The opposite of humbleness--arrogance--is a dangerous quality in a leader. The arrogant Marine is close-minded, believing that everyone else revolves around him. Marines are particularly vulnerable to arrogance because of the Corps' proud heritage as an elite fighting force. Too many Marines don't accept criticism well because arrogance from "living off of their reputation" gets in the way. You must constantly be on guard against arrogance and prevent it from taking hold in your unit. Arrogance prevents self-improvement.

General Robert E. Lee was a man of great humility. In *R. E. Lee*, Douglas Southall Freeman describes this quality in the character of a man revered by those who fought along side him:

> *. . . He did not covet praise. Blushing to receive it, he assumed that others would blush when he bestowed it, and he spared what he thought were their feelings, though no man was quicker to appreciate and, at the proper time, to acknowledge the achievement of others. Place and advancement never lured him, except as promotion held out the hope of larger opportunity and better provision for his family. . . . No man was more critical of his own performance because none demanded more of himself.*

General Lee's own words are revealing of his humility:

> *. . . The gentleman does not needlessly and unnecessarily remind an offender of a wrong he may have committed against him. He can not only forgive, he can forget; and he strives for that nobleness of self and mildness of character which impart sufficient strength to let the past be but the past. A true man of honor feels humbled himself when he cannot help humbling others.*

These are not the only traits of strong character although they are the most important. Other traits, like justice, loyalty, and self-control, also contribute to character. You may notice other traits in leaders whom you know personally.

General Robert E. Lee, CSA.

Character is not developed overnight. It is a long process, beginning early in life. Good character traits are instilled by the family, church, school, and other positive influences in a Marine's upbringing. However, modern society has some adverse influences on character development. Many of today's Marines grew up in a lax moral climate where delayed gratification and self-sacrifice were the exception, not the rule. Modern values such as materialism and selfishness work against character development. Recruit training does much to counteract negative influences, but in 12 weeks it can do only so much with a recruit who's spent 18 or 19 years in a permissive environment. The burden of character development falls on **you**, the leader. Character development is a process that must continue throughout each Marine's career.

You have seen Marines who set outstanding examples of good, strong character. They show absolute integrity in enforcing standards. They have a clear sense of what's right and never compromise themselves. They have the moral courage to speak up when they disagree and counsel subordinates with complete candor. They make clear decisions, but they also accept criticism well. They are self-confident, but always strive to better themselves. They truly care about the mission and their Marines' welfare. Their enthusiasm is contagious. Marines with these qualities are inspirational and a pleasure to work for. In combat, they are invaluable because they inspire men to accomplish things that wouldn't otherwise be possible. *Character is the source of all good leadership.*

MILITARY COMPETENCE

Although character is the most important of the leader's qualities, it is not the only one. The good leader must not only be a man of strong character, but also militarily competent. Usually, military competency is broadly divided into two categories: **tactical** and **technical** ability.

Tactical Ability

Tactical ability is the ability to develop a unique solution for a particular situation. It is your decision-making ability: the ability to study a situation, grasp its essential elements, and decide what to do.

Tactical ability is one of the things that separates real leaders from those who merely look like leaders. In some ways, it is the toughest challenge a leader faces. Each military situation is different, and each requires its own solution. You cannot follow a fixed pattern or scheme, always doing the same thing according to some recipe or checklist. If you do, the enemy will quickly learn your pattern and turn it to his advantage. You have to be able to see the essential elements in each situation, then come up with a new and different solution for that specific situation. What distinguishes the great commanders--Napoleon, von Moltke, Grant, Patton, Zhukov--from more ordinary leaders is this ability to see the essence of a situation at a glance and strike directly at the enemy's greatest weakness.

Tactical competence requires **knowledge**; knowledge of yourself, your tactical doctrine, and your enemy. In *Tactical Fundamentals* and *Small Unit Tactical Problems*, you learned the Marine Corps' doctrinal concepts of maneuver warfare tactics. You saw how these concepts apply in situational exercises, then you applied them yourself. Knowledge and experience provide you with reference points in tactical decision-making. That is another reason why the Commandant established a professional reading program for all Officers, Staff NCOs and NCOs: to broaden your military knowledge by studying the experiences of others so that you have a sounder, more knowledgeable base from which you can make decisions. The greater your knowledge, the better your decisions will be.

But knowledge alone is not enough. Tactical competence also requires **good judgment**: the ability to choose among various alternatives when deciding what to do. You develop military judgment through experience; by placing yourself and your subordinates in tactical scenarios, making decisions, and then critiquing results. You can do this through map and sand table exercises, war games, terrain walks, and free-play field problems. Developing good judgment is crucial in peacetime because it becomes extremely important when you go to war. Without it, you cannot be tactically competent.

Finally, tactical ability requires you to *see the larger situation*, to see how your action relates to what the company or battalion is trying to accomplish. You must be able to look beyond your immediate action, engagement, or battle and see how it fits in to the larger picture of what your force is trying to accomplish. Only then can you make good decisions about what to do in and after your own fight. This is why maneuver warfare tactics stress understanding the commanders' intent two levels up. You must be able to look up, to relate what you are doing to what echelons above you are trying to accomplish.

Technical Ability

Techniques are the skills that you learn through drill. They include operating weapons, communicating orders, and assaulting enemy positions. Compared to tactical ability, technical ability is relatively easy to quantify and measure.

A leader's technical abilities can be broadly divided into two categories. First, the leader has a number of techniques and procedures that he must be able to perform by virtue of his billet. For example, to fight his company well, a rifle company commander must be able to read a tactical map and communicate orders to his platoon commanders. He must also know the characteristics of the Dragon (range, etc.) because there will be times when he has a Dragon squad or section attached to his company, and he is responsible for its employment.

Second, the leader must know at least some techniques that his subordinates perform so that he can properly supervise them. For example, a rifle company commander does not have to be able to crew a 60mm mortar to MCCRES standards. But he does need to know the weapon's firing characteristics and maintenance procedures so that he can properly supervise those Marines who use it.

All professions require tactical and technical ability. A surgeon must be technically competent with his surgical instruments, but he must also approach each operation uniquely because no two are exactly the same. A lawyer must know courtroom procedures but also have the flexibility to adjust his plan as the case develops. Similarly, there are skills and procedures that you must know in addition to the knowledge and judgment used to apply them.

Because Marine leaders tend to change jobs frequently, the challenge to become both tactically and technically proficient is a demanding one. When you assume leadership of a unit, your subordinates don't expect you to know everything about your job right away. But they do expect you to learn quickly, or they lose confidence in you. No one wants to hire a surgeon who can't operate or a lawyer who can't defend a case. Similarly, no Marine wants a leader who isn't technically and tactically proficient.

CONCLUSION

Character and competence are the two most important characteristics in a leader. To be an effective leader of Marines, you must have both. The one without the other will leave you ineffective. You may be the greatest tactician since Rommel, but if you lack the nerve and will to see your plan through, you won't accomplish the mission. Similarly, you may have the character and strength of will of the defenders of Bastogne, but if you lack military judgment and competence, you will lead your unit into another charge of the Light Brigade. Your Marines will be, as it was said of the British Army during the First World War, "lions led by asses."

Developing your character and competence--and the character and competence of your subordinates--is one of your most important duties. It is not a duty you can take up when you come in the hatch in the morning and drop when you go home at night. It must guide and be part of everything you do, 24 hours a day, seven days a week. It must become a central part of what and who you are.

ANNEX C

Selected Articles

A Soldier's Dilemma

by LtGen Victor H. Krulak, USMC(Ret)

Young officers must strive to keep alive their creative and innovative energies, and senior officers must encourage and promote this attitude. . . For both, it is a matter of duty and obligation.

The essence of loyalty is the courage to propose the unpopular, coupled with a determination to obey, no matter how distasteful the ultimate decision. And the essence of leadership is the ability to inspire such behavior.

Although this is dogma, it is challenged daily by a double dilemma that has perplexed men-at-arms since warfare began. The first part of the dilemma is this: How should a subordinate behave when he has a novel and untested idea, or when he encounters proposals or decisions with which he does not concur? And the second part: How should a superior behave in order to elicit the most from the initiative and innovativeness latent in those under his authority?

Take the two elements of the problem in turn:

During a recent lecture at the National War College, one of the students asked the hard question: "What do you do when you have an offbeat idea, or when you don't agree? If you speak up, you risk being branded a maverick. If you remain silent, you're a hypocrite. If you speak up, your credibility may disappear. If you remain silent, you may lose a fleeting chance to advance your viewpoint. Tell me," he asked, "What do you do?"

The student's question will face many a professional officer at some time in his career. I say many a professional officer, but not all, by any means. The agony of "How do I offer a new, and perhaps unpopular, idea?" or "How do I dissent?" will affect only the creative minds among them. The remainder will have little interest in getting out in front and inviting the hazard of criticism. They will content themselves with life in the dismal world of conformity, where success is measured not in benefit to the state but in avoidance of controversy. This timid behavior is

an outgrowth of periods of peace, where promotion may be sought through a low profile and low risk, in contrast to war, where the rewards come to the leader whose visibility and accompanying risks are high. Another stimulus to prudent silence in today's peacetime environment is the pernicious tendency for any fitness report marking short of perfect to be interpreted as a signal that the officer suffers some grave professional or personality defect.

All of this reality may be discouraging to the military man blessed with a creative mind. Realistically, however, he has no cause to expect his life to be tranquil, nor does he have reason to expect always to be understood. Marine Maj Earl Ellis was a classic creative mind of the first quarter of this century. Most of his Marine Corps peers saw him as an ill-tempered rum pot, but history now regards him as a misunderstood visionary who saw accurately the nature of the 1941-1945 Pacific War long before it happened.

It is in this same sense that Socrates and Plato enjoy far greater reverence today than in their own times. Sun Tzu's military dicta are more respected now than they were 20 centuries ago. And the same may be said of the writings of Clausewitz and Mahan.

". . .timid behavior is an outgrowth of periods of peace, where promotion may be sought through a low profile and low risk. . ."

To be sure, these assurances of posthumous applause will give little comfort to the contemporary officer whose initiative and curiosity fall on rocky ground—except for one thing. They are a reminder that creative minds of other days, advocating their ideas in the face of discouragement and antagonism, won out in the end. And in this there must be solace for the lonely iconoclast.

Almost worse than antagonism, the creative mind is often tested in the furnace of incomprehension. President Grant, when shown Bell's telephone for the first time, asked, "But who would want one?" And a bishop named Wright, when offered the proposition that man might one day fly through the air, said, "For man to try to fly is blasphemy. Flying is for birds and angels." Bishop Wright had two young sons. Their names were Wilbur and Orville. Alexander Graham Bell and the Wright brothers persevered, overcoming the hostility and lack of vision around them, and they became fixtures of history.

From the experiences of these resolute men we may distill the beginnings of an answer to the War College student's question that set this discussion in motion.

Call it Rule 1: *Believe. Before offering a revolutionary idea, before disagreeing on any matter, large or small, know exactly what you want.* Be certain that you believe in it completely. And then stick with it.

Maj Earl H. "Pete" Ellis—far more than an ill-tempered rum pot.

LtGen Victor H. Krulak—Marine, author, statesman—began his career in the Marine Corps in 1934 after graduating from the U.S. Naval Academy. He served during a period spanning three wars, World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, in a variety of posts, including commander, 2d Parachute Battalion at Choiseul (1943), chief of staff, 1st Marine Division in Korea (1951), director, Marine Corps Education Center (1957), commanding general, Marine Corps Recruit Depot San Diego (1959), special assistant for counterinsurgency and special activities, Joint Chiefs of Staff (1962), and commanding general, FMFPac (1964). He retired from active duty in 1968.

As an author, Gen Krulak has written scores of articles on matters of national security and international affairs and has published three books—*Organization for National Security, University of the Third Age,* and the highly acclaimed *First to Fight,* which joins Gen Krulak's personal experiences with a contemporary view of the Marine Corps and the forces that have contributed to its institutional survival. Reviewed in the November 1984 GAZETTE, *First to Fight* was branded "the Marine book of the year—probably the Marine book of several years."

MajGen Richard C. Schulze Memorial Essay

MajGen Schulze

The MajGen Richard C. Schulze Memorial Essay honors the memory of the Marine Corps officer for which it is named. MajGen Schulze, a native of Oakland, California, died in November 1983, two years after his retirement. An enlisted Marine at the time of his commissioning in 1951, he earned his B.A. in Far East History from Stanford University in 1954, and later earned an M.S. in Public Administration from George Washington University (1971).

As a general officer, Gen Schulze served as director of three different divisions within the Manpower Department of Headquarters. He also served as inspector general of the Marine Corps and as commanding general, MCRD San Diego. He was a frequent contributor to the GAZETTE and wrote with philosophical insight on many of the intractable problems confronting the armed forces.

The Schulze Memorial Essays are published annually in the November issue of the GAZETTE. They are made possible by the earnings of an endowment fund established by friends of Gen Schulze and administered by the Marine Corps Historical Foundation. Authors of the essays are chosen by the editorial board of the GAZETTE.

This is fine as theory, but how would it apply to an officer who has a real life, real time problem? Let us take, as an example, any one of the areas upon which there is some disagreement in the Marine Corps today, say the concept of maritime pre-positioning.

Here is an ongoing, formally approved program. It enjoys substantial support. The Marine Corps already has the essential hardware in its possession. It has its operational guidance and is engaged in training designed to make the concept effective.

Under these terms is there any appropriate way for one who believes the concept is fundamentally wrong to make his views known? Yes, there is.

It is found in the chain of command, the precious mechanism by which all military activity is driven. The dissenter should use it. He should prepare his case thoroughly, put it on paper and take it to his immediate superior, not with the limited aim of getting his concurrence, but with the more aggressive object of getting the superior to adopt the idea as his own.

This approach may not work. The superior may not be convinced, in which case the next step is clear. Recast the paper, address it to the highest authority involved in the issue, deliver it to the immediate superior with the stated understanding that his forwarding endorsement is likely to be unfavorable. But the key point is this: The idea is now in the open, well developed and well expressed. And somewhere in the chain of command there may just be someone with the interest and perception to take up the cause—if it is a good one.

All of this responds to a scenario where there is time for the idea, concept, or disagreement to be organized and expressed carefully in writing. But how about the more likely situation? That is where, in the course of a conference or meeting, an unexpected opportunity arises to introduce a new or contradictory thought. How do you do it? How do you do it and still avoid being labeled a boat-rocker?

First the obvious—comply with Rule 1. *Don't shoot from the hip.* Know your subject and believe in it. Then, be certain that what you say is factual and devoid of emotion and rhetoric. Beyond that, the impact of your effort will be affected decisively by the quality of what you say and the skill with which you say it.

It will also be affected by your superior's behavior in response to your views. He has very real responsibilities, too, regarding such a dialog, responsibilities that will be explored in detail, later in this essay.

Here, then, Rule 2: *Express your innovative views in any forum you can find. Express your disagreement with announced policy within the structure of the chain of command.* Disagreement with an idea that has momentum and high level support will never be easy and, of this we may be sure, unless the dissent is accompanied by an alternative, it will be stillborn. If you have no reasonable alternative, your viewpoint is a dead bird.

Amphibious assault at Culebra in 1924 was an innovative development.

From this Rule 3 emerges: *Include, as a part of any disagreement, an alternative, presented in full and persuasive detail.* This applies equally, whether the setting is formal and written or a spur-of-the-moment oral dialog. The enthusiastic innovator should not be content to make his dissent or creative proposal a wholly private matter. He should hasten to publish his views in order to get his new or variant ideas into the public marketplace of ideas. There is no better way to stimulate discussion and to mature a concept than by publishing it. To be sure, there is a great difference between publication of an untested proposition, even if it is likely to generate widespread disagreement, and publication of a direct challenge to a formally announced decision.

This gives rise to a fourth and altogether obvious rule: *Publish, by all means, and as much as you like, before a final and formal decision is made. Thereafter, do not challenge the decision publicly.* Be assured that publication under the latter circumstances, however accurate, however well-intentioned, will be taken at face value and viewed as a conscious challenge to authority, which is to say a shortcut to professional disaster.

Case in point:

Col (later Commandant) John A. Lejeune lectured on and published unpopular views regarding the transcendent importance to the United States and the Marine Corps of the creation of a major amphibious capability. Two commandants were unconvinced by his efforts and told him so. But he continued to write and was ultimately successful.

Col (later Commandant) John H. Russell, in the first edition of the Marine Corps GAZETTE in 1916, made a plea that amphibious assault be established as the primary Marine Corps mission. He wrote in the face of much contrary feeling in the Corps, where the more popular idea was to place primary emphasis on service aboard ship and at naval stations ashore.

It should be noted that Lejeune and Russell wrote and lectured on a subject that, while controversial, was one on which no basic decision had yet been made.

But now, an example on the other side:

Col Robert D. Heinl, Jr., an officer of unusual perception, served in Haiti for three years, where he had much opportunity to observe the venal and oppressive behavior of President Francois ("Papa Doc") Duvalier. On his departure from Haiti, Heinl accurately described conditions there in an interview with a national magazine. Unfortunately, his portrayal was exactly opposite to the formally stated U.S. position. Because Papa Doc was, officially, a U.S. ally, Heinl suffered condemnation from the State and Defense Departments. A Legion of Merit, in the works for him, was canceled and he was officially reproved.

Now, back to the basic question. Having respected all the foregoing rules scrupulously, suppose your viewpoint has still not gotten off the ground. Suppose your idea is rejected. Or suppose your disagreement makes no headway. What then?

"The enthusiastic innovator should. . . hasten to publish his views in order to get his new or variant ideas into the public marketplace of ideas."

A fifth rule, and by far the most important one of all: *If you are able to swallow whole your disappointment, if you are able to work, flat out, to carry out a decision with which you do not agree, well and good. Do it.* But do not forget your convictions and do not forgo any opportunity to express your contrary views, always in the proper setting.

But if you are unable to countenance the decision as made, do not denigrate it. Do not withhold your best effort to make it work. Quit—just quit. Quit and take your ideas and your frustrations into the civilian world where you may complain to your heart's content and disagree in any forum you choose.

Three examples:

First, RAdm James H. Doyle, USN, was designated as attack force commander for the amphibious landing at Inchon, Korea, in September 1950. He was strongly opposed to making the attack at Inchon because of the immense hydrographic

MajGen John A. Lejeune published unpopular views as a field grade officer.

MajGen John H. Russell wrote in the face of opposition early in his career.

Col Robert D. Heinl, Jr., suffered unfair condemnation.

RAdm James H. Doyle (right) bit the proverbial bullet over the Inchon landing site.

BGen Merritt A. Edson retired to fight for the Marine Corps.

and logistic problems. He had an alternative idea for a landing about 30 miles away that, to his mind, made better sense. He presented his dissent and his alternative in powerful terms to Gen MacArthur, who was unmoved. Doyle bit the bullet. He set about, with total commitment, to make the chancy Inchon attack a success. It was, and in no small measure because of his professionalism and dedication.

Second, in 1947, at the height of the defense reorganization debate, Marine BGen Merritt A. Edson found himself in serious disagreement with the stated positions of both the President and Secretary of the Navy. Having failed officially to alter matters, Edson knew exactly what to do. He quit, retired, and immediately made his contrary views known both in print and in congressional testimony, something he could not have done properly and honorably in uniform.

A third, and contrasting, example—at the end of World War I, the strategic employment of air power was little understood and less appreciated in the War and Navy Departments. BGen Billy Mitchell, with a distinguished combat record, was well positioned to be the principal spokesman for strategic air power. Faced with an official policy with which he did not agree, Mitchell, while still in uniform, published articles, wrote a book, and made speeches condemning the judgment, competence, vision, loyalty, and motivation of those senior officials who opposed his views. He was court-martialed and convicted. Here was an able man with a good idea, but he handled it improperly and suffered accordingly.

* * *

We have addressed at some length the problems of the innovative or questioning subordinate and have laid down some rubrics concerning his behavior. Now, how about the corresponding problem, that of the superior who must deal with these situations as a part of his responsibility? We must begin by acknowledging

BGen Billy Mitchell was court-martialed for his poor handling of a good idea.

that his obligation is far greater, far graver, than that of a subordinate who feels that he has a good idea or has some cause to disagree.

However important the quality of creativity is in the subordinate, it is even more important in the superior. If he has a strong instinct to innovate, if he is willing to speak up and to write for publication himself, it is likely that he will be an effective vehicle for nourishing the ideas of his subordinates.

We should emphasize that not all creative ideas are good, however stubbornly they are held. But not all of them are bad either, and the superior who has the precious ability to discriminate between the two and the receptivity of mind to contemplate the new or the contrary idea is a man of great value. Conversely, the leader who does not possess those sovereign gifts is a continuing impediment to progress.

Once I heard two generals talking about LtCol (later Gen) Merrill B. Twining. One said, "Well, the trouble with Twining is that he is always upsetting things with some new idea or other." What a wonderful tribute! What greater praise could one seek than to be identified as the man who is guilty of "upsetting things" with new ideas?

And the general who found Twining's creative behavior odious, how about him? It could be that he was not thinking, just rearranging his prejudices for the benefit of his audience. Or it could be that he had been misled by Ecclesiastes 1-18: "To increase knowledge only increases distress." But the sadder likelihood is that he was professionally long dead, frozen stiff under the icy hands of custom, convention, conformity, and timidity, a hazard to his Corps and best replaced.

And from this something fundamental begins to emerge. No amount of originality, logic, eloquence, or passion on the part of a subordinate will prevail if the superior lacks the wisdom to stimulate disagreement or the elasticity of outlook to contemplate a novel proposition. Nothing good is going to happen if he does not possess the quality of inspiring initiative among those under his authority and the willingness to pursue every potentially good idea to its conclusion.

Should there not be a reflection of these qualities in the remarks required on the fitness reports of senior officers? Something like, "To what degree does this officer have:

"The ability to understand, and the willingness to evaluate new ideas?"; and

"The ability to stimulate initiative and creativity in subordinates?"

Here, then, is the fabric of Rule 1 for superiors: *Because you probably don't know it all, and because your subordinates represent a valuable source of ideas, make it your duty to bring their ideas and criticisms to the surface where all may analyze and evaluate them.*

Nurturing this rule to full flower requires much more than the plain statement that the commander is receptive to an idea or two, providing it is really good. It requires a dynamic approach that encourages criticism, rewards innovation, and deals mercilessly with the bureaucratic quicksand that is likely to smother a novel concept.

An example—once, when I was a captain commanding a .50 caliber antiaircraft machinegun battery, one of my sergeants brought me what he believed was a good idea. The .50 caliber antiaircraft machinegun was incapable of hitting anything because of its great vibration—an essentially useless weapon. The sergeant bolted one firmly to the bed of a light truck on the theory that the truck springs would set up a harmonic with the rate of recoil of the weapon, neutralize the vibration, and thus add to its accuracy.

It worked. With innocent enthusiasm I wrote a letter, with statistics, photographs, and diagrams advancing the idea. Nothing happened. Inquiry of the staffs at intervening headquarters revealed that no action had been taken. The idea had been swallowed, digested, and buried by the bureaucracy.

That is, it had been buried until a fortuitous day when the commanding general chanced to drive by at the time we were firing our truck-mounted device at target balloons.

You can guess the result. He became interested. The papers were disinterred from their bureaucratic crypt, and the idea given a good, and successful, testing. The general was indignant that this inefficiency had taken place, but he seemed to miss the point that the fault was his in the first place for tolerating a system where such things could happen.

Gen Merrill B. Twining—upsetting things with new ideas.



Stonewall Jackson had an early "open-door" policy.

So, here we have Rule 2 for superiors: *Clear a path. Make sure that the road to the top is wide open for ideas, opinions, and criticism, and that everyone knows that initiative is respected as a precious military jewel.*

It is told that in 1862 Stonewall Jackson, leaning against a tree and staring down the Shenandoah Valley, was asked by one of his staff officers what he was doing. He is supposed to have replied, "I'm trying to figure out what the Yankees are up to. If anyone in this army thinks he knows, tell them to come up here and see me." Jackson was clearing a path.

Marine Gen Keith B. McCutcheon, as an air wing commander, once said, "If anybody has an idea that will make this outfit better, my door is open. Just one thing, when he comes, I want all of the intervening commanders to come with him." McCutcheon, too, was clearing a path. In addition, he was demonstrating to his subordinate commanders the importance he placed on free communication and on the chain of command.

Encouraging initiative presupposes an understanding, by seniors and juniors alike, that innovation is imprecise, that error and false starts must be expected, that to try and fail is much to be preferred to never trying at all.

And there is Rule 3 for superiors: *Protect your subordinates as they make their mistakes.* Don't attempt to run your command as if there were such a thing as a zero defects military society. If you do, your unit, however large or small, will be a hollow shell comprised of timid men who, when the battle challenges their initiative, will collapse under the pressure. And it will be more your fault than theirs. Furthermore, if your own superior implies that you should try to run your command on a no-defects basis, have the integrity to take issue with him.

In World War II, while recovering from a wound, I was assigned as the Marine Corps logistic chief—29 years old, innocent, ignorant, and full of ideas.

One idea was an amphibian cargo trailer, intended to be towed ashore by an amphibian vehicle. Under my prodding, we bought 700 of them at $12,000 each. For a lot of reasons, they did not work out well. Very few were ever used in combat. Eight million dollars and change went down the drain.

In the ensuing recriminatory flap, my superior, BGen G.C. Thomas, insinuated himself quickly into the issue, declared that progress is made only those who are willing to accept a few mistakes along the way. I was chagrined at having done badly, but my initiative was kept alive by my superior, for whom my respect grew immeasurably.

BGen Gerald C. Thomas defended a junior officer's mistake.

"It becomes quickly apparent when a commander would rather hear his own views played back than risk hearing ideas that may. . .be repugnant to him."

Finally, a word about the virus of hypocrisy. Battles have been lost, opportunities missed, and reputations ruined where subordinates busied themselves telling the commander what they believed he wanted to hear rather than what they knew to be true. The sycophant is one of the great devils of the military world. He has an extraordinary capacity to survive, indeed to prosper—a melancholy condition that is less a product of his own ability to ingratiate himself with his superior than it is a measure of the weakness of the superior himself.

It becomes quickly apparent when a commander would rather hear his own views played back than risk hearing ideas that may in some way be repugnant to him. This egotistic behavior will cause the opportunists immediately to set about making themselves agreeable rather than useful.

Unless they are very lucky, both the flawed commander and the patronizing subordinate are headed for trouble—the former led into poor decisions and the latter put to the guillotine by the first no-nonsense commander he encounters.

Adolf Hitler and his immediate clique of advisors are the classic example. Hitler had a passionate determination to invade Soviet Russia and capture Moscow. Many of his military advisors, skilled professionals who understood the hazards of time, space, weather, and the nature of the Russian psyche, were overpowered by the Fuehrer's lunatic personality. They chose to agree with him rather than risk confrontation. Their stripes meant more to them than their self-respect, and the consequent disaster for the Nazis changed the face of Europe.

Adolf Hitler surrounded himself with sycophantic subordinates.

Similarly, Hitler was determined to invade England. His military commanders knew they had neither the requisite logistic support nor the ability to maintain air superiority over the English Channel. Nevertheless, they avoided confrontation by endorsing a flawed plan and proceeding to waste valuable resources and time building a fleet of invasion craft they knew could never be used.

So here is the fourth and final rule, one for those superiors who want to avoid being led into trouble by sycophantic subordinates: *Make very clear that you will not tolerate patronizing behavior on the part of your subordinates.* Emphasize that their minimum duty to you, to your institution, and to their country is an honest and fearless expression of their best thinking—the innovation and dissent of which we spoke at the outset. And then, by your day-to-day conduct, make plain that you mean it.

"Make very clear that you will not tolerate patronizing behavior on the part of your subordinates."

Let me conclude with a respectful genuflection to valor and esprit. These, the two great intangibles in warfare, have often provided the precious difference between defeat and triumph. Their importance must never, in any way, be denigrated.

But in the great battles, at Cannae and Lepanto, at Tannenberg and Tsushima, at Cape St. Vincent, Chancellorsville and The Marne, we must acknowledge that a creative mind fashioned the setting for victory in each case. It was a mind that could think beyond the moment of crisis and see beyond the horizon of battle that set the scene for bravery and leadership to work their wonderful magic.

It is this disciplined military mind, harnessed, directed, and encouraged, that can nourish innovation, inspire fruitful dissent and, in the end, dissolve the dilemma that created this discussion in the first place. USMC

MARINE CORPS MANUAL

SECTION B - LEADERSHIP

1100. MILITARY LEADERSHIP

1. Purpose of Scope

The primary goal of Marine Corps leadership is to instill in all Marines the fact that we are warriors first. The only reason the United States of America needs a Marine Corps is to fight and win wars. Everything else is secondary. In North China in 1937, Captain Samuel B. Griffith said,

> *Wars and battles are not lost by private soldiers. They win them, but don't lose them. They are lost by commanders, staffs, and troop leaders, and they are often lost long before they start.*

Our leadership training is dedicated to the purpose of preparing those commanders, staffs, and troop leaders to lead our Marines in combat.

2. Responsibility

a. The Commandant of the Marine Corps is directly responsible to the Secretary of the Navy for establishing and maintaining leadership standards and conducting leadership training within the Marine Corps.

b. Commanders will ensure that local policies, directives and procedures reflect the special trust and confidence reposed in members of the officer corps. Full credit will be given to their statements and certificates. They will be allowed maximum discretion in the exercise of authority vested in them, and they and their dependents will be accorded all prerogatives and perquisites which are traditional and otherwise appropriate. Except in cases where more stringent positive identification procedures are required for the proper security of classified material and installations, or are imposed by higher authority for protecting privileges reserved for eligible military personnel, the officers' uniforms will amply attest to their status, and their oral statements will serve to identify them and their dependents.

c. An individual's responsibility for leadership is not dependent upon authority. Marines are expected to exert proper influence upon their comrades by setting examples of obedience, courage, zeal sobriety, neatness, and attention to duty.

d. The special trust and confidence, which is expressly reposed in officers by their commission, is the distinguishing privilege of their officer corps. It is the policy of the Marine Corps that this privilege be tangible and real; it is the corresponding obligation of the officer corps that it be wholly deserved.

(1) As an accompanying condition commanders will impress upon all subordinate officers the fact that the presumption of integrity, good manners, sound judgment, and discretion, which is the basis for the special trust and confidence reposed in each officer, is jeopardized by the slightest transgression on the part of any member of the officer corps. Any offense, however minor, will be dealt with promptly, and with sufficient severity to impress on the officer at fault, and on the officer corps. Dedication to the basic elements of special trust and confidence is a Marine officer's obligation to the officer corps as a whole, and transcends the bonds of personal friendship.

(2) As a further and continuing action, commanders are requested to bring to the attention of higher authority, referencing this paragraph, any situation, policy, directive, or procedure which contravenes the spirit of this paragraph, and which is not susceptible to local correction.

(3) Although this policy is expressly concerned with commissioned officers, its provisions and spirit will, where applicable, be extended to noncommissioned officers, especially staff noncommissioned officers.

3. Personal Relations. Effective personal relations in an organization can be satisfactory only when there is complete understanding and respect between individuals. Commanders must:

a. Strive for forceful and competent leadership throughout the entire organization.

b. Inform the troops of plans of action and reasons therefore, whenever it is possible and practicable to do so.

c. Endeavor to remove on all occasions those causes which make for misunderstanding or dissatisfaction.

d. Assure that all members of the command are acquainted with procedures for registering complaints, together with the action taken thereon.

e. Build a feeling of confidence which will ensure the free approach by subordinates for advice and assistance not only in military matters but for personal problems as well.

4. Relations Between Officers and Enlisted Marines. Duty relationships and social and business contracts among Marines of different grades will be consistent with traditional standards of good order and discipline and the mutual respect that has always existed between Marines of senior grade and those of lesser grade. Situations that invite or give the appearance of familiarity or undue informality among Marines of different grades will be avoided or, if found to exist, corrected. The following paragraphs written by the then Major General commandant John A. Lejeune appeared in the Marine Corps Manual, Edition of 1921, and since that time have defined the relationship that will exist between Marine officers and enlisted members of the Corps:

a. "Comradeship and brotherhood. -- The World War brought a great change in the relations between officers and enlisted men in the military services. A spirit of comradeship and brotherhood in arms came into being in the training camps and on the battlefields. This spirit is too fine a thing to be allowed to die. It must be fostered and kept alive and made the moving force in all Marine Corps organizations.

b. Teacher and scholar. -- The relation between officers and enlisted men should in no sense be that of superior and inferior nor that of master and servant, but rather that of teacher and scholar. In fact, it should partake of the nature of the relation between father and son, to the extent that officer, especially commanding officers, are responsible for the physical, mental, and moral welfare, as well the discipline and military training of the young men under their command who are serving the nation in the Marine Corps.

c. The realization of this responsibility on the part of officers is vital to the well-being of the Marine Corps. It is especially so, for the reason that so large a proportion of the men enlisting are under twenty-one years of age. These men are in the formative period of their lives, and officers owe it to them, to their parents, and to the nation, that when discharged from the services they should be far better men physically, mentally and morally than they were when they enlisted.

d. To accomplish this task successfully a constant effort must be made by all officers to fill each day with useful and interesting instruction and wholesome entertainment for the men. This effort must be intelligent and not perfunctory, the object being not only to do away with idleness, but to train and cultivate the bodies, the minds, and spirit of our men.

e. Love of corps and country. -- To be more specific, it will be necessary for officers not only to devote their close attention to the many questions affecting the comfort, health, military training and discipline of the men under their command, but also actively to promote athletics and to endeavor to enlist the interest of their men in building up and maintaining their bodies in the finest physical condition; to encourage them to enroll in the Marine Corps Institute and to keep up their studies after enrollment; and to make every effort by means of historical, educational and patriotic address to cultivate in their hearts a deep abiding love of the corps and country.

f. Leadership. -- Finally, it must be kept in mind that the American soldier responds quickly and readily to the exhibition of qualities of leadership on the part of his officers. Some of these qualities are industry, energy, initiative, determination, enthusiasm, firmness, kindness, justness, self-control, unselfishness, honor, courage. Every officer should endeavor by all means in his power to make himself the possessor of these qualities and thereby to fit himself to be a real leader of men."

5. Noncommissioned Officers. The provisions of paragraphs 1100.4d and 1100.4e above, apply generally to the relationships of noncommissioned officers with their subordinates and apply specifically to noncommissioned officers who may be exercising command authority.

CODE OF ETHICS

I am a member of a profession which exists solely to serve American society. I therefore at all times place the interests of my country, my profession, my unit, and my mission above personal and career ambitions or loyalty to any individual.

I am a member of a profession which is unique in the scope and severity of the consequences of incompetence in its practice. I therefore strive single-mindedly to achieve the highest degree of proficiency achievable in the practice of my professional arts.

I am a member of a profession which possesses the legitimate capacity for the systematic application of force to accomplish its mission. I therefore, while attaining the highest degree of proficiency achievable in the practice of my profession, will never glorify the use of violence or use excessive force, and will at all times maintain a high regard for the value of human life and dignity.

I am a member of a profession in which decisive individual initiative is often necessary for success. I therefore do not allow conformity to precedent, procedure, or regulation to prevent the exercise of individual judgment when necessary and always accept responsibility for decisions I have made.

I am a member of a profession in which unified corporate effort is necessary for the achievement of objectives. I therefore at all times esteem above my own interests the welfare and dignity of individuals under my command and my fellow professionals.

I am a member of a profession in which all members are responsible for the actions of each individual within the profession. I therefore do not tolerate unethical conduct on the part of my fellows.

I am a member of a profession on which the American public has conferred special trust and confidence. I therefore will never compromise the dignity becoming of that trust and confidence through the immoderate use of alcohol or commission of any other improper act, but will at all times maintain standards of conduct which are above reproach.

I am a member of a profession which requires its members to possess unreserved confidence in one another. I therefore conduct all of my professional and private affairs with complete forthrightness and honesty.

I am a member of a profession which requires internal discipline and unity of action among its members in order to fulfill its mission. I therefore act within the intent of all ethically and judgmentally sound orders I am given.

I am a member of a profession which requires the exercise of sound judgment. I therefore seek the opinions of my subordinates and offer my opinions to my superiors concerning the appropriateness of any action.

Chapter Four

MAKING IT HAPPEN

I waited and watched those Marines about to go into battle. Some were standing watch, some readied equipment, some slept or rested, but all were quiet. No nervous jabbering, no false bravado, no whining, no melodramatics. . . they were professionals. Most were teenagers; many far less than a year away from home; but they were seasoned by months of fighting with a determined enemy. Despite their youth and their relatively short time in the Corps, they were as willing and professional as anyone who ever wore a uniform. I was proud to be among them.

Second Lieutenant Vic Taylor
"H" Company, BLT 2/4
at the battle of Dai Do
30 Apr-3 May 1968

An army of deer led by a lion is to be feared more than an army of lions led by a deer.

Philip of Macedon

By now, you should have a vision of what it takes to lead Marines. First, you studied the extraordinary challenges combat presents. Then, you saw how difficult a challenge *preparing for war* can be for the peacetime leader. Finally, you learned what it takes--character and military competence--to get the job done in war or peace. Now the question becomes, "How do you do it?"

Your road to success as a leader will be a unique one based on your personality, your strengths and your weaknesses. Every Marine's leadership style is somewhat different. While some traits and methods are common to all Marines, no two Marines lead exactly the same way. One can hardly imagine two leaders with such different personalities as the quiet, patient Robert E. Lee and the brash, cantankerous George S. Patton, yet both were remarkable leaders in their own ways. **Your** path to success is based entirely on your own style and temperament.

One thing must be true for your style of leadership: *it must be genuine*. Trying to be someone that you aren't by copying someone else won't work. Your troops will see right through it. You cannot **act** the role of leader. Strong character cannot be acted; indeed, no one with strong character puts on an act. If a leader is weak, if he is a careerist and a showman, he may sometimes fool his superiors. But he will never fool his subordinates. And he will never succeed in leading Marines in combat.

While leadership ultimately comes from within, some time-honored methods can help you along whatever path is genuine for you. Provided you have the strength of character and military competence to lead, the goals and techniques taught in this chapter should help you. Many of these techniques should already be in your leadership repertoire. Some will be new to you. And you probably know of others not mentioned here; you use them and know they work. Remember: your style of leadership is uniquely yours.

KNOW YOUR LEADERSHIP PHILOSOPHY AND LIVE IT

All Marine leaders have a personal style of leadership. Some leaders have a style which is little more than personal idiosyncracies, reflecting no thought or philosophy. Such a style usually proves frustrating to subordinates because it is shallow, changes constantly, and is often ineffective. Other leaders' styles reflect carefully thought out philosophies that they articulate clearly to subordinates.

If leadership is *the art of getting things done through people*, then a philosophy of leadership is your concept of how to do it. It includes your standards and values, your concept of what's important, and the leadership qualities you seek to instill in subordinates. In short, your leadership philosophy is your concept of how you want your unit to behave.

A philosophy of leadership is important for three reasons. First, it builds trust and confidence among subordinates. Your Marines follow you because they can see clearly what you want from them. You leave no doubt in their minds about what must be done. They know "where you are coming from." You are always consistent; you do not want, for example, initiative one day and blind obedience the next.

Second, your leadership philosophy gives everyone a common frame of reference. All your Marines can adopt your goals as their own, which provides your unit with unity of purpose. Everyone can "sing from the same sheet of music."

Finally, your leadership philosophy makes subordinate initiative possible. Like the commander's intent in tactics, your leadership philosophy provides guidance in the absence of specific instructions. If your leadership philosophy is unclear, your subordinates will remain indecisive or prone to inappropriate and wasteful actions.

How do you develop your philosophy of leadership? First you must look at yourself. You must ask yourself, "What kind of person am I? What are my strong and weak points? What are my goals? What can I do best, and where will I most need assistance form others?" You should reference your answers to what you learned in chapters two and three. If the answers are not consistent with what good leadership requires, then your first step is probably to make some changes in yourself or the way you operate. Remember: no one is perfect. But the intelligent leader finds ways to compensate for the weaknesses he has.

You must think about and decide how you want your unit to behave. For example, do you want your subordinate leaders to check with you before making every decision, or do you want them acting on their own initiative based on your intent? If you want the latter, then you must think through how to develop such behavior in them. If you want the former, you need to re-read *Tactical Fundamentals*.

Once you've developed your philosophy, you must communicate it. You can do this both orally and in writing. But your responsibility does not stop after you have done this once. Communicating your philosophy is a continuous process. Your goal must be to have your subordinates believe in your philosophy and adopt it as their own--that takes constant effort on your part.

Finally, and most importantly, *you must live your philosophy*. Nothing will destroy you more effectively as a leader than a difference between your words and your actions. "Do as I say and not as I do" will not work as a maxim for Marine leaders. Your Marines will quickly see through it--and you.

In contrast, no leadership tool is more powerful than example. If you set the example by consistently doing what your leadership philosophy calls for, your Marines will respect and follow you. They will accept and act on your philosophy because they will see you doing so. Actions speak far louder than words. When the words and the actions carry the same message, then the Marines you lead will recognize you as a genuine leader.

BUILD A COHESIVE UNIT

Unit cohesion is a powerful force in battle. As French theorist Ardent du Picq noted:

> *Four brave men who do not know each other will not dare attack a lion. Four less brave, but knowing each other well, sure of their reliability and consequently of mutual aid, will attack resolutely.*

In the Marine Corps, unit cohesion comes from many sources. As American fighting men, Marines feel allegiance to their country and its cause. Marines fight for an idea--democracy--because it represents a cause that is morally right. Marines also draw cohesive strength from the name *Marine* and what it represents. As this nation's elite fighting force, all Marines share a common bond. Marines also feel allegiance to their unit--their division, regiment, battalion, company/battery, etc. Each unit has its own heritage and customs which help bind its Marines together as a fighting force.

But the greatest cohesion is found in the smallest unit--the squad, section, or team. Here, Marines are bound together in a group that functions as a team on a day-to-day basis. All the Marines in the team get to know each other intimately. Individual strengths, weaknesses, and personalities mesh together in a single unit. The cohesion in this group determines the fighting spirit of the company, battalion, regiment, and division.

As the leader, you want to form your Marines into a tightly knit team. In combat, you want your Marines to draw courage from their bonds with each other, courage that can keep them going in the face of enemy fire. In chapter one, S. L. A. Marshall noted that in extreme danger, the fear of failure in the eyes of peers is what keeps men fighting. But this is true only in tightly-knit teams. Allegiance to the team is a valuable source of courage.

Cohesion works to your advantage in another way as well. Experienced teams fight well because each man becomes familiar with how his fellow Marines work. Through practice, the team members develop sound SOPs and battle drills. They also learn to think alike tactically. This principle is the same in sports. For example, all-star teams usually don't do well against teams that have played together regularly. Even with superior talent, all-star teams usually lose because they lack team experience. In combat as in sports, experience and teamwork count.

How can you build unit cohesion?

--Keep teams together; don't break them up unless you have to. Don't shift your Marines from one team to another just to fill billets. Keep teams together even if, in the short term, it means some teams will be over T/O while others are under. Fighting power depends more on cohesion than whether all your billet slots are evenly filled.

--When possible, assign tasks to teams, not individuals. Make it a habit to maintain unit integrity in all that you do. For example, when you have to fill a working party, keep the team together even if it means sending five men when only four are needed.

--Use competition. Because combat is competitive by nature, you should strive to instill a competitive drive in your unit. Teammates bind together when their team competes against another. Competition among units is healthy unless continuing antagonism develops.

--Challenge your subordinates with tough training. Facing adversity together binds men as well as anything--particularly when they succeed. For example, some units develop squad or fire team reaction courses that test both combat skills and physical endurance. Exercises like these also build cohesion and esprit.

MAKE TRAINING PURPOSEFUL

Nothing demotivates Marines more than dull, useless training. Yet all too often, you see Marines in the field lying about doing nothing because training was poorly planned. To the small unit leader, large exercises are often a waste of time because the exercise is nothing more than a high level staff moving units around the training area like pieces on a chess board. That is something that you can change. You may not be able to affect the overall exercise, but you can affect what your unit does within the exercise. For example, whenever there is a lull in the play, you can set up a local engagement against an enemy unit, a neighboring unit, or even by dividing your unit and fighting yourself. You can have a "battle within the battle." Or, if your commander uses mission orders (as he should under Marine Corps doctrine), you can take the initiative and seek out the enemy. You need not--and should not--sit passively waiting for orders. Remember: it is not an excuse to blame poor training on "higher ups." As a leader, your responsibility is to make the training good for your Marines. With some imagination on your part, you usually can.

If you lead an FMF unit, you must orient your training on your wartime mission. Too many leaders train their units only in the things that they know best and ignore more important tasks. For example, many leaders like adventure training (rappelling, rope bridging, etc.) because it's fun and something the leader knows well. But few Marines have ever rappelled in combat! You must focus on the things you will have to do in combat and not get sidetracked on "neat" things that accomplish little.

You can also do imaginative training on or off base during down time. Some Marines go to civilian military war games, such as paint gun wars. You may be able to get paint guns for your unit. Similarly, MILES gear may be available for training like the squad-level free play exercise described in chapter four of *Tactical Fundamentals*.

In designing training, one of the most important things to remember is if you tell someone something, he will probably forget it. If you let him do something, he may remember it. But if you give him a problem he must think through himself, that will bring him to the point you want him to learn on his own, he will almost certainly remember and practice it. This is of particular importance in teaching technical training like gun drill. If you show your Marines how to operate a machine gun, they will probably remember little. If you let each one load and fire the gun, more of them will remember how. But if you put them in a tactical problem where they need to use a machine gun and then let them operate it to accomplish their mission, they will learn and remember how to use it correctly.

Finally, remember that your Marines will see what you really consider important in training. If all you are concerned with is getting through the training schedule, they will see that. Like you, they will not pay much attention to learning. If all you really want is to pass the Essential Subjects Test, your Marines will do that but nothing more. However, if you really want to train for combat, your Marines will see that too. They will join you in the effort to take combat seriously and train for it. They will share your interest and your goal of a unit that is ready to go into battle, well-trained to fight and win. In training as in everything, your Marines will follow what you do--not just what you say.

MENTALLY PREPARE YOUR MEN FOR COMBAT

In chapter one, you saw how fear and stress affect men in combat. Combat will be a brutal shock to them if their training and education are insufficient. Since you can't use deadly force in training, you must find other ways to "steel" your Marines for combat. Let's look at a few useful ways to do this.

First, your training should simulate the battlefield as closely as possible. You want to create noise, smoke, confusion, and simulated casualties so that your Marines have to make decisions and act in an environment as close to real combat as possible. You should "fight" tanks at close quarters. Gas chamber training is also valuable; you get a sense of terror when you remove your mask and start to choke. You should use smoke pots, booby traps, and artillery simulators whenever you can get them. You sometimes see football teams do something similar when preparing for a game. During practice, the coach places loudspeakers on the sidelines to simulate crowd noise while the quarterback is calling signals.

Second, you must educate your men about the mental strain present in combat. You should have them read books like *The Forgotten Soldier* and *Men Against Fire* to gain insight into the tremendous stress inherent in combat. Have them watch films of men in real combat so that they can see and hear what it's like. Bring in combat veterans to talk about their combat experiences. All these methods can give your Marines a valuable picture of the mental and emotional aspects of combat.

Third, you can train with BB guns. While a hit from a BB gun won't kill you, it does hurt. It hurts enough to create some fear of being hit. It will at least introduce your men to the fact that courage is needed to move in the face of hostile fire. This is why BB guns are now used in training at SOI West. Of course, you must use them safely, that is, with goggles.

Finally, you should use your own imagination to come up with ways to introduce the stress of combat into training. This does not mean brutalizing your men, nor can you allow training that is unsafe. But there may be ways you or your Marines can think of to make training more realistic in terms of fear and stress. Be creative!

DEVELOP SUBORDINATE LEADERS

One of any leader's most fundamental responsibilities is to develop his subordinates. Major General John A. Lejeune, 13th Commandant of the Marine Corps, wrote:

> *The relation between officers and enlisted men should in no sense be that of superior and inferior nor that of master and servant, but rather that of teacher and scholar. In fact, it should partake of the nature of the relation between father and son, to the extent that officers, especially commanding officers, are responsible for the physical, mental, and moral welfare, as well as the discipline and military training of the young men under their command who are serving the nation in the Marine Corps.*

In the German army, commanders at every level are expected to spend at least one-third of their time developing their subordinates. A recent commander of the 9th Marines, Colonel Tony Zinni, ran officers' school for his regiment twice a week, and taught all the classes himself. Developing his subordinates was Colonel Zinni's top priority, because he knew that if war came, the success of the regiment would depend at least as much on them as on him.

What does developing your subordinates mean? How do you do it? From chapter three, you know that your greatest responsibility is to develop character in your Marines. You want to instill in them traits like courage, unselfishness, and decisiveness, traits that Marines need to lead successfully in peace or war. How can you do this? You should always look for situations that test and develop the traits discussed in chapter three. For example, one way to develop courage is to put the subordinate leader in a situation where he must depart from the assigned mission to accomplish your intent. You should also hold leadership classes where you and your subordinate leaders study successful leaders and their traits. This teaches subordinates why good character traits are important. But the most useful tool for teaching character is the personal example you set. You cannot develop character in your subordinates if you "cut corners" on integrity, lack the courage to speak candidly, and demand "zero defects." The technique *do as I say not as I do* doesn't work.

You must also develop technical and tactical ability in subordinate leaders. Of these, tactical decision making ability is probably the most challenging. You develop this ability by placing leaders in situations and having them make decisions. You can do this through map exercises, war games, terrain walks, and tactical field exercises. These exercises are important because they teach your subordinates how **you** think and develop their own ability to think tactically. If you use mission orders, teaching subordinates how you think is very important. For example, the centerpiece of your order--the commander's intent--is not simply a short paragraph in the operation order; it includes the mutual understanding built over time between you and your subordinate leaders through familiarity and day-to-day experience.

Your relationship with your subordinates is important. You must build confidence in each other's ability based on familiarity and mutual respect. You must also develop a common purpose and a common set of standards so that your unit is led with consistency. But this does not mean that you should give all your subordinate leaders uniform latitude for initiative. Some will act properly under a minimum of guidance and supervision. Others need more supervision to accomplish what you want. However, you are responsible for developing initiative in all your subordinate leaders regardless of their ability.

INSTILL DISCIPLINE

Marines are noted for their strong sense of discipline. There is a good reason why the Corps prides itself on its discipline. Few qualities are more important for winning in combat. Without it, a military force is little more than an armed mob.

What is discipline? It is the order that comes from adhering to certain set standards. It is staying within certain boundaries, boundaries that limit how you behave. The standards and boundaries reflect what experience teaches is necessary to be effective.

There are two basic kinds of discipline: **imposed discipline** and **self-discipline**. You remember imposed discipline from Boot Camp or OCS. Your DI told you what to do and made sure you did it. He looked over your shoulder constantly and made you do what you were supposed to.

In earlier times, imposed discipline was the main type of military discipline. First and second generation tactics relied on imposed discipline. In the Prussian army of Frederick the Great, the soldier was expected to fear his sergeants more than he feared the enemy. All that was required of the soldier was blind obedience.

But third generation warfare--maneuver warfare, which is now Marine Corps doctrine--demands more than obedience. It demands that Marines at every level take the initiative to support the commander's intent. Blind obedience does not create Marines who take the initiative. Marines who are merely obedient will not act without instructions.

Maneuver warfare instead demands self-discipline. It demands that Marines of every rank discipline themselves to act with initiative, but to do so within the bounds set by the focus of effort, the mission, and the commander's intent. Those limits and bounds must be accepted by every Marine; they are what keep initiative from resulting in fatal disorder. They are the tools of discipline in maneuver warfare tactics, and Marines must discipline themselves to act within them.

To develop the self-discipline maneuver warfare requires in tactics, you must apply it in everything. If discipline is the order that comes from adhering to certain set standards and staying within certain boundaries that limit how you behave, then self-discipline is **making yourself** adhere to set standards and keeping your own behavior in certain bounds. Imposed discipline is where someone else does those things for you; **they** make you keep the standards and act within the bounds. With self-discipline, **you** do not need someone else to do it for you; you do it for yourself.

What does this mean for you, the Marine leader? It means that one of your main goals must be instilling self-discipline in your Marines. Of course, that begins with instilling self-discipline in yourself. Here as everywhere, your actions speak louder than your words. If you cannot instill self-discipline in yourself, then you cannot expect your Marines to discipline themselves either.

In training, imposed discipline may be necessary, but it must always be used as a tool to develop self-discipline. What are some ways you can do this? Two are of prime importance.

First, you can explain to your Marines why they must do something. That helps build one of the most important elements of self-discipline, a sense of shared responsibility for accomplishing the mission or task. If every Marine can see the result of his action--or his failure to act--he has a tool for disciplining himself.

Second, you can establish high standards of conduct and performance. By setting high standards and demanding that your Marines meet them, your Marines will develop good habits. Good habits are a form of self-discipline. A good example is always cleaning your gear when you come back from the field before going on liberty.

You can see a good example of self-discipline if you go to the parade at 8th and I. The Marines stand absolutely still. They do so because they know it is important to make the parade a good one and to give the audience a good impression of the Marine Corps. They know why they must stand still, even though doing so for long periods is very painful, so they discipline themselves to do so.

The same is true in combat. For example, let's suppose your unit is in an ambush position, and one of your Marines is stung by a hornet. He does not move or cry out, because he knows if he does so, he could give away the ambush and risk the lives of his fellow Marines. He knows why he must be absolutely still.

Developing self-discipline in your Marines is not always easy. They come from a society that puts little emphasis on self-discipline. But by showing the purpose behind why you do something and establishing and maintaining high standards to develop good habits, you can do it. By developing self-discipline in your subordinates, you make them combat effective Marines. You also give them one of the most important tools in life.

COMBAT LEADERSHIP TECHNIQUES

Up until now, you have learned about leadership techniques used in peacetime. Of course, these all relate to leadership in combat, because they affect how well your unit is prepared for combat. Good preparation will translate into good performance in combat.

But what about the question of what **you** can do once the shooting starts? What can you do in combat to be an effective leader of Marines?

Reducing Cumulative Stress

If you think back to the first chapter, you will remember that combat generates two kinds of stress in your men: cumulative stress and acute stress. Cumulative stress is the stress that builds up over time. It results in anxiety, anguish, and a steady degradation of combat performance. There are a number of things you can do to help reduce cumulative stress in your unit:

Perhaps most important is ensuring that your Marines get enough rest. Courage and fatigue are closely linked; rested men are generally more courageous in combat than tired men. Fatigue has a similar effect on performance. As one Marine Vietnam veteran noted:

> *The tremendous heat during the day and cold at night, inadequate intake of food and water, mental stress and constant movement through the mountains of northern I Corps all contributed to near physical exhaustion. . . Every third or fourth night, my squad was assigned a mission to establish a listening post or conduct some type of night patrol. On those nights that we did not have any "night acts" going, we stood watch in three-man holes, which meant, at best, six hours of sleep a night with two interruptions to stand watch. Without a doubt, inadequate rest detrimentally affected our ability to concentrate on the mission.*

Second, you can make the best use of available time. As in peacetime, in combat you **never** have enough time to get everything done that should be done. Rest, rehearsing upcoming events, improving positions, cleaning weapons, and first aid will fill most of the time available to you. When possible, you should train your Marines because training is as important in war as it is during peacetime. You should refine and practice immediate action drills and other SOPs. You should also hold "chalk talks" to critique past actions and solicit ideas from subordinates on how to do things better. You should focus on the enemy, thinking about and discussing the best ways to defeat him. At a minimum, you should make every Marine aware of what's going on around him. For example, a platoon commander or platoon sergeant might brief his Marines on the situation as follows:

> *Last night, K Company was probed around 0300, near this finger (point to terrain model.) Tonight they're going to set up three squad ambushes near the river here, at the end of this perpendicular ridge, and at this saddle, so that if he tries to get out he's trapped. We're going to conduct a platoon night ambush here, so that if the enemy tries to reinforce his units near K Company, we'll put him on ice.*

Third, humor helps. If you, the leader, can keep a sense of humor in even the toughest situations, you can use it to cut through the tension that may envelop your men.

Fourth, Marine Corps rituals help fight stress. Celebrating the Marine Corps birthday under combat conditions will help remind your men of the strong tradition that stands behind them. A unit mascot can help break tension. The old tradition of a steak and eggs breakfast before an amphibious landing helps steady the troops. Your unit may have some traditions of its own.

Fifth, don't forget your chaplain. He can offer a great deal of comfort to your men, comfort that can reduce anxiety. He can help put the stressful situation of combat in a larger perspective.

Finally, you can work to keep your men focused outward on the mission rather than inward on themselves and their stress. Ultimately, anyone who focuses continually inward is likely to become a stress casualty. He will create a "feedback loop" where stress builds upon itself. The best antidote is to focus your Marines outward, and the tool with which to do that is the mission. Keep emphasizing it and explaining why it is important. Explain how and why accomplishing the mission will help other Marines and the unit survive and win. Men who are focused on winning and on helping their comrades are less likely to fall victim to stress than those who are focused only on themselves.

These techniques can help you help your Marines overcome cumulative stress. But what about acute stress--paralyzing fear or panic? This is the kind of stress that comes with actual combat, with being in the thick of the fight. What can you do there?

Reducing Acute Stress

You can set the example. *Coolness is contagious*. If your men see you acting effectively and courageously, they will be inspired to do the same. In *Battle Leadership*, Captain Adolf Von Schell explained how he calmed his men in one tense situation:

. . . Until night fell or the Russian balloon went down, we could not move. The shells continued to fall around our shed. No one said a word. I noticed that my men were highly nervous. Several came to me and asked permission to go outside, giving more or less trivial excuses. I refused, for it was apparent that they only wanted to reach a place of safety. The nervous excitement became tense. Suddenly a shell came down right in the middle of the company, but it failed to burst. Nerves were frayed almost to the breaking point. We were like a kettle which would soon boil over.

In order to obtain a feeling of security somebody had to act. Then I had a good thought; I called the company barber, and sat down with my back to the front and told him to cut my hair. I must say, that in my whole life, no haircut has ever been so unpleasant. Every time a shell whistled over our heads, I jerked my head down and the barber would tear out a few hairs instead of cutting them. But the effect was splendid; the soldiers evidently felt that if the company commander could sit quietly and let his hair be cut that the situation was not so bad, and that they were probably safer than they thought. Conversation began; a few jokes were played; several men began to play cards; some began to sing; no one paid any more attention to the shells, even though two men were wounded a few minutes later by a shell which struck in the vicinity.

You can allow and assist natural leaders to rise. As you saw earlier, you will probably be surprised by the performance of your Marines in combat. Some who are impressive in peacetime may fail in combat. Others will "rise up" and surprise you, emerging as natural combat leaders. Those people are your best asset. You should attempt to identify them and put them in key leadership positions. They will do wonders to keep the rest of your men moving and fighting.

You can continue to emphasize the shared purpose of the unit, what it is trying to accomplish and why. This remains very important during the actual fighting. Now more than ever you need to keep your men focused on something beyond themselves, not inwardly on their own fears. Keep stressing the mission and why it is important.

Leadership in the heat of combat, when the bullets are flying and shells bursting, is the ultimate challenge for Marine leaders. As in all leadership, everyone will have his own personal style. But one thing is common to all: you cannot start leading effectively only when the shooting starts.

Unless you have led effectively in peacetime and prepared your unit well for war, it will not perform well in combat regardless of what you do. It's too late to start at that point. On the other hand, if you have led well in peacetime, your unit will probably perform effectively in combat. You will still face leadership challenges, but they are not likely to be challenges such as outright mass panic. Remember: what you do now will have a great influence on what you face then.

MOTIVATE YOUR MARINES

As you saw in chapter one, combat is brutally competitive. It is a clash of wills, a clash where one side wins and the other loses. The loser is the first to quit, the first to lose his motivation to fight. Marines have a reputation for winning. Marine leaders have had a major role in establishing this reputation. In combat, the Marine leader is renowned for *making it happen.*

Your most important allies in making it happen are the Marines under your charge. After all, in combat, they, not you, will have to do most of the fighting. But to get the most out of them, you need to motivate them. You need to make them want to make it happen. How can you do this?

The first step is to make it clear to them that they are part of a team. You respect them, you want their cooperation, not just obedience, and you welcome their ideas and initiatives. You must make the final decision, because that is the leader's responsibility. But you want their input before the decision is made. And you want their initiative in carrying out the decision.

This requires keeping the troops informed and explaining why you are doing something. This is true at every level of command. In a meeting at Quantico, General P. K. Van Riper explained that he always required his Marines to keep their compasses in a certain pocket of their utilities. That way, in combat, if a man was hit and another Marine needed his compass, he knew exactly where to find it. A lieutenant in the meeting said, "At TBS, they always told us to do that, but they never explained why." Now, because he knows why, that lieutenant can be counted on to require the same thing of the men in his platoon. Do you think they will be more likely to do it if he explains why to them?

Positive leadership is an important tool for motivating your Marines. When a Marine does something right, he should be commended and rewarded in public. This is especially important in terms of developing initiative. Any Marine who acts to accomplish the mission on his own, without being told, should get high praise. This is true even if what he did might not have been exactly the best thing. While you should reward in public, reprimands should generally be given privately. Of course, if someone is screwing up deliberately, then a public reprimand is in order.

Competition is another good tool for motivating your Marines. Once they sense they are part of a team--your unit--they will want that team to win. As noted earlier, sports can be useful in this regard. But it is even more important for your Marines to want to win in training. Free-play training against other units is a valuable tool. It leads your men to want to do the things that are important for winning in combat: good patrolling, effective camouflage, and above all, initiative in accomplishing the commander's intent. Linking the things you want your Marines to be good at in combat to competition is one of your best tools for both training and motivating your men.

There are a number of motivators that are standard Marine Corps practice, things that contribute to the Corps' unusually high level of esprit. They are all ways of telling your Marines that you care about them. They include telling the troops that their welfare comes before your own by always seeing that the men eat before the officers. They include telling them that you, the leader,

always bear the heavier burden by always dropping your pack last. These may seem like minor matters, but they are not. They speak loudly to the men, because actions speak more eloquently than words. They are important ways of motivating your Marines to want to give you their best in return.

Finally, one of the most powerful motivators which you can use is creating a shared sense of purpose. The purpose of making your unit ready for combat should be a shared purpose. It should be something where every Marine sees the importance of what he does. Shared purpose builds a team, leads your Marines to show initiative, and leads every Marine to give his best. Creating it is one of your most important responsibilities as a leader.

When you think about motivating your Marines, remember that they want to be motivated. They are all volunteers; they came in the Marine Corps because they were motivated to do so. They want to give their best to their unit and to the Corps. Your challenge, as a leader, is to keep that motivation alive, despite the drudgery of the daily job. Ultimately, everything you do as a leader, but especially the way you train for combat, is key to that.

CONCLUSION

You have read about the great leaders of the past, men like Washington, Grant, Lee, Rommel, and Patton. They stood out above other men of their time, in ways that lead people to still admire them years and centuries later.

From among you, the Marines taking this course, will come the great leaders of tomorrow. And there will be many of you who, if not known ultimately to history, will be remembered forever by your men as the leaders who shaped their lives. That is perhaps your greatest opportunity, as well as your greatest challenge. One of the Corps' proudest traditions is that it builds men; it sends back into society people who will be forever different, and better, for having been Marines. They will be better because of the way **you** have led them.

Whether you will face the ultimate challenge, leadership in combat, only time can tell. Some of you probably will. But if there is one message this course would leave you with, it is this: the time to begin preparing yourself and your Marines to meet that challenge is now. Unless you make preparing for war your focus of effort now, you may find, in retrospect, that you started too late. But if Marine leaders everywhere decide **now** to cut through the distractions, the careerism, and the "looking good" and focus on preparing for war, then the Marine Corps will be ready. And in the process, you will develop the genuine leaders who can once again carry the United States Marine Corps through to victory.

ANNEX D

Selected Articles

Toward a Definition of Leadership

by LtGen Charles G. Cooper, USMC(Ret)

Based on a talk given at the U.S. Naval Academy 1987 Leadership Conference, the author shares his views on leadership, including his concept of a "Band of Brothers," a set of principles identified closely with LtGen Cooper's leadership style.

Back in 1968 during the battle of Khe Sanh in northern I Corps, some unknown Marine inscribed a message on a C-ration carton with a grease pencil and mounted it on a metal stake at the landing strip for all to see. It carried a clear and poignant message—as far as we know, an original message—and its author is still unknown. It said: *For those who fight for it, life has a special flavor the protected never know.* Ponder that simple expression. It explains in large part why we are all gathered here to talk about leadership, the kind the protected never know, leadership in defense of our country. This is our ultimate purpose, the reason for our military's existence, and we must not be distracted from this principal point.

Since I'm a fervent believer in equating military leadership with sports and other competitive activities to help understanding, I don't necessarily think we can define leadership by memorizing or exposing a long list of unassailable, strong character traits; although indeed they must be recognized. Just as a college football coach either recruits to support his system or adjusts his system to the talent available, I do contend strongly that we must teach and constantly stress that leadership style is not necessarily constant. It must adapt to the mission, resources, dangers, and "whatever is necessary to get the job done." It's seldom the same. That is not to advocate inconsistency, just flexibility and adaptability. We sometimes overlook that point.

If I were smart enough to define leadership, I would describe it as the art of taking what you have personally, what your job entails, what resources you have, and making them work together most effectively. Oversimplified? Yes, of course it is. It means getting the job done, the best way possible, and we don't all have to do it the same way. Too often we try to clone leaders rather than encourage the development of natural individual talents.

Over the years, my leadership philosophy has remained relatively constant. It is, essentially, the unselfish pursuit of excellence, leadership by example, know your job, demand the best from your men, encourage, praise in public, and—*foremost*—never accept anything less than a Marine's very best effort. It has been called the "Band of Brothers" leadership concept. It has 11 short principles that reflect traditional values and family-type pride that transcend cultural differences and places the emphasis on putting support of your fellow Marine, soldier, sailor, or airman in battle as the highest of callings. It places the unit ahead of self but promises that you will never be without that same assistance should you need it—at all levels.

Some have called this code a very sophisticated approach to behavioral modification. It is. But it also is the glue that holds things together in combat. It is a simple, straightforward appeal for one's best, a ready arm of help when needed, a sense of belonging, being a part of something you can believe in. History does teach us that men don't readily die for noble causes or fight to the end for a national objectives; men fight for their buddies, their comrades in their squads, platoons, ships, or squadrons. In two wars I have witnessed the miracle of this unselfish comradeship. Most of you have too—such as seeing Marines and Navy corpsmen literally go over the hill from the hospitals and rear areas to get back to their units when they knew they were needed; to not report wounds; to refuse evacuation when wounded.

FMF-PAC

BAND OF BROTHERS

1. All Merines ere entitled to dignity end respect es individuels, but must ebide by common stenderds esteblished by proper euthority.
2. A Merine should never lie, cheat, or steel from e fellow Merine or feil to come to his eid in time of need.
3. All Merines should contribute 100% of their ebilities to the unit's mission. Any less effort by en individuel pesses the buck to someone else.
4. A unit, regerdless of size, is e disciplined femily structure, with similer reletionships besed on mutuel respect emong members.
5. It is essentiel thet issues end problems which tend to lessen e unit's effectiveness be eddressed end resolved.
6. A blending of seperete cultures, verying educetionel levels, end different sociel beckgrounds is possible in en unselfish etmosphere of common goels, espiretions, end mutuel understending.
7. Being the best requires common effort, herd work, end teemwork. Nothing worthwhile comes eesy.
8. Every Merine deserves job satisfection, equel consideration end recognition of his eccomplishments.
9. Knowing your fellow Merine well enebles you to leern to look et things "through his eyes", es well es your own.
10. Issues detracting from the efficiency end sense of well-being of en individuel should be surfeced end weighed egeinst the impect on the unit es e whole.
11. It must be recognized thet e brotherhood concept depends on ell members "belonging"—being fully eccepted by others within.

The urge, the drive, this love that transcends Service, rank, and even life itself is one of the truly great American miracles of this 20th century.

The 18- to 21-year-old American, if properly led, trained, and supported with the assorted firepower we can provide is as fine a fighting man as there is in this world. But without that first ingredient, we come off very poorly. A unit may survive in combat despite less than adequate leadership because subordinates rose to overcome the problems or because of its inner strength. But in most instances it is the reverse. Our troops need that identification with their leaders—from sergeant to lieutenant to general.

There are times when all these theories fall apart. Combat means different things to all of us; it's not all in the mud and rain, or being catapulted off a carrier, or riding that tank into the assault. But these are the ultimates we must prepare for. The best plans can go awry. Exhaustion, fear, enemy superiority, and many other things can make the world turn black. As a lieutenant leading an assault on an impregnable mountain, the wisdom of a colonel's judgment isn't too obvious. I know. There comes a time when the only thing that overcomes the absolute certainty of defeat, failure, death, or all factors combined is that glue we must manufacture in peacetime—unit cohesiveness, the ability to reach down in the last five minutes of the fourth quarter, to suck it up, to never quit, to try even harder. This comes only from camaraderie, a closeness of purpose, pride in unit, and strong personal leadership. It is priceless and can work miracles where there is no hope!

Certainly all leadership can't be equated with the hell-for-leather, life-threatening horrors of hand-to-hand close combat on the ground, but it will, in any environment, have some constants we need remember:

- Marines want to be led, but they soon become impatient with dull or unimaginative leadership.
- Marines expect their leaders at all levels to be competent, but they often have a "show me" attitude until it becomes self-evident.
- Marines will uniformly support enthusiasm, sincerity, and determination, even if it is reflected in tight, firm discipline.
- Marines can spot selfishness a mile away.
- A good horse deserves a loose rein. Train 'em right, and then give 'em room to operate. Don't suffocate initiative.

Years ago, I was fortunate to have an enlightened commanding officer during a difficult period as a young company commander. He gave me an imaginary candle and a challenge to help me during a very difficult period. Over the years I've never forgotten it. Let me leave one with each of you. Let the lighting of this candle reflect your own unselfish dedication to excellence, your resolve to be the very best you can be—leadership by example—so that the people above, next to, or under you will be better by your presence and will want to help you keep that flame burning brightly. Remember that you are not the unit. But its success or failure is in your hands. Hold that candle high, my friends, and the greatest pleasure I could ever receive in this world would be when we meet again for you to say to me as we exchange salutes, "Good morning, General, my candle is still lit!"

USMC

> LtGen Cooper, an infantry officer, retired in 1985 after serving as commanding general, FMFPac.

The Martial Spirit

by Capt Kent W. Bradford

What would your emotional reaction be in the following situations?

You are about to engage in the fitness report counseling of an aggressive, intelligent, defensive staff noncommissioned officer who is not going to welcome constructive criticism.

You are going to conduct office hours or preside on a tough summary court of a controversial and hotly contested case.

Your troops cajole you into participating in a boxing smoker. Your opponent is not particularly strong or skilled. There are no stakes but you are committed.

You walk into a bar and are confronted by a large and imposing drunk who has decided that you are to be his fight for the night.

In these situations of psychological or physical confrontation, would you feel confident or experience some degree of anxiety?

If you are apprehensive, nervous, or afraid when faced with psychological or physical confrontation, then I suggest that you, as well as many others in the Marine Corps, are lacking in "martial spirit."

By now you might suspect that I am about to advocate turning Marines into Bruce Lees. But please do not confuse the term "martial art" with "martial spirit." Websters' defines "martial" as "pertaining to war." I am concerned here with warlike spirit.

Much has been written recently about the lack of hand-to-hand training in the Marine Corps. Much of it deals with the inability of the individual Marine to fight in close combat. I propose that the absence of adequate hand-to-hand or other combative training has done something far more insidious than just rob us of our ability to fight without weapons.

Many of us have lost, or have never developed, our "disciplined aggressiveness." We have lost what the French have called our *crains et elan*, or "guts and spirit."

Somewhere amidst the tactical complexity and technological profundity that is our Marine Corps, we have laid aside the animal combativeness that is the mettle of a warrior. We have all the outward trappings of a warrior—physically fit, intelligent, and tactically aware—but we have not the hearts; in short, we have lost our martial spirit. I believe we are, in fact, "spiritual quiche eaters."

The Japanese had a good explanation of martial character. They felt that a warrior who was not confronted with a threat exhibited *zanshin*, a relaxed awareness. His eyes were peacefully focused on *enzan no metsuke* or "mountains far away." When confronted with a threat his character changed instantly to that of *satsui o kanjiru* or "a killing mood." There was no fear or apprehension; he had experienced combat in training and was confident in his ability to overcome his opponent. Perhaps he even enjoyed it.

This combative nature can best be exemplified by historical figures exhibiting the martial spirit. Many of us have read Kenneth Roberts' famous book *Northwest Passage* in which he speaks of Maj Robert Rogers of "Rogers' Rangers." During the French and Indian War, Maj Rogers marched an army of farmers through Massachusetts, Vermont, and western Maine all the way to Quebec in the winter. Game was so scarce during the march that even the Indians traveling with the army went hungry. The men boiled and ate their leather uniform articles, shoes, harnesses, and belts for sustenance. Their stomach linings stuck together, front to back, which prevented the men from standing erect without considerable pain and forced them to march stooped over. When the men stumbled they tried to fall forward so that they would not have to backtrack even a few paces.

This miserable army attacked and defeated the French at Montreal and marched all the way back to Massachusetts. Clearly, the principal reason for their success and survival was the indominable, charismatic leadership and martial spirit demonstrated by Maj Rogers.

During the Vietnam War, a young Air Force lieutenant named Lance Peter Sijan ejected from his burning F-4 into an undeveloped region of northern Laos. Crashing through the jungle canopy, he broke both his legs and sustained other injuries. Eluding enemy patrols, Lt Sijan crawled backward through the jungle for six weeks. He maintained some degree of strength by eating slugs, insects, and leeches off his legs and drinking rainwater. When finally captured, he escaped two times with both legs in homemade splints, killing his guard with his bare hands on his first attempt. Recaptured a third time on Christmas day, he was transported to Hoa-Lo prison where he later died under torture.

Accounts from fellow prisoners state that Lt Sijan's combative spirit was so intense the prison guards were afraid to be around him. They also indicate Sijan was never known to have broken. Based on the accounts of his fellow prisoners, Lt Sijan was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.

These men exemplify the martial spirit. But where do we get such men and how is this combative nature developed? The foundation of the martial spirit begins, interestingly enough, during childhood participation in contact sports. I have observed that Marines who played contact sports in their younger years fare much better in situations of mental or physical confrontation than those who did not. Confidence during confrontation begins with physical contact on the football field, soccer field, etc. Individual sports, such as running, weightlifting, hunting, fishing, and golf, do not promote a martial spirit.

How then may we correct the deficient martial spirit of our Corps? We must introduce our Marines to some activity that involves controlled, violent physical contact.

Let me give you an extreme example of this approach in a military environment. Viktor Suvarov, a defected member of the Soviet Military Intelligence organization GRU, tells of his experiences as a Spetsnaz officer in his book *Inside the Aquarium.*

Suvarov speaks of a unique form of company "field day" recreation in which members of the Spetsnaz company are selected at random, regardless of rank, and placed into a pit with an attack dog. The rest of the company sits around the pit and observes their peer fight the dog. When one combatant kills the dog, or is too badly torn up to continue, then the next trooper, and perhaps a fresh dog, is placed in the pit.

Suvarov also speaks of Spetsnaz recruits undergoing "puppet training." The term "puppet" is a Soviet euphemism for a condemned prisoner of state. Spetsnaz recruits will conduct hand-to-hand and silent kill training on condemned prisoners who, interestingly enough, are not restricted in how they defend themselves.

The result is that Spetsnaz recruits may have fought attack dogs and killed men in hand-to-hand combat before they even see active duty.

In a more realistic vein, let us look at the example of the Korean Marine Corps. Most of us are aware that the Koreans have a nationally sponsored hand-to-hand skill called Tae Kwon Do. Marine officer candidates must possess at least a first degree black belt in Tae Kwon Do before they are eligible for commissioning. The massive morning formations during which the Korean Marines practice hand-to-hand combat under the leadership of their officers is impressive.

Why do the Korean Marines place such an emphasis on these skills? Do they expect to build a corps of Bruce Lees? No. Do they ever expect to engage the North Koreans in hand-to-hand combat? Certainly not often. They do it for the mental benefit, to foster a martial spirit among their Marines.

What must we do to foster the same? Ideally, we should institute a regimented, command-sponsored, hand-to-hand program, but we can start with anything from football to pugil sticks to the bear pit (see *MCG*, Oct86).

The program needs to be mandatory for all Marines regardless of rank, military occupational specialty, age, or sex. The program should be competitive and physically intense; it should provide good cardiovascular exercise; ant it should involve controlled, violent physical contact.

Our Corps is tactically sound, technically advanced, and intellectually profound, but we are rapidly becoming hollow men; warriors without the hearts of warriors. It is a deficiency that we should move to correct.

USMC

> Capt Bradford wrote this article while a student at AWS.

But Can They Fight?

by Capt Michael L. Ettore

The Marine Corps has always taken pride in the fact that its small unit leaders are among the best in the world. We are equally proud of privates, corporals, and sergeants who took charge of squads and platoons in combat and saved many a battle. Tales of lieutenants who suddenly became company commanders when their skipper was killed are legendary. While modern warfare is without question quite different, one fact has not, and I believe will not, change—the necessity for enlisted leaders and junior officers to be capable of assuming command of scared, confused troops in desperate situations. Today, the Marine Corps has many men who possess the ability to perform heroically but who are not getting enough quality training and preparation for the day when all eyes may look to them for decisive leadership.

Recent articles in the *Gazette* from worried and sometimes disgusted leaders have convinced me that I was truly fortunate as a new second lieutenant with a rifle platoon. I had the luck to be sent to a battalion that viewed tactical expertise as its number one priority. In this unit, little or no value was placed on painting rocks, running marathons as a unit (with press coverage of course!), winning the division savings bond drive, or getting write-ups in the base newspaper.

I'd like to offer a few examples of how my contemporaries and I were introduced to the officer ranks of an infantry battalion. I will not go into great detail. Rather, I will cite a few examples of what made our unit exceptional. I call this unit exceptional in the sense that platoon and company commanders were truly allowed to lead and train their respective units without having everything forced upon them from above.

"Go to your area and train."

In talking to peers about their recent duty in the Fleet Marine Force, I am amazed at how many had negative experiences. Many seem envious of the fact that I actually was allowed to go to the field with my platoon and train as a platoon. When I related how I started with my platoon sergeant teaching hand and arm signals and then progressed onward, I am often met with stares of disbelief. A few said they had never been to the field when platoon-level training was allowed; it was always company level or higher. My company went to the field together, and each platoon was assigned an area in which to train. Platoons were spread apart by about 3,000 meters to avoid interfering with each other. The commanding officer (CO) had already approved each lieutenant's schedule back in the rear, so we were free to get right to work. The CO would say something like "It's now 0800 Monday, go to your areas and train. I'll meet all of you at grid 872 653 at 1100 Wednesday. We'll do a night attack that night. I'll be visiting each platoon periodically." We would go to our areas and get on with training. The CO established a CP located away from the platoons, but we would be in radio contact with him. He forced himself to keep out of our way and enabled us to use our imagination and be in charge. I really appreciated this chance to run my own training and the CO, who visited occasionally, never made us do it his way if ours was just as good.

During early periods of training, I allowed the squad leaders to have blocks of time for training their squads. This allowed them to establish themselves as the leader, and it allowed me to observe them and find out who was really good and who was not.

As a result of this training, I saw the platoon evolve into a tight unit in which the fire team and squad leaders

Field training was accomplished several days a week.

took charge and accepted responsibility.

Because the CO, executive officer, and platoon commanders had planned the time so well, there was rarely any unplanned slack time in the field. The Marines knew what we were going to do and could see a progression from one week to the next. We never had men sitting around bored, waiting for chow, etc. We had an outstanding company gunny who was a tireless worker. As a result of his efforts, we were always supported well. Some friends tell me that they went to the field and had no schedule, which is really a waste of time. Others said they had a schedule, but it was handed down by higher levels and often unrealistic.

An alarming number of peers tell me that more often than not they went to the field as a battalion, even before the platoons and companies became proficient on their own levels. One remarked that he felt like he was a chess piece. True, the troops were in the field, tactical movements were being made, the battalion staff was getting a good workout, but very little real training was actually happening on the rifleman's level. I can remember our battalion staff doing many MAPEXs, TEWTs, etc. in the rear or out in the field without tying up the rest of the battalion. They became skilled without wasting time that the companies could utilize more effectively.

Another surprise to me was how little some units actually go to the field. I hear of units that go out for a few days and then weeks pass until they return to the field. Our battalion CO made field training his priority, and we took him up on it. I arrived in February, just as the battalion was reorganizing after a float. From March until late August my company was in the field every week except one. The average stay per week was usually three days and nights, sometimes four. We would usually have an inspection Friday morning, and if all was well the troops were on liberty by 1300. My point is that you can only become proficient in the field by spending time in the field. There comes a point when the classroom outlives its usefulness.

There is no doubt in my mind that the main reason for the motivation and spirit of the battalion was the leadership and guidance of the battalion commander. He let us all know what he wanted right from the start in plain English. He said he didn't want PT formations running by his office just to impress him. Every company commander knew never to get caught with his troops just sitting around in the rear with nothing to do or standing by waiting for the word. "Soon you'll be on float," he said. "Don't be afraid to take some time with your families, and don't forget some of the troops are about to go out for their third float." He spoke with disdain of those who might want to impress him by being workaholics. In fact, he said excessive hours in garrison was a sign of poor leadership. He let his commanders command, did not try to personally run everything, and listened to his staff's suggestions; yet there was never any doubt who was in charge. Nobody in the unit was afraid to make a mistake, and we all made them. No heads were lopped off. In almost 11 years of service, I have never been in a unit where the atmosphere was so motivated and professional as it was in this battalion.

I'm sure there will be some who read this article and think that I don't understand the "big picture." Maybe so, but I do understand that many people are counting on the Marine Corps to be immediately ready to fight and win. We can tell them we are ready; we can choreograph enough CAXs and major exercises to impress all of our generals into thinking we are ready; we can listen to lofty discussions on maneuver warfare; but unless fire teams, squads, and platoons are truly combat ready we will go to war with a paper tiger. We must realize that we have become lax in our combat skills since Vietnam. Commanders at all levels should consider the tactical proficiency of their unit as their number one priority and dedicate most of their efforts toward this area. The current return to our old philosophy of "Every Marine a Rifleman" makes this the best opportunity we've had in years to change some of the attitudes around the Corps. I'd like to see the day when a battalion is judged as good or bad based on how it performed in an unannounced, tactical exercise against aggressors who are trying to win. This type of test would tell us more about a unit than any wall locker inspection or the Marine Corps Institute completion rate. Yes, there are units out there who are ready, units that are training hard and learning. But someone has to be wise enough to lead them with the right priorities in mind and not be afraid to exercise some moral courage. We are here to fight and win. This can never take a backseat to any other aspect of being a Marine. USMC

> Capt Ettore is currently assigned to Weapons Battalion at MCRD Parris Island.

COURSE REQUIREMENT

Marine Corps Leadership
MCI-7404

In this course, you have learned many of the challenges to successful leadership. You have learned what qualities good leaders must possess and techniques that you--the leader--can use. Hopefully, you have also realized the tremendous leadership responsibility that you hold by virtue of the word *officer* in your title. During peacetime, your responsibilities are largely intangible. But in combat, they become tangible in blood. What is your fundamental responsibility in combat? It is *to accomplish the mission at the least cost in lives.* If this course causes you to realize that this responsibility is not to be taken lightly, then its main purpose has been fulfilled.

The second purpose of this course is to cause you to think about leadership and how you do it. In chapter four, you learned that good leaders know their leadership philosophy and live it. They know their standards and values, their concept of what's important, and the values they seek to instill in their subordinates so that all are "operating off of the same page." This quality is perhaps the most important one in units that function well.

To cause you to think about leadership and help you organize your thoughts, write a short essay (approximately 750 words) on <u>one</u> of the following:

a. **Your philosophy of leadership**. Some of the key areas you might discuss include:

1. Your definition of leadership.

2. Why a leadership philosophy is important.

3. The character traits that you consider to be most important and why.

4. Your concept of "What's really important" about your job.

5. Your vision of how a well-led unit should behave.

6. Principles of leadership that you consider particularly important and why.

b. **A fictional story about a Marine leader in combat.** Discuss his character traits (both good and bad) and his military competence, relating them to why he succeeded or failed.

c. **A case study, from personal knowledge,** of an event that showed either exceptional leadership ability or significant leadership failure.

d. **An essay about a leader whom you know personally and hold in high regard.** Describe his leadership style, character, and what makes him successful.

e. **An essay about a leader who either succeeded or failed in combat,** describing his qualities and why he succeeded or failed.

1. You may wish to use the following procedure to write your essay:

a. Start by outlining your essay. First, list all ideas relevant to your topic. Then group similar ideas and organize them in a logical sequence. If you have trouble getting started, you are encouraged to seek help from your senior or the testing officer assigned by your CO. Annex E includes example essays that you may find useful.

b. Write a rough draft using your outline. If you feel your grammar needs improvement, refer to the *principles of writing* or any of the other sources listed in Annex F. Don't worry about perfect spelling or grammar; develop your ideas and get them down on paper. Often, your outline will change once you begin writing your rough draft. The key is to get your ideas down in a draft that can be revised.

c. Review your rough draft. Edit the draft based on the rules of good grammar. Is it written in the active voice? Are your key points properly supported? Are your paragraphs well organized? Are your conclusions logical? Are your sentences complete and your spelling and punctuation correct? You may have to revise your rough draft two or more times to get a smooth draft that you are comfortable with.

d. Type your smooth draft and review it for errors. If you have access to a personal computer or word processor, use it.

e. You are strongly encouraged to have a fellow Marine review and edit your smooth draft. He will find errors that you will miss. Prepare your final draft and check it one last time for errors.

2. Submit your essay to the testing officer assigned by your commanding officer. Your essay must be double-space typed and include a cover sheet like the example on page 133.

3. The testing officer will grade your essay based on the merits of its content. Is your essay relevant to the topic? Is it thoughtful and well-organized? Are the points you make sound and well-supported? Are your conclusions logical? A minimum score of 75 points is needed to pass the course.

4. Your essay will be graded according to the following criteria:

(90-100 points)	**Noteworthy essay.** Content includes innovative ideas that are well-organized and logical. Content is worthy of publication.
(75-89 points)	**Satisfactory essay.** Content is sound and generally well-organized. Conclusions are logical and adequately supported.
(0-74 points)	**Unsatisfactory essay.**

5. **Grammar.** Although not formally evaluated, you should use good grammar. Is your sentence structure correct? Are your spelling and punctuation correct? Did you proofread your work to eliminate typographical errors? If you lack good writing skills, you are encouraged to have your essay edited before submitting it for scoring.

6. Outstanding essays will be published periodically in either a supplement to this course or a professional journal. Keep a copy of your essay. **MCI will not return any essays!**

SAMPLE COVER SHEET

Essay Title

by

Rank, Name, SSN

MCI 7404

Reporting Unit Code (RUC)

Date

Score: _____

ANNEX E

Example Essays

CONCEPT OF COMMAND

by

MAJOR MARK L. BROIN, USMC

As a Second Lieutenant at The Basic School during a leadership class held in the field by a captain, I was taught that in order to be a good leader you need to be firm, fair, consistent, and be yourself. Being a grunt, and as such rather simple minded, anyone who could synthesize all the leadership traits and principles down to four simple words was all right in my book, besides they were easy to remember. These four words are what I have used to guide my leadership development thus far and will continue to use as my guide in the future. What the good captain didn't tell us that day was that these four simple words, once they were properly understood, were quite involved, in fact the more I learned about them the more I realized how much I didn't know. Since my concept of command is based on my concept of leadership, I will attempt, in the following paragraphs, to describe these words as I've come to understand them.

To be firm encompasses a large area of responsibility. You have to be firm in your decisions, wavering as a commander does not inspire confidence from the men that you lead. You have to be firm in your convictions that what your doing is right and that it needs to be done. You need to be firm in the support of your

subordinates both to those above you and to those below them. You need to be firm in the goals that you set, and firm in your desire to achieve them. You need to be firm in the respect that you show those you lead because without them there would be no need for your leadership. You have to be firm in your efforts to preserve the welfare of your men and realize that their ultimate welfare is directly related to how well they and you perform your duties in combat.

Fairness tempers firmness, it is the quality that establishes balance in your efforts to command. Fairness requires that you look at each individual and situation as unique and that you make your judgments and assessments based on that uniqueness. Fairness requires that you provide your best to your men as you expect them to provide their best. Fairness requires that you insure that your command receives that which it needs to perform its responsibilities and that you provide the means to accomplish the tasks that you assign. Fairness means that once you've have an opportunity to lead at a particular level, let your subordinates have the same opportunity when in that position. Fairness means that you let your subordinates grow in an environment that allows them the latitude to thoroughly develop their skills. Fairness means that there is one standard and that standard applies equally to each member of the command. Fairness in applying standards means that they are applied with regard to the individual, his capabilities, and the circumstances. Fairness requires that you remember that you are not perfect.

If fairness is the balance, then consistency is the sinew that holds everything together. Consistency provides your command with temperament, it establishes an evenness that promotes cohesiveness, and a steadiness that enables high achievement. Consistency means that changes are made when needed to improve or correct a situation and not for the sake of change. Consistency requires that standards are set and that the direction is maintained to achieve those standards. Consistency is dependability, the knowledge that an assignment given is an assignment done and a request put forth is a request processed rapidly and positively. Consistency is the knowledge that you will be taken care of because you have been taken care of into the past. Consistency is the unity of command and purpose that enables the improbable to be accomplished. Consistency is steadiness, a confidence in the abilities of the command and the ability to be unwavering under fire.

In order to effectively apply the ideas of firmness, fairness, and consistency, you need to be yourself. This requirement is what will establish your creditability, it makes you both accessible and believable. It enables you to be consistent and establishes your command on a real basis, not on some assumed role. The key to being yourself is knowing yourself, identifying your strong and weak points and then working to improve the deficient areas. Being yourself requires confidence in your strengths and in your ability to overcome your weaknesses. Being yourself allows you

to transition from situation to situation comfortably and consistently without adjusting your style to the new role. It prevents embarrassment should your real self slip out and shows that perfection is something you are striving for and have not already received. Your self is who you are most comfortable with, and comfort leads to confidence and confidence is infectious.

Firmness, fairness, consistency, and being yourself--four simple easy words to remember--but contained in each word is an extensive range of leadership qualities that keep growing with each leadership experience. A concept of command based on these ideas will provide for the welfare of the command, inspire confidence, and enable mission accomplishment.

LEADERSHIP, IN THE REAR WITH THE GEAR

by

GySgt R. A. Gatling

MCI 7404

RUC 54900

23 Feb 90

While most studies of leadership are focused within the confines of the infantry community, those leaders in the rear should not be slighted. For how could the O-3's operate without their beans, bullets, and bandaids. Now, with rear areas providing their own security and defense, the maintenance shop chiefs, communications officers, supply NCO's et al must be proficient not only in their MOS but in the art of war as well.

During a field exercise with a LAAM Bn headquarters element, the successes and failures of leadership were evidenced daily. The Bn, along with it's mission of air defense, was also tasked with providing its own security. Security for the Bn was placed in the hands of a Warrant Officer selected for his past experience and recent completion of a wing sponsored rear area security school. Two SNCO's, also alumni of RAS, assisted him as his SNCOIC and react team chief.

This was the first leadership failure. The failure was in the lack of knowledge of the security force leadership. The knowledge of the job at hand that these three possessed was for the most part that of the superficialities learned at RAS.

The react team was manned by members of a LAAD Bn resupply detachment. Team members stood OP/LP watches, conducted patrols as well as serving as the reactionary force for the compound. This was in addition to their regular duties as radio watchstanders and resupply drivers. After the third day of the operation, probes by opposing forces occurred at least once a night with a corresponding call-up of the react team. Though always tired the team members remained motivated through the force of will of the team leader.

This was successful leadership. Though not thoroughly trained for his job, his character kept the team motivated.

On the eighth night, after the third call for the react team the team leader did not rush off to his assigned position. Fatigue caused by the events of the last week had exhausted him. Team members did not rush to their positions but waited for the team leader to move first though all members knew the drill and where to report.

This was a leadership failure. The leader's will had failed. It was his strength of will that kept the unit cohesive. When his will failed, the unit ceased to function.

The biggest hindrance to successful leadership during the exercise was the competence of the leaders once outside their respective MOS. In many instances strength of character was present, but this alone is not sufficient for successful leadership. The exercise pointed out the need for training for non-grunts in the art of being a grunt. Unfortunately the experiences of the field did not initiate the type of training to address the problems encountered.

Audacity: The 15th Leadership Trait

by

SSgt J. D. Martin

MCI 7404

Reporting Unit Code 54900

2 March 1990

"Hard pressed on my right. My center is yielding. Impossible to maneuver. Situation excellent. I am attacking!"

Ferdinand Foch: Message to Marshal Jofre, Battle of the Marne, 1914.

"Never forget that no military leader has ever become great without audacity."

Clausewitz: Principles of War, 1812

"Audacity, audacity again, and audacity always!" ("De l'audace, encore de l'audace, et toujours de l'audace!")

George Danton, 1792

I have heard, on more than one occasion, Marines suggest that if, given the opportunity, they would see to it that Tact was removed as one of the Fourteen Leadership Traits. But, I have rarely heard them say what trait would take its place!

I do not propose to eliminate any of the Fourteen Traits. They have served our Corps well and there is a place for all of them. However, I would add the Trait of Audacity and it would be of no small consequence that it would alphabetically head the list of traits.

We pay a lot of lip service to delegating authority to the lowest levels of command, but do we also delegate to those levels the freedom to make bold decisions? I think that all too often we want our subordinate leaders to make decisions that don't "rock the boat."

If we are nurturing and bringing up our young Marines the right way -- the way that will win the next war -- strong emphasis must be placed on making bold, even desperate, decisions during desperate situations. We owe it to ourselves and our troops to spend as much time talking about, and more importantly, thinking about the Trait of Audacity as we spend on other Traits.

There is a Danish proverb that says the bold are always lucky. We could easily replace "bold" with "audacious" and not lose anything in the process. When analyzed, that proverb shows us that no one is inherently lucky, but rather, they create their own luck by being audacious. By making bold decisions in the face of

adversity, we create friction for our enemy. One of the objects of maneuver warfare is to create more friction of the enemy than he creates for us. Thus, it is essential that we and our subordinates be daring and bold, constantly doing things the enemy does not expect and thereby breaking his will to fight.

Since the majority of us are not combat-tested Marines, I think it is important to keep in mind what General George S. Patton, Jr., wrote to Cadet George S. Patton, III, USMA, on 6 June 1944. General Patton wrote, "All men are timid on entering any fight whether it is the first fight or the last fight. All of us are timid. Cowards are those who let their timidity get the better of their manhood." We overcome timidity and its by-product, cowardice, by training ourselves and our Marines to be Audacious!

ANNEX F

Aids to Effective Writing

1. The following is a list of references you may find helpful in completing the course writing requirement:

a. MCI 7204 *Professional Communications* (Chapter Four *Basic Principles of Writing* is included in this annex.

b. MCI 01.18 *Spelling*.

c. MCI 0119 *Punctuation*.

d. *The Elements of Style*, by William Strunk and E. B. White.

e. *Harbrace College Handbook*, by John C. Hodges and Mary E. Whitten.

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF WRITING

SECTION I. GETTING TO THE POINT

101. INTRODUCTION

a. Timid writing creeps up on the most important information. First come references, then follows a discussion, and finally the "so-what." With luck, the main point follows a sign such as *therefore*, *consequently*, or *due to the above*. Even with such a signal, readers must grope for the meaning, which is rarely at the bottom but somewhere near there. This slow buildup isn't chaotic; it is the way that writers inform themselves. But this pattern isn't efficient. From the reader's perspective, it is the clue-by-clue pattern of mystery stories.

b. Your writing should follow the newspaper pattern. Open with the most important information and taper off to the least important. **Avoid mere chronology.**

102. START FAST, EXPLAIN AS NECESSARY, THEN STOP

a. When you write a letter, think about the one sentence that you would keep if you could keep only one. Many letters are short and simple enough to have such a key sentence. It should appear by the end of the first paragraph. The strongest letter highlights the main point in a one-sentence paragraph at the very beginning. **Put requests before justifications, answers before explanations, conclusions before details, and the general before the specific.**

b. You've probably seen this first in endorsements and official biographies. Endorsements usually start by concurring or not concurring, while biographies usually start by giving the senior official's present duties.

c. Sometimes, as in a complex proposal or a reply to various questions, you may have many key points. They would overload the first paragraph if you tried to put them all there. In these cases, start with a general statement of purpose, as directives do.

d. Here are some good beginnings:

> *The Engineering Department was inspected on 24 January 1983. Its overall performance was satisfactory. Special-interest areas were satisfactory.*

An earlier version of the inspection report buried the information of greatest interest to readers--the results--on the second page. It opened with references, the inspection's scope, and detailed findings. By the way, inspection reports and other documents whose topics vary widely are especially suited to headings. They allow readers to see the structure at a glance.

> *We request authorization to hire a full-time clerk typist or reassign a yeoman from the word-processing center.*
>
> *In January 1983, our typing workload increased because of....*

A lesser writer might have combined the two paragraphs above. Or he might have started with the second paragraph and delayed the request for authorization until the end. **Remember to keep your first paragraphs short, to use one-sentence paragraphs occasionally for special emphasis, and avoid chronology.**

This memorandum summarizes how we are planning the first step toward the goal of reorganizing the Naval Air Reserve.

The memorandum developed a series of complex points that would have come too fast if they had appeared in the top paragraph, so the writer wisely began with a general statement of purpose. Should he have begun with "*The purpose of this memorandum is to summarize ...*"? Strictly speaking, the added words are unnecessary, but they leave no doubt that a key idea is about to follow.

> *We're moving toward a more modern style of writing in the Department of the Navy, and I want the Secretariat to get there first. You'll find that style amply illustrated in the next presentations of the Naval Writing Course. Please try to attend if you haven't already, and urge your people to do the same.*

The Under Secretary of the Navy might have begun with details about dates, times, and places for the writing course. However, readers might have yawned and put the letter aside before getting to his endorsement of the program. The first paragraph was uncommonly personal so that senior SECNAV officials would give the letter special attention.

> *LCpl John Smith did a superb job during our recent engine change.*

This is the first sentence of a thank-you letter to Smith's supervisor. Notice that it avoids a slow buildup. The second paragraph described Smith's long hours, careful trouble-shooting, and determined search for parts. The last paragraph read, "*Please thank LCpl Smith for all his extra effort.*" This three-paragraph formula will keep your thank-you letters short, detailed and focused on the person being praised.

e. Delay you main point to soften bad news or to introduce a controversial proposal. But don't do this routinely. Like listeners, readers are put off by people who take forever to get to the point. In most cases, plunge right in.

f. To end most letters, just stop. When writing to persuade rather than just to inform, you may want to end strongly -- with a forecast, appeal, or implication. When feelings are involved, you may want to exit gracefully -- with an expression of good will. When in doubt, offer your help or the name of a contact.

103. DOWNPLAY REFERENCES

a. Reading slows with every glance from the text to the reference caption. Justify such distractions by using only those references that bear directly on the subject at hand. **Avoid unnecessary or complicated references.** Many letters need no references at all while others are complete with a reference to only the latest communication in a series. Reading letters that overuse references is like driving in reverse through alphabet soup.

b. When you respond to an earlier communication, subordinate it to your main point. Don't waste the opening, the strongest place in a letter, by merely summarizing a reference or saying you received or reviewed something.

Examples: Reference (a), inter alia, recommended the reestablishing of training in the field of transportation management. Reinstitution of this training is strongly supported.

Revised: We strongly support the recommendation in reference (a) to reestablish transportation management training.

This is in reply to your conversation with Captain Jones on 1 August wherein you requested a copy of the Hazardous Substances Plan (HSP). A copy of the HSP is enclosed.

Revised: Here's the Hazardous Substances Plan that you requested from Captain Jones on 1 August.

c. Be sure to mention in the text any reference cited in the reference block. List references in the reference block by following the order of their appearance in the text.

104. AVOID MOST NOTAL REFERENCES

a. A NOTAL -- not to all -- reference is a document that some or all addressees neither hold nor need. Work to cite directives, correspondence, and messages which all addressees have. Some alternatives to NOTAL references are these:

(1) If the action addressee lacks a document, either send it as an enclosure, or refer to it very generally in the text; for example, "CNO has asked us for..." might replace a NOTAL reference to a CNO message.

(2) If a *copy to* or *via addressee* lacks a document and needs it, list it as a normal reference. On all copies add a note such as *w/ref(b)* to the right of the addressee you send it to.

b. If a NOTAL reference is unavoidable, add *NOTAL* in parentheses (NOTAL) following the citation in the reference block.

105. USE SHORT PARAGRAPHS

a. Long paragraphs swamp ideas. Cover one topic completely before starting another, and let a topic take several paragraphs if necessary. But keep paragraphs short, down to roughly four or five sentences. Long paragraphs will divide where your thinking takes a turn. By adding white space, you make reading easier.

b. Short paragraphs are especially important at the start of letters. Long first paragraphs discourage reading.

c. Call attention to lists of items or instructions by displaying them is subparagraphs. But don't use so many levels of subparagraphs that the writing becomes hard to follow.

d. Now and then use a one-sentence paragraph to highlight an important idea.

106. TAKE ADVANTAGE OF TOPIC SENTENCES

a. A paragraph may need a topic sentence, which is a generalization explained by the rest of the paragraph. The decision to use a topic sentence is your judgment call. A short paragraph announcing the time, place, and agenda of a meeting might begin with "*Here are details about the meeting.*" Such a topic sentence may not be necessary because readers can follow the writer's thinking without it.

b. If you are writing a report on ways to protect a particular naval facility from attack, your ideas are complex, and the evidence needed to make them clear and convincing is considerable. So your paragraphs are likely to be longer. Use more topic sentences than is the case in letters. Here's a model:

> *Because so much of the complex borders the river, its waterfront is especially vulnerable to attack. The naval station and the shipyard next to it have 1.5 miles of waterfront on the river's north bank. Together they have 13 dry docks and piers. Two piers are used to load fuel. Most of the piers extend to within 100 yards of the center of the river's main ship channel, and the river itself is only 900 yards at it widest.*

The first sentence of the sample gives the paragraph a bull's eye. Because we know early where the facts are headed, the paragraph inspires confidence. A lesser writer might have left out the topic sentence or put it elsewhere in the paragraph or claimed more than the facts support. Be alert to the advantages of topic sentences, for they help shape masses of information. Without them, some paragraphs make readers shrug and say, "*So?*"

c. The topic sentence of a paragraph is like the main point of a letter; both give general statements that you later develop. However, a short and simple letter you could write as one unbroken paragraph should still be divided for ease of reading.

107. WRITE DISCIPLINED SENTENCES

a. So far in this section on organized writing, you have covered structuring letters and paragraphs, so they call attention to important ideas. Now, here are a few important ways to avoid sentences that are unclear: Subordinate minor ideas, place ideas deliberately, use more parallelism, and try some mini-sentences.

b. **Subordinate minor ideas.** Besides clarifying the relationship between ideas, subordination prevents the overuse of *and*, the weakest of all conjunctions.

Examples: The revised housing allowance tables, which have been mailed to all pay offices, are effective 1 October. (stresses date)

Revised: The revised housing allowance tables, which are effective 1 Oct, have been mailed to all pay offices. (stresses mailing)

The naval station exchange uses a similar contractor service and saves its patrons about 15 percent.

Revised: By using a similar contractor service, the naval station exchange saves its patrons about 15 percent.

c. **Place ideas deliberately.** Start and finish a sentence any way you like, but remember that ideas gain emphasis when they appear at either end. To mute an idea, put it in the middle.

Examples: It has been determined that **moving** the computer as shown in enclosure (1) would allow room for **another cabinet** to be installed.

Revised: **Moving** the computer as shown in enclosure (1) would allow room for **another cabinet.**

I would like to **congratulate** you on your selection as our **Sailor of the Month** for August.

Revised: **Congratulations** on your selection as our August **Sailor of the Month.**

We may have to retire the ships **faster** if more major structural problems arise. (faster retirement muted)

Revised: If more major structural problems arise, we may have to retire the ships **faster.** (faster retirement stressed)

d. **Use more parallelism.** Look for opportunities to arrange two or more equally important ideas so they look equal. Parallelism saves words, clarifies ideas, and provides balance. Go by the first words of the series; all should be the same part of speech.

Examples: Their position is that the symposium is a forum for the dissemination of information and is not intended to establish standards.

Revised: Their position is that the symposium is a forum for **sharing** information and not **setting** standards.

Effective 1 October, addressees will be required to utilize the cost accounts contained in enclosure (1). Addressees will cease reporting against cost accounts 1060, 2137, and 2340.

Revised: On 1 October, **start** using the cost accounts in enclosure (1) and **stop** using cost accounts 1060, 2137, and 2340.

e. **Try some mini-sentences.** An occasional sentence of six words or less slows down readers and emphasizes ideas. This principle is illustrated in the following example from a general's memo to his staff.

Example: I can get more information if each of you gives me less. **Here's why.** In a week, about 110 staff actions show up in my in-box. I could handle that in a week if all I did was work in the in-box. Yet 70% of my time in the headquarters goes not to the in-box, but to briefings. I could handle that dilemma, too--by listening to briefings and thinking about staff papers at the same time. **I don't.**

SECTION II. NATURAL WRITING

201. INTRODUCTION

a. Make your writing as formal or informal as the situation requires, but use language that you might use in speaking. This doesn't mean to copy every quirk of speech down to grunts and ramblings. Granted, some people don't speak very well but because readers hear writing, the most readable writing sounds like people talking to people.

b. A spoken style means fewer changes each time you write. It also means less adjustment for new personnel, who find the old style increasingly foreign. You probably remember your own difficulty in getting used to roundabout writing.

c. To make your writing more like speaking, begin by imagining your reader is sitting across from your desk. If you are writing to many different people but none in particular, picture one typical reader. Then write with personal pronouns, everyday words, and short sentences--the best of speaking.

202. USE PERSONAL PRONOUNS

a. Though you needn't go out of your way to use personal pronouns, you mustn't go out of your way to avoid them. Avoiding natural references to people is false modesty. Whether you sign with "*by direction*" or a title, follow these principles:

(1) Speak of your activity, command, or office as *we, us, our.* These words are the conventions of modern writing that prevent much roundabout language.

(2) Use *you*, stated or implied, to refer to the reader.

(3) Use *I, me, my* less often, usually in correspondence which the commanding officer signs and then only to show special concern or warmth.

b. Multiplied across an entire letter, roundabout sentences like those in the next examples do severe damage. We would be laughed out of the room if we talked that way. Ordinary English is shorter, clearer, and just as official:

Examples: It is necessary that the material be received in this office by 10 June.

Revised: **We** need the material by 10 June. (or)

The material must reach **us** by 10 June.

Conceivably funding constraints for POM 86 will exceed in severity the financial scarcities of POM 85.

Revised: **We** may have less money to work with in POM 86 than in POM 85.

The Naval Facilities Engineering Command, by reference (a), forwarded its draft master plan for the Washington Navy Yard to the Naval Supply Systems Command for review and comment. The following comments apply.

Revised: In response to reference (a), here are **our** comments on **your** draft master plan for the Washington Navy Yard.

c. *It is* and *this command* complicate the next example. They force readers to put back the pronouns the writer took out. To make matters worse, the first *it is* refers to the reader, while the second refers to the sender.

Example: If **it is** desired that Marines be allowed to compete for positions on the pistol team, **this command** would be happy to establish and manage team tryouts. **It is** recommended that tryouts be conducted soon to ensure....

Revised: If **you** allow Marines to compete for positions on the pistol team, **we** would be happy to establish and manage the tryouts. **We** recommend that tryouts start soon to ensure....

d. Can you overuse personal pronouns? You can use so many pronouns that you obscure the subject; no number of them will overcome confused thinking. Besides, some subjects don't lend themselves to pronouns. The description of a ship's structure, for example, isn't likely to include people. Criticism also hurts fewer feelings if it is delivered impersonally. "Nothing has been done" avoids the direct attack of "**You** have done nothing."

e. If *we* or *I* opens more than two sentences in a row, the writing becomes monotonous and may suggest self-centeredness. Sometimes a single sentence can call too much attention to the reader: "Congratulations on the fine job **you** did."

f. Stressing the readers' interests is a matter of attitude more than pronouns, but pronouns contribute. "The help **you** receive" suggests more concern for readers than "the help **we** provide." If you are sensitive to the difference, you are more likely to meet your reader's needs.

203. TALK TO ONE READER WHEN WRITING TO MANY

a. When writing to many addressees but none of them in particular **talk directly to a typical group of readers or, better, one typical reader**. Use *you* and *your*, stated or implied. Only one person reads your writing at any one time, so the most readable writing speaks directly to one reader.

Examples: **All addressees** are requested to provide inputs of desired course contents.

Revised: Please send us **your** recommendations for course content.

It is requested that **all personnel** planning to take leave in December fill in the enclosed schedule.

Revised: If **you** plan to take leave in December, fill in the enclosed schedule.

b. When you write directives, look for opportunities to talk directly to a user. Procedures, checklists, or other how-to instructions lend themselves to this cookbook approach. Imagine someone has walked up to you and asked what to do. The following example is from a notice that repeated *the duty officer* dozens of times:

Example: **The duty officer** will verify that security responsibilities have been completed by putting **his/her** initials in the checklist.

Revised: When **you** complete the inspection, initial the checklist.

This course talks directly to you, a typical user. The sentences that give directions lead with verbs; *you* is simply implied. This direct approach requires imagination more than technical skill. Think of writing not as words on a page but as speaking from a distance.

204. RELY ON EVERYDAY WORDS

a. The complexity of your work and the need for precision require some big words. But don't use big words when you can use little words. People who speak with small words often let needlessly fancy ones burden their writing. On paper *help* swells to *assistance*, *pay* to *remuneration*, and *visit* to *visitation*. The list goes on, and so does the damage from word inflation.

b. Do you remember the dude in those old Western movies who overdressed to impress the folks at the ranch? Overdressed writing fails just as foolishly. Here are some commonly overdressed words.

Not	But
commence	start
facilitate	help
optimum	best
promulgate	issue
utilize	use

c. Use short, spoken transitions instead of long, bookish ones. Save long transitions for variety. By using short ones, you help set an ordinary tone for the rest of what you say.

Bookish	Spoken
consequently	so
however	but
in addition	also
nevertheless	still

And you can start sentences with conjunctions such as *but*, *so*, *yet*, *and*.

d. Avoid the needless complications of legalistic lingo. Let a directive's number or a letter's signature carry the authority. You risk committing bloated bombast by trying to put that authority in your language. **Write to express not to impress.**

Legalistic	Normal
aforesaid	the, that
heretofore	until now
herewith is	here is
notwithstanding	in spite of
the undersigned	I

All writers try to impress readers. The best do it through language that doesn't call attention to itself. Size of vocabulary is less important than skill in manipulating the words that you already know.

205. USE SOME CONTRACTIONS

a. Contractions link pronouns with verbs (*we'd, I'll, you're*) and make verbs negative (*don't, can't, won't*). They are appropriate in less formal writing situations. Yet even when your final product is very formal, you can use contractions in drafts to help you write naturally. Limit contractions to negative verbs because research shows that readers are less likely to skip over *not* when it is contracted.

b. The point is that if you are comfortable with contractions, your writing is likely to read easily, for you will be speaking on paper. And because the language is clear, you are more likely to spot holes in your thinking that you need to fill.

c. If contractions seem out of place, you may need to deflate the rest of what you say. In the next sentence, something has to go, either the opening contraction or the inflated language that follows: "It's incumbent upon all personnel to effect energy savings." Written naturally, the sentence might read "It's your job to save energy."

206. KEEP SENTENCES SHORT

a. For variety, mix long sentences and short tones, but average under twenty words. Though short sentences won't guarantee clarity, they are usually less confusing than long ones. You needn't count every word, Try the eye test: average under two typed lines. Or try the ear test: read your writing aloud, and break up most of the sentences that don't end in one breath.

b. Break long sentences into manageable units. Then delete needless words and ideas.

Example: It is requested that attendees be divided between the two briefing dates with the understanding that any necessary final adjustment will be made by OP-96 to facilitate equitable distribution. (29 words)

It is requested that attendees be divided between the two briefing dates. Any necessary final adjustments will be made by OP-96 to facilitate equitable distribution. (12, 13 words)

Send half your people on one day and half on the other. Op-96 will make final adjustments. (12, 5 words)

207. ASK MORE QUESTIONS

A request gains emphasis when it ends with a question mark. Look for opportunities to reach out to your reader:

Examples: Request this command be notified as to whether the conference has been rescheduled.

Instead: Has the conference been rescheduled?

In an effort to improve the cost of office copier operation, it is requested your firm complete the attached form relating to office copiers which you would propose to rent/lease.

Instead: Would you let us know on the accompanying form what you charge to rent and lease your copiers?

208. BE CONCRETE

a. Without generalizations and abstractions, lots of them, we would drown in detail. We sum up vast amounts of experience when we speak of dedication, programs, hardware, and lines of authority. But such broad language isn't likely to evoke in a reader's mind the same experiences that it evokes in a writer's. Lazy writing overuses such vague terms. Often it weakens them further by substituting adjectives for examples: immense dedication, enhanced programs, viable hardware, and responsive lines of authority.

b. If you write, "*The solution to low morale and poor discipline is a good leader,*" your readers may feel warm all over. But until you point out some specific behavior meant by **low morale, poor discipline,** and **good leadership**, neither you nor your readers can tackle the problem.

c. Similarly, don't use a general word if the context allows for a specific one. Be as definite as the situation permits.

For	Try
aircraft	plane
plane	F-18
improved costs	lower costs
enhanced method	faster method? cheaper?

d. Vague, high-sounding language weakens job descriptions. Someone is said to "assist and advise in the organization management aspects of manpower management." Another "serves as a system proponent to transition from current capabilities to architectural projections." but what do these people really do? After all, a person who "serves as a direct interface with interstate commerce" may be only a highway flag holder.

e. Performance evaluation (Fitness Reports) suffer when writers make extravagant, unsupported claims.

> *Engaged in a technical assignment of a highly complex and technical nature, Sgt Smith has molded on-the-job experience, diligence, and perseverance to a point where his seniors and supervisors can inevitably afford credence to his work and the conclusions he derives therefrom.*

Communication, someone once said, is never having to say, "*Huh?*" Effective evaluations show what a person did and how well he did it. They are concrete enough to inspire confidence in the writer's judgment about the performance and potential of the person being rated.

209. LISTEN TO YOUR TONE

a. Tone, a writer's attitude toward the subject or readers, causes relatively few problems in routine letters. The rules are straightforward. Subordinates may suggest, request, or recommend, but only superiors may direct. And though pronouns are acceptable, you don't "get personal." Courtesy is required, warmth is not. The tone is neutral.

b. Because much of your writing is routine, tone causes problems when the matter is delicate. The more sensitive the reader or issue, the more careful you must be to promote good will. Tactlessness in writing suggests clumsiness in general. When feelings are involved, one misused word can make an enemy.

c. Imagine that you are the head of a government agency. What do you think of an organization that would send the next sentences?

> *At our last meeting you requested agenda topics for a meeting of the Committee on Atmosphere and Oceans. I certainly support this interagency grouping as it may serve as an appropriate forum for addressing our marine technology needs and concerns.*

The first sentence is just lazy, because it does no more than repeat the request. The real trouble comes from the second sentence, whose attempt at good will backfires. *Certainly* is a needless intensifier, like many words ending in-*ly*. *Interagency grouping* is pompous for *group*. *Needs and concerns* form a doubling. *I certainly support this* is undermined by *it may serve*. *May* serve? The issue isn't whether the group should exist, but what it should discuss. The admiral who signed the letter dropped the second sentence and made the first one do more work:

> *As you requested, I am submitting some agenda topics for the meeting of the Committee on Atmosphere and Oceans.*

d. Now imagine you have asked for more time to complete a correspondence course. Here is the last sentence of the letter that turns you down:

> *If we can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to write.*

Beware of rubber-stamp endings. They don't improve good letters or save bad ones. To the reader whose request has been denied, *further assistance* promises further disappointment. The closing sentence should be dropped entirely or tied to the rest of the letter:

> *This setback aside, we hope you will take advantage of other correspondence courses available to you.*

In all fairness to the writer, the letter did explain the denial in enough detail to avoid any hint of a brush-off. Most *no*-answers need some explanation. *Yes*-answers need little explanation because readers get what they want.

e. Finally, imagine you are a reservist who has asked to stay on active duty even though you have a serious illness. How does this answer strike you?

> *Because you have failed to pass the prescribed physical examination, you will be removed from activity duty.*

> Failed? Removed? These words hint at crime and punishment. To avoid such tactlessness, the writer should have been positive.

Negative	Positive
Opportunity is limited.	Competition is keen.
Stop writing badly.	Start writing well.
Don't use the small hoist.	Use the big hoist.
The cup is half empty.	The cup is half full.

The positive approach removes some of the sting from the Reservist's answer. Here are two possibilities:

Given the results of your physical examination, we must transfer you to the Retired Reserve.

In light of your physical examination and the need to administer the examination program evenhandedly, we have decided in favor of your transfer to the Retired Reserve.

The structure of the letter was better than the wording of the "failed" sentence. The letter opened by acknowledging the favorable endorsements that accompanied the request to stay on active duty, and it closed by thanking the reservist for his years of service. This tactful arrangement helped to soften the bad news.

SECTION III. COMPACT WRITING

301. INTRODUCTION

a. Give your ideas no more words than they deserve. The longer you take to say things, the weaker you come across and the more you risk blurring important ideas.

b. Economy requires the right attitude. You must suspect wordiness in everything you write. When you revise, tighten paragraphs to sentences, sentences to clauses, clauses to phrases, phrases to words, words to pictures--or strike the ideas entirely. To be easy on your readers, you must be hard on yourself. To help you hunt for wordiness, here are some common problems that are easy to spot and avoid.

302. AVOID THE EXPLETIVES: "IT IS" AND "THERE IS"

a. No two words hurt writing more than *it is*. They stretch sentences, delay meaning, hide responsibility, and encourage passive verbs. Unless *it* refers to something mentioned earlier, avoid *it is*. Spare only natural expressions such as "*it is* time to..." or "*it is* hard to..." and an occasional pointing expression such as "*it is* your job to..."(not someone else's).

Not	But
it is requested	we request, please
it is my intention	I intend
it is necessary that you	you need to, you must
it is apparent that	clearly
it is the recommendation of this office that	we recommend

Examples: It is mandatory that all active-duty personnel receive flu vaccinations.

Revised: All active-duty personnel must receive flu vaccinations.

It is requested that upon departure of the ship from the shipyard, all badges be surrendered.

Revised: When the ship leaves the shipyard, please return all badges.

b. Like *it is*-constructions, forms of *there is* make sentences start slowly. Don't write these expletives without first trying to avoid them.

Examples: **There will** be a meeting of the Human Relations Council at 1000 on 26 July in the main conference room.

Revised: The Human Relations Council will meet at 1000 on 26 July in the main conference room.

There are two alternatives offered in the report.

Revised: The report offers two alternatives.

303. PRUNE WORDY EXPRESSIONS

a. Wordy expressions don't give writing impressive bulk, they clutter it by getting in the way of the words that carry the meaning. *In order* to and *in accordance with*, for example, are minor ideas that don't deserve three words. Here are some repeat offenders.

Not	But
for the purpose of	for, to
in accordance with	by, following, per, under
in order to	to
in the event that	if
in the near future	soon
be advised	-
in the process of	-
is responsible for	-
the provisions of	-
the use of	-

b. Wordy expressions dilute the next examples:

Examples: **In accordance with** reference (b), you may pay the claim with a check **in the amount of** $300.

Revised: **Under** reference (b), you may pay the claim with a check **for** $300.

In the event that this offer is satisfactory, **be advised** your written acceptance must reach us before May 11.

Revised: If this offer is satisfactory, write us before May 11.

We are **in the process of** revising our form letters **in order** to make them more readable.

Revised: We are revising our forms letters **to** make them more readable.

304. FREE ANY SMOTHERED VERBS

a. The most important word in a sentence is the verb, the action word, the only word that can do something. Weak writing relies on general verbs, which take extra words to complete their meaning. When you write a general verb such as *make* or *is*, check to see if you can turn a nearby word into a verb.

b. Let your verbs do more work:

Examples: This directive **is applicable** to all personnel who **make use of** the system.

Revised: This directive **applies** to all personnel who **use** the system.

The committee **held a meeting** to **give consideration to** the proposal.

Revised: The committee **met** to **consider** the proposal.

We will **conduct an investigation into** the matter before **making a decision.**

Revised: We will **investigate** the matter before **deciding.**

305. SPLICE DOUBLINGS

a. As the writer, you may see some differences between *advise* and *assist*, *interest* and *concern*, or *thanks* and *gratitude*. But your readers won't. Repeating a general idea can't make it any more precise.

b. Simple subtraction will overcome doublings such as these:

Examples: We must comply with the **standards and criteria** for **controlling and reducing** environmental pollution.

Revised: We must comply with the **standards** for reducing environmental pollution.

The Department of the Navy has developed plans for an **orderly and integrated** system of **executive and management** advancement.

Revised: The Department of the Navy has developed plans for a system of **executive** advancement.

306. DON'T USE THE "-ION OF" AND THE "-MENT OF"

a. Words ending in *-ion* and *-ment* are verbs turned into nouns. Whenever the context permits, change these words to verb forms.

b. By favoring verb forms, your sentences will be shorter and livelier.

Examples: Use that format **for the preparation of** your command history.

Revised: Use that format **to prepare** your command history.

The settlement of travel claims involves **the examination of** orders.

Revised: **Settling** traveling claims involves **examining** orders.

The development of an effective system depends on three factors.

Revised: **Developing** an effective system depends on three factors.

307. PREVENT "HUT-2-3-4" PHRASES

a. Though you should cut needless words, sometimes you can go too far. Avoid "hut-2-3-4" phrases, long clots of nouns and modifiers. Readers can't tell how the parts fit together or where they will end.

b. We must live with some established "hut-2-3-4" phrases such as *standard subject identification codes* for *subject codes*, but you can keep them out of whatever you originate by adding some words or rewriting entirely.

Examples: **The Board of Inspection and Survey service acceptance** trials requirements

Revised: requirements **by** the Board of Inspection and Survey **for** service acceptance trials

approved air defense operations manual position reporting system

Revised: approved system **for** manually reporting positions **during** air defense operations(?)

an active driver improvement safety training program

Revised: a driver improvement program

308. AVOID EXCESSIVE USE OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

a. Excessive abbreviating is false economy. Use abbreviations no more than you must with insiders and avoid them entirely with outsiders. Spell out an unfamiliar abbreviation the first time it appears, like this:

Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC)

b. If an abbreviation appears only twice or infrequently, spell out the term every time and avoid the abbreviation entirely. Put clarity before economy.

SECTION IV. ACTIVE WRITING

401. INTRODUCTION

Doctor: When did you first notice your use of verbs in the passive voice?

Patient: The utilization was first noticed by me shortly after the Navy was entered. The Marine Corps has been joined by my brother. The same condition has been remarked on by him.

Doctor: Did you know that most of the verbs we speak with are active? So are most of the verbs in newspaper and magazines, the kinds of writing we like to read.

Patient: Well, it is believed by me that most verbs are made passive by military writers. In the letters and directives that have been prepared by this speaker, passive verbs have been utilized extensively. Are problems caused?

Yes, problems are caused. Or, rather, passives cause problems. They make writing wordy, roundabout, and sometimes downright confusing. To avoid this infectious disease, learn how to spot passive verbs and make them active. Most of your sentences should use a **who-does-what** order. By leading with the doer, you automatically avoid a passive verb.

Passive: The ship was inspected by the skipper.
Active: The skipper inspected the ship.

If you hear the unnatural sound of the patient's passives and know to lead with doers, don't read any further. But the following technical discussion may be helpful.

202. LEARN THE SYMPTOMS OF PASSIVE VOICE

a. A verb in the passive voice uses any form of *to be* plus the past participle of a main verb:

am *is* *are* *was* *were* *be* *being* *been*

PLUS

a main verb usually ending in *-en* or *-ed*

Examples: is given
were saved
have been taken
was being underscored

b. Unlike sentences with active verbs, sentences with passives don't need to show who or what has done the verb's action. If a doer appears at all, it follows the verb. But most passives in writing just imply the doer, sometimes a severe problem, when the context doesn't make the doer clear.

Examples: As a result of what has *been learned* it *is desired* that additional equipment testing *be made*.

(*Be made* is passive. The past participle of *to make* is irregular.)

Two units of blood *were ordered* for an emergency patient whose hematocrit had fallen below 20 percent.

(*Had fallen* is active. *Had* isn't a form of *to be*. And what did the falling? Hematocrit, which appears before the verb.)

We are used to working with equipment that has been available locally.

(*Are used* ends in an adjective. If you don't miss the doer when none appears, you don't have a passive. *Been available* ends in a less misleading adjective.)

403. KNOW THE THREE CURES

a. **Put a doer before the verb:**

Examples: The part must have been broken by the handlers.

Active: The handlers must have broken the part.

The requests will be approved. (By whom?)

Active: (Supervisors?) will approve the requests.

Appropriate clothing will be worn by all personnel.

Active: All personnel will wear appropriate clothing. (or)

Wear appropriate clothing.

b. **Drop part of the verb:**

Examples: The results are listed in enclosure (2).

Active: The results are in enclosure (2).

Then he was transferred to Camp Pendleton.

Active: Then he transferred to Camp Pendleton.

c. **Change the verb:**

Examples: Letter formats are shown in this manual.

Active: Letter formats appear in this manual.

Personnel are prohibited from doing so.

Active: Personnel must not do so.

404. WRITE PASSIVELY ONLY FOR GOOD REASONS

a. Write passively if you have good reason to avoid saying who or what has done the action of the verb. This situation may occur when the doer is unknown, unimportant, obvious, or better left unsaid:

Examples: Presidents are elected every four years.
(doer obvious)

The part was shipped on 1 June.
(doer unimportant, perhaps)

Christmas has been scheduled as a work day.
(doer better left unsaid)

When in doubt, write actively, even though the doer may seem obvious: You will write livelier sentences (not, livelier sentences will be written by you). Now and then you may want to write a passive sentence that names the doer. The situation may occur when you need a transition from one topic to another.

405. PRACTICE ON THESE NEXT EXAMPLES

a. The following paragraph comes from a letter that proposes to expand a scheduled airline ticket office (SATO). Note the passives and try to make them active. Then check yourself against the revision.

During that time period, a total of $644,000 was expended in the issuance of government transportation requests (GTR) for air travel. It is estimated by SATO that an additional $10,000 per month would be generated through casual travel. A summary of the GTR revenue by month is provided in enclosure (1).

Here is a sentence-by-sentence revision of the passive paragraph:

During that time period, a total of $ 644,000 was expended in the issuance of government transportation requests (GTR) for air travel.

We can cut 19 percent from the passive sentence above just by shortening *during that time period* to *during that time* and by omitting *a total of.* No writing has any excuse for not performing such simple subtraction. To avoid the passive *was expended*, we don't have to know who or what did the spending. The core idea is this: "During that time, government transportation requests (GTR) for air travel totaled $644,000." Now the verb carries more of the meaning, $644,000 appears in a stronger place, and the sentence is slimmer by 43 percent.

It is estimated by SATO that an additional $10,000 per month would be generated through casual travel.

This sentence is easy to improve because doers follow both passive verbs. "SATO estimates that casual travel would generate an additional $10,000 per month." Though active now, the sentence still needs work. We can *generate* to *add*, *an additional* to *another*, and *per* to *a*. For clarity, *casual travel* can become *off duty travel.* These small improvements add up: *"SATO estimates that off-duty travel would add another $10,000 a month.*

A summary of the GTR revenue by month is provided in enclosure (1).

Though the sentence would be shorter if we simply dropped *provided*, the weak *is* would remain. Better to reshape the sentence: "Enclosure (1) provides a summary of the GTR revenue by month." But *provides a summary* is a smothered verb for *summarizes*. So the best improvement is this "*Enclosure (1) summarizes the GTR revenue by month.*" Here is the passive original again, followed by the active version:

Passive: During that time period, a total of $644,000 was expended in the issuance of government transportation requests (GTR) for air travel. It is estimated by SATO that an additional $10,000 per month would be generated through casual travel. A summary of the GTR revenue by month is provided in enclosure (1). (50 words)

Active: During that time, government transportation requests (GTR) for air travel totaled $644,000. SATO estimates that off-duty travel would add another $10,000 a month. Enclosure (1) summarizes the GTR revenue by month. (31 words)

b. Passives complicate the simple ideas in this last example, a letter to the Naval Sea Systems Command:

> Enclosure (1) **is forwarded** for review and comment as a concurrence or nonconcurrence with the recommendations of the subject inspection. Only those recommendations requiring NAVSEA action **are forwarded**. Comments **are requested** by 7 June 1982 in order that approval and implementing action can **be taken**. Recommendations will stand as written if concurrence **is** not **provided** by the above date.
>
> Status reports or comments concerning actions completed or in progress **are not to be submitted** at this time. Guidance on status reporting will **be provided** at a later date. (85 words)

The second sentence of the letter is unnecessary. Elsewhere the writing is swollen: *provided* and *submitted* for *sent*, *in order that* for *so*, and *at a later date* for *later*. But the worst damage comes from the seven untouched-by-human-hands passives. They force readers to pause and figure out just who is suppose to do what. Here is an active version:

> *Please concur or nonconcur with the inspection recommendations in enclosure (1). To consider changes to these recommendations, we must have your comments by 7 June 1982.*
>
> *Don't send status reports about actions completed or in progress. Guidance on these will reach you later.* (40 words)

Please, the first word of the active version, is a convention of modern writing and speaking that helps avoid many roundabout constructions. "Please send us two blivets" is far more efficient than "It is requested that two blivets be sent to this command."

c. By doing little more than avoiding passive verbs, the active versions in paragraphs a and b have saved 64 words or 47 percent. A preference for active verbs will produce great savings in typing, reading, filing, and misunderstanding.

SIMPLER WORDS AND PHRASES

Official writing does not demand big words or fat phrases. Go out of your way to use ordinary English. The result will be clearer thinking and shorter writing.

Instead of	Try
a and/or b	a or b or both
accompany	go with
accomplish	carry out, do
accorded	given
accordingly	so
accrue	add, gain
accurate	correct, exact, right
additional	added, more, other
address	discuss
*addressee	you
addressees are requested	(omit), please
adjacent to	next to
advantageous	helpful
adversely impact on	hurt, set back
advise	recommend, tell
afford an opportunity	allow, let
aircraft	plane
allocate	divide, give
anticipate	expect
a number of	some
apparent	clear, plain
appreciable	many
appropriate	(omit), proper, right
approximately	about
arrive onboard	arrive
as a means of	to
ascertain	find out, learn
as prescribed by	in, under
*assist, assistance	aid, help
attain	meet
attempt	try
at the present time	at present, now
be advised	(omit)
benefit	help
by means of	by, with
capability	ability, can
caveat	warning
close proximity	near
combat environment	combat
combined	joint
*commence	begin, start
comply with	follow
component	part
comprise	form, include, makeup
concerning	about, on
consequently	so
consolidate	combine, join, merge
constitutes	is, forms, makes up

Instead of	Try
deem	believe, consider, think
delete	cut, drop
demonstrate	prove, show
depart	leave
designate	appoint, choose, name
desire	want, wish
determine	decide, figure, find
disclose	show
discontinue	drop, stop
disseminate	give, issue, pass, send
due to the fact that	due to, since
during the period	during
effect modifications	make changes
elect	choose, pick
eliminate	cut, drop, end
employ	use
encounter	meet
endeavor	try
ensure	make sure
enumerate	count
equipments	equipment
equitable	fair
equivalent	equal
establish	set up, prove, show
evidenced	showed
evident	clear
exhibit	show
expedite	hasten, speed up
expeditious	fast, quick
expend	spend
expertise	ability, skill
expiration	end
facilitate	ease, help
failed to	didn't
feasible	can be done, workable
females	women
finalize	complete, finish
for a period of	for
for example, ___ etc	for example, such as
forfeit	give up, lose
for the purpose of	for, to
forward	send
frequently	often
function	act, role, work
furnish	give, send
has a requirement for	needs
herein	here

Instead of	Try
contains	has
convene	meet
currently	(omit), now
identical	same
identify	find, name, show
immediately	at once
impacted	affected, changed
*implement	carry out, start
*in accordance with	by, following, per under
in addition	also, besides, too
in an effort to	to
inasmuch as	since
in a timely manner	on time, promptly
inception	start
incumbent upon	must
inform	tell
indicate	show, write down
indication	sign
initial	first
initiate	start
in lieu of	instead of
in order that	for, so
*in order to	to
in regard to	about, concerning, on
inter alia	(omit)
interface with	meet, work with
interpose no objection	don't object
*in the amount of	for
*in the event that	if
in the near future	shortly, soon
in the process of	(omit)
in view of	since
in view of the above	so
is applicable to	applies to
under	
is authorized to	may
is in consonance with	agrees with, follows
is responsible for	(omit), handles
it appears	seems
*it is	(omit)
it is essential	must, need to
it is requested	please, we request, I request
liaison	discussion
limited number	few
limitations	limits
magnitude	size
maintain	keep, support
majority of	most
maximum	greatest, largest, most
methodology	method
minimize	decrease, lessen, reduce
minimum	least, smallest
modify	change
monitor	check, watch
necessitate	cause, need
notify	let know, tell

Instead of	Try
heretofore	until, now
herewith	below, here
however	but
objective	aim, goal
obligate	bind, compel
observe	see
on a __ basis	(omit)
operate	run, use, work
optimum	best, greatest, most
option	choice, way
parameters	limits
participate	take part
perform	do
permit	let
pertaining to	about, of, on
point in time	point, time
portion	part
possess	have, own
practicable	practical
preclude	prevent
previous	earlier, past
previously	before
prioritize	rank
prior to	before
proceed	do, go ahead, try
procure	buy
proficiency	skill
*promulgate	issue, publish
provide	give, offer, say
provide that	if
provides guidance for	guides
purchase	buy
pursuant to	by, following, per,
reflect	say, show
regarding	about, of, on
relative to	about, on
relocate	move
remain	stay
remainder	rest
remuneration	pay, payment
render	give, make
represents	is
request	ask
require	must, need
requirement	need
reside	live
retain	keep
said, some, such	the, this, that
selection	choice
set forth in	in
similar to	like
solicit	ask for, request
state-of-the-art	latest
subject	the, this, your
submit	give, send

Instead of	Try
not later than 10 May,	by 10 May, before 11 May
not later than 1600	by 1600
not withstanding	in spite of, still
numerous	many
take action to	(omit)
task	ask
terminate	end, stop
the month of	(omit)
there are	(omit), exist
therefore	so
therein	there
there is	(omit), exists
thereof	its, their
the undersigned	I
the use of	(omit)
*this activity, command	us, we
timely	prompt
time period	(either one)
transmit	send
-type	(omit)
subsequent	later, next
subsequently	after, later, then
substantial	large, much
successfully complete	complete, pass
sufficient	enough
under the provisions of	under
until such time as	until
*utilize, utilization	use
validate	confirm
viable	practical, workable
vice	instead of, versus
warrant	call for, permit
whereas	because, since
with reference to	about
with the exception of	except for
/	and, or

*U.S. G.P.O.:1994-300-673:106

COURSE EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE

MARINE LEADERSHIP MCI-7404 (1990)

To improve this course, please complete and return this questionnaire to MCI. If you answer "no" to any of the questions, please explain your answer. Include recommendations to improve this course, as appropriate.

1. Do you feel the purpose of this course was fulfilled?

2. Did the text present the material clearly?

3. Was the writing requirement a good way to evaluate you?

4. Was the level of instruction appropriate to your grade and MOS?

5. Additional comments or recommendations. Please be specific.

How many hours did it take for you to complete the course?_____

Please provide the following:

1. Rank:
2. MOS:
3. Current Assignment:

If you have an administrative problem, please use the Student Request/Inquiry Form (MCI R-11K) provided.

STUDENT REQUEST/INQUIRY
MCI - R-11

DATE SENT: _____

COURSE TITLE

COURSE NUMBER

Section 1. Student Identification

RANK INITIALS LAST NAME MOS

SSN REPORTING UNIT CODE (RUC)

MILITARY ADDRESS

INSTRUCTIONS: Print or type name, rank, and address clearly. Include ZIP CODE. Only Class III Reservists may use civilian address.

Section 2. Circle the appropriate number and fill in the appropriate spaces. FOR REGULAR AND CLASS II RESERVE MARINES, THIS FORM MUST BE SIGNED BY THE COMMANDING OFFICER OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE, e.g. TRAINING OFFICER.

1. CHANGE. The following information needs correction:

	From	To
Name	_____	_____
Rank	_____	_____
SSN	_____	_____
RUC	_____	_____

2. MATERIALS. The following materials are needed: Lessons ____ Manual ____ Answer Sheets ____ Other ____

3. EXAM OVERDUE. The last lesson was sent in on _____.

4. MISSING RESULTS. The exam was sent in on _____. (If not received at MCI a new exam will be issued).

5. MISSING DIPLOMA. The course was completed in _____ 19____.

6. EXTEND. (Students are only eligible for one extension prior to their CCD).

7. REENROLL. (Students are only eligible for reenrollment once and only after their CCD. If already reenrolled and disenrolled, a new enrollment must be requested).

8. OTHER (EXPLAIN): _____

NOTE: This form will not be returned by MCI. If the request is valid, the transaction will show on next UAR or on MCI-R-1 Form.

SIGNATURE - TITLE OR RANK
(MUST BE CO. OR REPRESENTATIVE)
ATV _____

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974
(5 U. S. C. 522A)

1. AUTHORITY: Title 5 USC Sec. 301 Use of your Social Security Number is authorized by Executive Order 9397 of 22 Nov 43.

2. PRINCIPLE PURPOSE: The Student Request/Inquiry is used to transmit information concerning student participation in MCI courses.

3. ROUTINE USES: This information is used by MCI personnel to research student inquiries. In some cases information contained therein is used to update individual student records maintained by the Marine Corps Institute.

4. MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE AND EFFECT ON INDIVIDUAL NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION: Disclosure is voluntary. Failure to provide information may result in the provision of incomplete service to your inquiry. Failure to provide your Social Security Number will delay the processing of your inquiry/request.

NO POSTAGE
NECESSARY
IF MAILED
IN THE
UNITED STATES

BUSINESS REPLY MAIL

FIRST CLASS PERMIT NO. 9074 ARLINGTON, VA

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
MARINE CORPS INSTITUTE
ARLINGTON, VA 22223-0001